Three Essays on Corporate Governance and Meeting-Beating or Missing Analyst Forecasts by Rickling, Maria F
Florida International University
FIU Digital Commons
FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations University Graduate School
7-11-2011
Three Essays on Corporate Governance and
Meeting-Beating or Missing Analyst Forecasts
Maria F. Rickling
Florida International University, mrick002@fiu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd
This work is brought to you for free and open access by the University Graduate School at FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact dcc@fiu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rickling, Maria F., "Three Essays on Corporate Governance and Meeting-Beating or Missing Analyst Forecasts" (2011). FIU Electronic
Theses and Dissertations. Paper 438.
http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/438
FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY 
Miami, Florida 
 
 
 
 
THREE ESSAYS ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND MEETING-BEATING OR 
MISSING ANALYST FORECASTS 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
in 
BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 
by 
Maria Filofteia Rickling 
 
2011 
  ii
To: Dean Joyce J. Elam 
 College of Business Administration 
 
This dissertation, written by Maria Filofteia Rickling, and entitled Three Essays on 
Corporate Governance and Meeting-Beating or Missing Analyst Forecasts, having been 
approved in respect to style and intellectual content, is referred to you for judgment. 
 
We have read this dissertation and recommend that it be approved. 
 
 
 
      ____________________________________ 
Abhijit Barua 
 
 
____________________________________ 
Suchismita Mishra 
 
 
____________________________________ 
Dasaratha Rama, Co-Major Professor 
 
 
____________________________________ 
Kannan Raghunandan, Co-Major Professor 
 
Date of Defense: July 11, 2011 
 
The dissertation of Maria Filofteia Rickling is approved. 
 
 
 
____________________________________ 
Dean Joyce J. Elam 
College of Business Administration 
 
 
____________________________________ 
Dean Lakshmi N. Reddi 
University Graduate School 
 
 
 
 
Florida International University, 2011 
  iii
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Copyright 2011 by Maria Filofteia Rickling 
  
All rights reserved.  
  iv
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DEDICATION 
I dedicate this dissertation to my mother. Her endless love, her tireless support, and 
her unwavering dedication as a parent are the reasons for each and every one of my past, 
present, and future accomplishments.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 I wish to thank my committee members: Dr. Kannan Raghunandan, Dr. Dasaratha 
Rama, Dr. Abhijit Barua, and Dr. Suchismita Mishra for their support and willingness to 
serve on my dissertation committee.  
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my mentor Dr. Kannan 
Raghunandan.  Words cannot express my appreciation and thankfulness for his limitless 
help, constant guidance, compassionate understanding, and sincere dedication to my 
success throughout this entire doctoral process.  It is my belief that no other dissertation 
chair is as devoted to their students as Dr. “Raghu”.  I would not have been able to 
accomplish this without his direction.  
I would also like to express my heartfelt appreciation to Dr. Divesh Sharma. The 
completion of this dissertation would not have been possible without his “unofficial" 
guidance and steadfast support.  
I would also like to thank all of the faculty and staff within the School of 
Accounting as well as the University Graduate School. My success, and the success of 
the program, would not exist without their support.  
Finally, I would like to extend a warm thank you to my peer Dr. Barri A. Litt for 
her camaraderie throughout this doctoral journey. Our many lunch meetings, study 
sessions, and hours of conversation greatly contributed to the magnificence of this truly 
unforgettable experience.  
  vi
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
THREE ESSAYS ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND  
MEETING-BEATING OR MISSING ANALYST FORECASTS 
by 
Maria Filofteia Rickling 
Florida International University, 2011 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Kannan Raghunandan, Major Professor 
The beginning of the 21st century was plagued with unprecedented instances of corporate 
fraud.  In an attempt to address apparent non-existent or “broken” corporate governance 
policies, sweeping measures of financial reporting reform ensued, having specific 
requirements relating to the composition of audit committees, the interaction between 
audit committees and external auditors, and procedures concerning auditors’ assessment 
of client risk.  The purpose of my dissertation is to advance knowledge about “good” 
corporate governance by examining the association between meeting-or-beating analyst 
forecasts and audit fees, audit committee compensation, and audit committee tenure and 
“busyness”.  Using regression analysis, I found the following: 1) the frequency of 
meeting-or-just beating (just missing) analyst forecasts is negatively (positively) 
associated with audit fees, 2) the extent by which a firm exceeds analysts’ forecasts is 
positively (negatively) associated with audit committee compensation that is 
predominately equity-based (cash-based), and 3) the likelihood of repeatedly meeting-or-
just beating analyst forecasts is positively associated with audit committee tenure and 
“busyness”.  These results suggest that auditors consider clients who frequently meet-or-
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just beat forecasts as being less “risky”, and clients that frequently just miss as being 
more “risky”.  The results also imply that cash-based director compensation is more 
successful in preserving the effectiveness of the audit committee’s financial reporting 
oversight role, that equity-based compensation motivates independent audit committee 
directors to focus on short-term performance thereby aligning their interests with 
management, and that audit committee director tenure and the degree of director 
“busyness” can affect an audit committee member’s effectiveness in providing financial 
reporting oversight.  Collectively, my dissertation provides additional insights regarding 
corporate governance practices and informs policy-makers for future relevant decisions. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
In October 2001, Enron’s announcement of a $1 billion nonrecurring charge for 
accounting “errors” led to the demise of both the corporation and its external auditor 
Arthur Anderson, one of the “Big 5” brand-name auditors during its time.  Months later, 
Enron’s bankruptcy filing, largest to date at that time, was overshadowed by WorldCom 
and its announcement of an even larger earnings restatement due to accounting fraud, 
followed by subsequent fraud investigations of numerous corporate giants such as 
Adelphia, HealthSouth, McKesson, Tyco, and Quest (Koh et al. 2008).  The downfall of 
such large U.S. corporations, spurred by a lack of integrity in corporate management and 
non-existent or “broken” corporate governance policies, left the entire business 
community, specifically investors, economically impacted and skeptical of the 
accounting profession in its ability to lend credence to corporate financial reports.  
Hence, the beginning of the 21st century has been deemed the “scandals period” by 
academics, regulators, business leaders, and others.  The largest implication has been an 
overhaul of the policies and regulations concerning U.S. capital markets and corporate 
governance systems, the most extensive being the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX).  
The clear intention of SOX is to restore investors’ confidence in the financial reporting 
system by implementing numerous corporate governance provisions, including 
restrictions on certain auditor-provided services, mandatory auditor-partner rotation, 
internal controls reporting, and the composition and function of audit committees.  Such 
reform in the regulatory environment and the economic consequences associated with 
litigation play an important role in shaping auditor behavior.   
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However, financial misreporting in the “post-scandals” and post-regulatory reform 
period seems to be arguably just as prevalent.  Recent examples include American 
International Group (A.I.G.), Diebold, General Electric (GE) and Xerox, each resulting 
with the firm, or executives of the firm, agreeing to pay $15 million, $25 million, $50 
million, and $670 million, respectively, in penalty fines associated with fraudulently 
reporting financial results specifically intending to meet or exceed earnings expectations 
(Taub 2008; SEC 2009; Walsh and Healy 2009; Goldfarb 2010; Leone 2010). 
In this doctoral dissertation, I develop arguments as to why I expect various aspects 
of corporate governance to be relevant in explaining the behavior of companies meeting 
or just beating analysts’ earnings forecasts.  I then empirically evaluate hypotheses 
concerning my assertions.  Specifically, my dissertation consists of three essays in which 
I test to determine if associations exist between the following: audit fees and the 
frequency with which a firm meets or exceeds or misses analyst forecasts, type of audit 
committee compensation and the likelihood of meeting or just beating analyst forecasts as 
well as the extent to which forecasts are exceeded, and audit committee characteristics 
(specifically, audit committee director tenure and “busyness”) and the likelihood of 
repeatedly meeting or just beating analyst forecasts.  
In the first essay, I add to extant audit fee literature by providing evidence 
regarding auditors’ risk assessment of clients that frequently meet or just beat, or 
frequently just miss, analyst forecasts.  The significant economic consequences of 
meeting or just beating analysts’ forecasts have led management to adopt earnings 
manipulation practices (e.g., Bartov et al. 2002; Barua et al. 2006; Bauman and Shaw 
2006; Burgstahler & Eames 2006).  Such practices have led to the SEC using a pattern of 
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meeting or beating analysts’ estimates to identify possible cases of accounting 
irregularities (Bryan-Low 2002).  Extant academic literature has found evidence that 
audit fees are higher for client firms that possess more inherent risk, suggesting that 
auditors seek to be compensated for accepting an engagement that carries a greater 
likelihood of auditor litigation (Bell et al. 2001; Bedard and Johnstone 2004; Abbott et al. 
2006).  Consistently meeting or just beating analyst forecasts may signal additional client 
risk to auditors leading to higher audit fees.  The counterpoint to this argument is that 
since the market assigns a higher value to firms that meet or beat, and consistently meet 
or beat, earnings forecasts (Barth et al. 1999; Bartov et al. 2002; Kasznik and McNichols 
2002; Chevis et al. 2007), auditors may view such client behavior as posing less risk of 
litigation leading to lower audit fees.  Given the aforementioned countering points, I do 
not make a directional prediction concerning the association between audit fees and 
frequently meeting or just beating, or just missing, earnings forecasts.  
In the second essay, I seek to empirically address a question that continues to be of 
significant interest amongst academics and practitioners: how to remunerate the board of 
directors for public firms.  The agency framework suggests that to ensure directors 
provide effective oversight of management and protect shareholders’ interests, directors 
need to be appropriately compensated (Elson 1995; Daily and Dalton 2002; Hillman and 
Dalziel 2003; Sharma and Iselin 2006; Archembeault et al. 2008).  However, what the 
“appropriate” compensation structure should be is yet to be determined.  The present 
compensation structure for directors comprises equity and cash, with an increasingly 
greater proportion of equity (Monks and Minow 2001; Yermack 2004) because the belief 
is that incentive-based compensation will align the directors’ interests to those of 
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shareholders, as it would motivate directors to ensure management engages in projects 
that create value for the firm (NACD 2001; 2003).  Conversely, equity-based pay could 
also align directors’ interests with those of management’s and cause directors to focus on 
the short-term financial performance goals of the firm in order to boost equity 
compensation payouts.  Given the vital role of the audit committee in providing financial 
reporting oversight, contemporary literature has studied the effects that varying audit 
committee director compensation structures have on different proxies of financial 
reporting quality, in general yielding evidence indicating that equity-based pay causes a 
misalignment of directors’ interests and that cash-based pay may preserve objectivity in 
performing financial reporting oversight tasks (Carcello and Neal 2003; Sharma and 
Iselin 2006; Archambeault et al. 2008; Cullinan et al. 2008; 2010; Persellin 2009).   
Hence, in this second essay, I contribute to the literature by analyzing the proclivity of 
firms to meet or just beat, as well as the degree to which they beat, analysts’ earnings 
forecasts as a function of the type of audit committee director pay.  I categorize audit 
committee compensation types as the percentage of equity compensation to total 
compensation, the percentage of cash compensation to total compensation, and the ratio 
of the natural logarithm of cash compensation to the natural logarithm of total 
compensation.  I posit that the proportion of equity-based (cash-based) pay will be 
positively (negatively) associated with the likelihood that a firm will meet or just beat 
analyst expectations as well as positively (negatively) associated with the extent to which 
the actual earnings exceed forecasted earnings.  
In the third essay, I examine the association between audit committee 
characteristics and the likelihood of firms repeatedly meeting or just beating or just 
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missing analysts’ forecasts.  Almost all prior research on audit committee composition 
has focused on independence and financial expertise of the audit committee directors.  I 
extend the literature on audit committee composition by focusing on two factors that have 
received little attention in prior research, yet have become the focus of legislators, good 
governance advocates, and others: audit committee members’ tenure and the number of 
other directorships (i.e. “busyness”).  The limited literature that does exist pertaining to 
the association between various measures of financial reporting quality and audit 
committee tenure and busyness yields non-uniform results (Yang and Krishnan 2005; 
Sharma and Iselin 2006; Fich and Shivdasani 2007; Dhaliwal et al. 2010).  Given such 
inconsistent evidence I do not make a directional prediction concerning the effects of 
audit committee tenure and busyness on the likelihood of meeting-beating analyst 
forecasts. 
I organize the remaining sections as follows.  Chapter II begins with a discussion 
concerning corporate governance, associated legislation and policy implementation, and 
the increasingly important role of the audit committee in the monitoring of financial 
reporting.  In addition, I present an in-depth discussion on the phenomena of meeting or 
just beating analysts’ earnings expectation including anecdotal evidence of its economic 
consequences.  I also provide arguments as to why I employ it as a proxy for earnings 
management, and I summarize the related research that has been conducted on this topic 
within a variety of contexts.  
Chapter III presents the first essay, which examines the association between audit 
fees and the frequency with which firms meet or just beat, or just miss, analyst forecasts.  
The natural logarithm of audit fees serve as the proxy for the auditor’s assessment of 
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client-risk and, using OLS regression, I test the effect of the frequency of meeting or just 
beating and just missing analyst forecasts.  I find that the frequency of meeting or just 
beating (just missing) analyst forecasts is negatively (positively) associated with audit 
fees.  
Chapter IV contains the second essay, which studies the effect of types of audit 
committee compensation on the likelihood of meeting or just beating analyst forecasts, 
and if the firm beats the forecast the extent to which the forecast is exceeded.  Using 
logistic regression, I find that predominantly equity-based (cash-based) compensation is 
positively (negatively) associated with the likelihood of meeting or just beating analyst 
forecasts, as well as the extent to which the forecast is exceeded.  
Chapter V focuses on the third essay, which pertains to the analysis of the 
association between audit committee tenure and busyness and the likelihood of meeting 
or just beating earnings forecasts.  The relevant hypotheses are tested using logistic 
regression and the evidence yields a positive association between audit committee 
directors’ tenure and multiple board seats and the likelihood of meeting or just beating 
earnings forecasts.  
Chapter VI concludes this dissertation.  In this chapter, I discuss the three essays, 
including the contributions of this dissertation and potential limitations, and suggest 
avenues for future research. 
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CHAPTER II: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND MEETING-BEATING  
ANALYST FORECASTS IN THE POST-SOX ERA 
In this chapter, I discuss prior research relating to meeting or beating analyst 
earnings forecasts in a variety of contexts, as well as the historical changes in applicable 
regulations and the increasing legislative focus on audit committees and corporate 
governance policies.  I begin by presenting anecdotal evidence of contemporary 
occurrences and the related economic consequences of firms reportedly manipulating 
earnings specifically to meet or beat earnings expectations.  I then discuss why I employ 
meeting or beating analyst forecasts as a proxy for earnings management and provide a 
timeline of regulation that has been enacted to curb such activity, and conclude by 
describing pertinent legislation and characteristics concerning corporate governance and 
the audit committee.  
Corporate governance concerns the relationships between all stakeholders in an 
organization, including shareholders, directors, management, and auditors, and is 
comprised of policies, processes, and procedures that affect the way a company conducts 
its business.  However, each stakeholder possesses a personal agenda that is often unique, 
with the difference usually most extreme between the principals of the organization 
(shareholders) and the agents (management).  This difference in interests defines the 
basic premise of agency theory and characterizes the separation of ownership and control 
that exists in corporations.  Thus, corporate governance, 
“… is concerned with understanding the mechanisms that have evolved to 
 mitigate incentive problems created by the separation of the management and 
 financing of business entities. Financial accounting provides financiers with the 
 primary source of independently verified information about the performance of 
  8
 managers. Thus, it is clear that corporate governance and financial accounting 
 are inexorably linked.” (Sloan 2001, 335-6) 
 
The description of the relationship between corporate governance and financial 
accounting as an “inexorable link” underscores the importance of transparent financial 
reporting as a component of an effective corporate governance system: one that is 
designed to mitigate market failures, moral hazards, asymmetric information, and 
opportunistic managerial behavior (Bonazzi and Islam 2007).  
The numerous financial reporting scandals at the beginning of this century have led 
to widespread reform of corporate governance practices and regulations.  However, as the 
20th century was coming to a close, business leaders were already expressing concerns 
about aggressive earnings management.  For example, throughout the 1980s and 1990s 
private sector institutions like the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the 
Treadway Commission (COSO) and blue ribbon commissions were already in the midst 
of devising frameworks for the implementation of effective governance systems 
(National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting [NCFFR] 1987; New York 
Stock Exchange / National Association of Securities, Blue Ribbon Committee [BRC] 
1999).  The following is a fatefully predictive quote made in 1998 by former Securities 
and Exchange Commission chairman Arthur Levitt: “I fear that we are witnessing an 
erosion in the quality of earnings, and therefore, the quality of financial reporting. 
Managing may be giving way to manipulation; integrity may be losing out to illusion” 
(Charles et al. 2010, 18).  Arguably, the words of Mr. Levitt spurred an interest to 
improve corporate governance mechanisms.  
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Beginning in 1999, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National 
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) modified their 
listing conditions to include requirements pertaining to board independence and the 
inclusion of a financial expert on the listing firm’s audit committee (Carcello et al. 2008).  
However, the failure of audit committees amongst the Enron-type string of scandals led 
the U.S. Congress to pass the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), which charged audit 
committees with having the responsibility of monitoring financial reporting and also 
mandated numerous corporate governance provisions including audit committees be 
comprised entirely of independent directors as well as the disclosure of the presence of a 
financial expert.  Thus, there is now universal agreement amongst regulators, legislators, 
boards of directors, auditors, and academics that the audit committee is the primary 
internal governance mechanism responsible for overseeing the quality of financial reports 
prepared by management (e.g., Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 1999a; 
2003; Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 2002; U.S. Senate 2002a; 2002b; DeZoort et al. 2002; 
DeFond and Francis 2005; Beasley et al. 2009; Carcello et al. 2011; Sharma and Sharma 
2011).   
Further, in October 2002 the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA) issued the Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99: Consideration of 
Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, effective for audits of financial statements for 
periods beginning on or after December 15, 2002 (AICPA 2007).  Brought upon by the 
scandals, SAS No. 99 represents professional guidance in assisting auditors identify 
client risks that may result in a material misstatement due to fraud.  It includes new 
procedural requirements for auditors and charges audit committees with additional 
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responsibilities in the audit function (Charles et al. 2010).  This revised emphasis on risk-
assessment and fraud detection immediately following the demise of Arthur Anderson 
suggests the profession’s renewed commitment to improving the quality of financial 
statement audits.   
Although these policy and legislative reforms have been enacted to deter corporate 
fraud through an intensified focus on systemic corporate governance changes, 
opportunistic earnings manipulation continue to spring forth in the “post-Sox” era, in part 
evidenced by recent risk-based investigations associated with meeting or beating 
analysts’ earnings forecasts.  
The significant economic gains attributed to meeting or just beating, and the extent 
of beating, analysts’ forecasts have led management to adopt earnings manipulation 
practices (e.g., Bartov et al. 2002; Barua et al. 2006; Bauman and Shaw 2006; 
Burgstahler & Eames 2006).  Such practices have led to the SEC using a pattern of 
meeting or beating analysts’ estimates to identify possible cases of accounting 
irregularities (Bryan-Low 2002).   
Since SOX, the frequency of meeting or just beating analyst earnings expectations 
appears to have declined (Bartov and Cohen 2008; Koh et al. 2008).  However, the 
problem has not disappeared as firms continue to engage in earnings manipulation to 
achieve these benchmarks set by financial analysts.  For instance, in August of 2009, 
General Electric (GE) agreed to pay a $50 million penalty to settle charges stemming 
from a risk-based investigation made by the SEC alleging that GE consistently met or 
exceeded financial analysts’ consensus EPS expectations (SEC 2009).  The SEC’s 
investigations found four separate occasions where GE’s accounting executives approved 
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improper application of accounting standards.  Other recent examples include American 
International Group (A.I.G.), Diebold, and Xerox, resulting with the firm, or executives 
of the firm, agreeing to pay $15 million, $25 million, and $670 million, respectively, in 
fines associated with fraudulently reporting financial results specifically intending to 
meet or exceed earnings expectations (Taub 2008; SEC 2009; Walsh and Healy 2009; 
Goldfarb 2010; Leone 2010). 
Prior, Related Literature on Meeting/Beating Analyst Forecasts 
Analysts’ forecasts are an important proxy for the market’s expectations of a firm’s 
performance, which management strives to meet and/or beat (Degeorge et al. 1999).  
Management has two primary incentives to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts: a firm 
valuation premium and a reduced cost of capital.   
Empirical evidence shows that investors assign a valuation premium to firms that 
meet or beat analysts’ forecasts and penalize those that fall short.  Moreover, the reward 
is greater as the duration, and extent to which forecasts are exceeded, increases.  For 
example, Barth et al. (1999) employ the Miller and Modigliani (1966) price-earnings 
valuation model and determine that firms with patterns of increasing earnings have higher 
earnings multiples.  They obtain a sample of 21,173 firm-year observations spanning the 
period of 1982-1992 and comprising of firms having at least five years of earnings 
history. Data are obtained from the Compustat, the Center for Research and Securities 
Prices (CRSP), and the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) databases.  The 
authors also find evidence of a decrease in the earnings multiple when a firm experiences 
a decrease in earnings subsequent to continuous earnings increases.  Their findings 
suggest that the changes in the earnings multiple “is not attributable to factors known 
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before the [earnings] pattern develops”, lending further support to the notion that the 
market rewards firms exhibiting patterns of increasing earnings (Barth et al. 1999, 410).  
Bartov et al. (2002) obtain the necessary data from the Compustat, CRSP, and 
I/B/E/S databases in order to test for the existence of differences in returns associated 
with meeting or beating analysts’ earnings expectations.  Studying a sample of 64, 872 
firm-quarter observations during January 1983 and December 1997, they regress various 
measures and frequencies of earnings surprises on risk-adjusted cumulative abnormal 
returns over the period of two days before the date of the earliest forecast until one day 
after the quarter’s actual results.  The authors find that quarterly abnormal returns are 
positively associated with the earnings surprise for the quarter.  These results strongly 
suggest that investors reward (penalize) firms having earnings that meet or beat (miss) 
earnings forecasts. Kasznik and McNichols (2002), employing research methodology 
similar to Bartov et al. (2002), find that abnormal annual returns are positively associated 
with firms at least meeting analysts’ estimates, and that the market assigns an even higher 
value to firms that meet estimates consistently.   
Building upon the aforementioned studies, Chevis et al. (2007) empirically address 
the question as to whether managers have incentive to consistently meet or beat analysts’ 
forecasts and thus view this behavior as a “strategy” in improving market perceptions.  
Specifically, they examine whether the market valuation and the valuation of earnings of 
firms that consistently meet or exceed analyst forecasts differs as the frequency of 
meeting or beating increases.  The authors analyze the period 1991 through 2003.  
Following Bartov et al. (2002), they obtain data from the I/B/E/S database to create 
quarterly measures of analyst forecasts in order to derive measures for meeting or 
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beating, or missing, forecasts.  The authors use standard OLS regression, with a measure 
of firm market value as the dependent variable, and compare the estimates obtained 
across two sub-samples: the “meet” sub-sample comprised of firms meeting or beating 
the analyst forecast measure for exactly 8 consecutive quarters, and the “non-meet” sub-
sample comprised of firms meeting or beating the forecast measure for no more than four 
quarters.  Regression analysis yields evidence suggesting that “meet” firms are more 
highly valued in the market than “non-meet” and that this valuation premium is positively 
associated with the firm’s “meet” horizon.  
In summary, this line of research has found that investors assign a valuation 
premium to firms that meet or beat analysts’ forecasts and penalize those that fall short.  
Moreover, the reward is greater as the duration increases and as the extent to which 
forecasts are exceeded increases.  In addition, this premium exists even when the firm 
likely manages either earnings or expectations in order to meet the earnings expectations.  
In addition to enjoying a premium in stock price valuation, management may be 
incentivized to meet or exceed analyst forecasts, and to consistently do so, in order to 
reap the benefit of a reduced cost of capital that is associated with a decrease in 
information asymmetry.1  Brown et al. (2009) empirically test the conjecture that meeting 
or beating analyst forecasts results in a reduction in information asymmetry, thereby 
resulting in an implicit reduction in cost of capital.  They base their analysis on research 
suggesting that uninformed investors are attracted to stocks of firms that receive greater 
attention (Grullon et al. 2004; Frieder and Subrahmanyam 2005; Barber and Odean 
                                                 
1 Ross (1977), Myers and Majluf (1984), Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), and Lev (1992) develop 
theoretical arguments for the positive association between cost of capital and information asymmetry that 
have been empirically supported (Ruland et al. 1990; Frankel et al. 1995; Lang and Lundholm 1993; 2000; 
Marquardt and Wiedman 1998).  
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2008), and assert that earnings surprises are events that capture the attention of investors.  
Their analysis period is the first quarter of 1995 through the second quarter of 2004.  The 
OLS regression is performed on a sample comprising 61,838 firm-quarters, resulting 
from the intersection of the Trades and Quotes (TAQ), CRSP, and First Call databases, 
and is modeled so that estimates are obtained on the association between changes in the 
probability of informed trading (or bid–ask spreads) and whether firms beat or miss the 
measure for analyst earnings forecasts and other control variables.  In both regressions, 
the variable representing firms that beat (miss) analysts’ forecasts is negative (positive) 
and highly significant.  In addition, a variable representing consistent beating of forecasts 
is also found to be significant as opposed to only sporadically beating forecasts.  In 
summary, Brown et al. (2009) find that beating (missing) analyst forecasts is negatively 
(positively) associated with information asymmetry and the decrease (increase) in 
information asymmetry is larger for “beat” (“miss”) firms that have regularly met or 
beaten (missed) expectations over the prior eight quarters. 
Graham et al. (2005) corroborate the economic gains associated with increased 
market valuation and reduced information asymmetry through a survey of CFOs.  They 
report that more than eighty percent of CFOs agree that “hitting earnings benchmarks 
builds credibility with the market and helps to maintain or increase their firm’s stock 
price” (Graham et al. 2005, 5).  
Meeting/Just Beating Analyst Forecasts as a Proxy for Earnings Management 
As noted by Carcello et al. (2011) and DeFond and Francis (2005), many prior 
studies have examined the notion of earnings management and reporting quality by 
focusing on a variety of dependent variables, such as fraudulent financial reporting, 
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restatements, qualified opinions, and accruals quality.  Fraud, restatement, and modified 
opinions are relatively infrequent occurrences, while the accruals quality metrics are 
noisy and potentially performance-biased (DeFond and Francis 2005) and prone to 
problems with model specification (e.g., Krishnan et al. 2007; Ball 2009).  In this 
dissertation, I analyze corporate governance aspects related to auditors and audit 
committees through the implementation of another metric that has been identified in 
research as a measure of earnings management (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997), namely 
meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts.  Importantly, the SEC’s statements and actions 
indicate that meeting-beating analysts’ forecasts is considered by the SEC to be a factor 
in evaluating the quality of financial reporting (SEC 1999d; 2009).2 
It is also important to note, ex-post, that employing restatements particularly in 
essay two of this dissertation, which studies the association between the likelihood of 
meeting or beating analyst forecasts, and the extent of beating forecasts, and the type of 
audit committee compensation, poses certain limitations.  It is often not clear when the 
accounts were actually misstated that led to a subsequent restatement (Agrawal and 
Chadha 2005).  Researchers use financial restatements to proxy for the fact that the 
accounts were misstated and tend to examine data in the year of, or the year prior to, the 
restatement.  Unless there is a fairly precise match between the year the misstatement 
took place and the audit committee’s compensation, I cannot use restatements as a proxy 
for earnings management since I am unable to clearly analyze the incentives facing the 
audit committee members at the time the accounts were misstated. 
                                                 
2 The SEC (1999d) noted that “among the considerations that may well render material a quantitatively 
small misstatement of a financial statement item” is “whether the misstatement hides a failure to meet 
analysts’ consensus expectations.” 
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Thus, one such proxy for financial manipulation widely recognized in the literature 
that may avoid the limitations of financial restatements, and have an immediate impact on 
the capital markets, is meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts.  In this dissertation, the 
ability of management to meet or just beat, and the extent to which they beat, analysts’ 
forecasts serve as the proxy for management’s manipulation of earnings information 
contained in the financial reports (see Dechow et al. (2010) for a comprehensive 
discussion of proxies for earnings manipulation). 
In summary, given the theoretical, and empirically supported, economic 
consequences associated with achieving positive earnings surprises and avoiding negative 
ones, prior research considers meeting or beating analysts’ forecasted earnings a form of 
earnings management (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Frankel et al. 2002).   
Therefore, in this dissertation I use meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts as a proxy for 
financial reporting quality for several reasons.  First, as presented above, it is a 
performance measure that management is strongly motivated to meet (Degeorge et al. 
1999).  Second, the occurrence of meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts via improper 
accounting methods remains prevalent in present day markets (SEC 2009).  Third, prior 
research (DeFond and Francis 2005; Dechow et al. 2010) argues meeting or beating 
analysts’ forecasts (1) is a relatively less noisy proxy for earnings management/financial 
reporting quality, (2) it is a measure widely understood by the market, and (3) occurs 
more frequently than other proxies such as fraud, restatements, and going concern 
modifications.  
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CHAPTER III: AUDIT FEES AND REPEATEDLY MEETING-BEATING OR 
MISSING ANALYST FORECASTS 
The motivation for this essay comes from the apparent proclivity of companies to 
meet or beat analysts’ expectations, and the risk-based investigations that have been 
conducted on firms engaging in such behavior.  One such instance pertains to General 
Electric (GE).   In August 2009, GE agreed to pay a $50 million penalty to settle charges 
stemming from a risk-based investigation made by the SEC alleging that GE accounting 
executives approved improper application of accounting standards, with one specific 
occasion allowing GE to directly avoid missing analysts’ expectations.  The SEC (2009) 
specifically noted in its complaint that GE consistently met or exceeded financial 
analysts’ consensus EPS expectations each quarter from 1995 through 2004. 
The significant economic gains of meeting or just beating analysts’ forecasts have 
led management to adopt earnings manipulation practices (e.g., Bartov et al. 2002; Barua 
et al. 2006; Bauman and Shaw 2006; Burgstahler & Eames 2006).   The SEC has used a 
pattern of meeting or beating analysts’ estimates to identify possible cases of accounting 
irregularities (Bryan-Low 2002).  Thus, if regulatory agencies such as the Securities and 
Exchange Commission view firms that engage in such behavior as worthy of being 
subject to “risk-based” investigations, then it begs the question of whether auditors view 
clients that frequently meet or just beat (just miss) as having more (less) inherent risk and 
hence whether audit fees are priced accordingly in order to compensate for the increase 
(decrease) in likelihood of auditor litigation. However, given that empirical evidence 
documents a market valuation premium assigned to firms that meet, beat, and 
consistently meet or beat earnings forecasts (Barth et al. 1999; Bartov et al. 2002; 
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Kasznik and McNichols 2002; Chevis et al. 2007), a client with a higher market-assigned 
valuation may be viewed by auditors as posing less risk of auditor litigation.  Simunic 
and Stein (1996) reason that as client-specific risk increases, so does the risk of auditor 
litigation and auditors increase audit effort to reduce litigation or increase audit fees to 
compensate for litigation exposure (Watkins et al. 2004).  This assertion suggests that 
litigation risk is positively correlated with audit fees, and has been empirically supported 
through studies seeking to understand the relationship between client risk, audit effort, 
and audit fees (Simunic and Stein 1996; Bell et al. 2001; Johnstone and Bedard 2003; 
Bedard and Johnstone 2004).  The question at hand is whether auditors view client firms 
that consistently meet or beat analyst forecasts as being more or less inherently risky.  
Given the aforementioned countering points, I do not make a directional prediction 
concerning the association between audit fees and the frequency of meeting or just 
beating, or just missing, earnings forecasts.  
Related Research 
I begin the discussion of related literature with a review of the audit fee research, 
which is an integral component in understanding the association between a client’s 
inherent risk and the pricing of the client’s audit.  
Audit Fee Framework 
Prior to discussing existing literature seeking to identify determinants of audit fees, 
it is important to first present the audit fee framework to which many extant audit fee-
related papers adhere.  Drawing on multiple sources, Charles et al. (2010) succinctly 
discuss the audit fee framework.  They begin by stating that in order to make decisions 
such as the structure of an audit, pricing of services, and client retention, auditors must 
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perform an assessment of client risk (Messier et al. 2008), and that a useful tool 
pertaining to risk assessment is the audit risk model, as presented by the professional 
auditing standards of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA).  
One of the model’s risk components is the client’s inherent risk, which is influenced by 
various characteristics of the client organization, such as management’s attitude toward 
fair and transparent reporting and corporate governance practices.  The model conveys 
that, ceteris paribus, auditors can offset higher levels of inherent risk by decreasing 
detection risk (Charles et al. 2010).  Auditors can reduce detection risk by increasing the 
quality and/or quantity of the audit services provided. Such an increase in audit effort 
results in an increase in the fees charged for the audit services.  This assertion is 
corroborated with the seminal production function model of audit fees documented by 
Simunic (1980), which supports the notion that auditors will charge higher audit fees to 
riskier clients.  
Audit Fees and Audit Quality 
This stream of research is grounded in studies that analyze the existence of an audit 
fee premium associated with different types of auditing firms.  Within the context of the 
audit fee framework, a positive relation is generally assumed to exist between audit 
quality and audit fees, with most researchers theorizing that larger audit firms charge 
higher fees in exchange for the provision of higher quality audit services (Davidson and 
Neu 1993; Watkins et al. 2004).  Three relevant theories are: 1) larger audit firms seek to 
earn relatively larger future economic rents from clients, and therefore provide better 
quality of services in order to secure those rents (DeAngelo 1981b), 2) larger audit firms 
have a reputation to protect and are therefore more diligent and objective than smaller 
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audit firms (Klein and Leffler 1981; Palmrose 1988), or 3) as argued by Dopuch and 
Simunic (1982), “audit quality is a function of the number and extent of audit procedures 
performed by the auditor and…large firms visibly have more resources with which to 
conduct tests” (Watkins et al. 2004, 175).  
One of the earliest empirical studies pertaining to testing the aforementioned 
theories on large audit firms and audit quality is Simunic (1980), who develops an audit 
fee determinant model that is used by most contemporary audit fee literature.  Simunic 
(1980) captures audit fee data by gathering responses from 397 public companies in the 
United States, to a survey administered in 1977.  In addition to developing a widely used 
least-squared regression model for estimating the coefficients on variables representing 
the determinants of audit fees, the paper presents results suggesting that Big 8 auditors 
charge lower audit fees due to being able to take advantage of economies of scale and 
thereby passing cost savings on to the client firms.  
Subsequent studies have presented results to the contrary.  Using 210 responses 
collected from a questionnaire administered to firms selected from two 1984 industrial 
firms manuals that represent the small client segment, Francis and Simon (1987) provide 
evidence that Big 8 audit firms charge a premium for their audit services.  These results 
suggest a differentiation in audit quality amongst Big 8 and non-Big 8 firms.  
In comparing management earnings forecasts of net income to actual audited net 
income for 112 firms applying for initial listing on the Toronto Stock Exchange between 
1983 and 1987, Davidson and Neu (1993) find that the absolute value of the forecast 
error is larger for firms audited by a Big 8 audit firm.  Their results, obtained using 
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ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with the natural logarithm of the “relative 
prediction error”, suggest that “brand name” audit firms provide better quality auditing.  
Using data collected from Australian firm proxy statements, as well as data 
published in an Australian academic database, for a sample of 1,484 public, Craswell et 
al. (1995) document the existence of two types of audit fee premiums: one associated 
with the brand name of the Big 8 auditor, and one associated with the Big 8 auditor’s 
specialization within a specific industry.  They find a 30% increase in premium for Big 8 
auditors as compared to non-Big 8 auditors, and a 34% increase in premium for industry-
specialized Big 8 auditors, as compared to non-specialized Big 8 auditors.  
DeFond et al. (2000) conduct a similar study, however the analysis is performed on 
348 public companies in Hong Kong and examines the audit fees charged by Big 6 versus 
non-Big 6 firms.  They use the 1992 Pacific-Basin Capital Market Database (PACAP) 
and document the existence of an audit fee premium associated with both auditor brand 
name and auditor specialization.  
In summary, the majority of empirical research seeking to test the assumption that 
larger, brand name audit firms provide better quality auditing services generally supports 
this supposition and provides evidence suggesting that larger brand name, specialized 
audit firms provide better quality audit services. 
These earlier works used “auditor quality” to mean “audit quality”, but with the 
passage of time, more contemporary works have analyzed audit quality in the literal sense 
using various proxies.  This more literal analysis stems from theoretical arguments that 
audit quality, in its literal sense, pertains to resource availability (see the Dopuch and 
Simunic (1982) theory mentioned above).  For example, using the September 2001 
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version of the Compact Disclosure - SEC (CD-SEC) database, Geiger and Rama (2003) 
identify 66 manufacturing firms possessing the required data in order to study the 
association between audit fees and firms receiving first-time going concern modified 
opinions during the 2000 fiscal year.  Using logistic regression on a matched-pair design, 
the authors find a significant positive association between the magnitude of audit fees and 
the likelihood of receiving a modified going concern opinion.  These results support 
research concerning the production function of audits (Simunic 1980); specifically it 
compliments extent research that finds a positive association between audit fees, audit 
effort, and audit quality (Palmrose 1986).   
Larcker and Richardson (2004), apply latent class mixture models3 to 3,424 firms 
obtained from the Standard and Poor’s database, which are restricted to only non-
financial firms and only firms that are audited by a Big 5 auditor, during the fiscal years 
2000 and 2001.  They determine that the level of audit fees is negatively associated with 
the dependent variable, which are various measures of accruals.  These “results are most 
consistent with auditor behavior being constrained by the reputation effects associated 
with allowing clients to engage in unusual accounting choices” (Larcker and Richardson 
2004, 625).  However, Choi et al. (2010) present evidence that abnormal audit fees are 
negatively associated with audit quality as represented by the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals and serves as the dependent variable.  They conduct their study by 
obtaining the necessary data from Compustat and verifying the accuracy of the data by 
referring to the sample firms’ actual quarterly or annual report filings.  They restrict their 
                                                 
3 The authors claim that by classifying the sample “into homogeneous clusters of observations that appear 
to follow a similar regression model” (Larcker and Richardson 2004, 638) they can then identify the 
characteristics common to the clusters and then utilize standard statistical methods for analysis. This 
description forms the basis of the latent class mixture method of analysis.  
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sample to firms that do not operate in the financial industry or the utilities industry (i.e. 
the SIC code not being either 6000-6999 or 4000-4999).  Their sample period runs from 
the year 2000, when audit fee data first became available in Compustat, and ends in the 
year 2003 to avoid any data complications associated with the adoption of SOX Section 
404 in 2004.  Their findings, obtained by OLS regression, suggest that positive abnormal 
audit fees may incentivize auditors to compromise audit quality. 
In summary, contemporary research seeking to understand audit fees as a function 
of audit quality, as opposed to auditor quality, yield inconclusive results.  
Audit Fees and Client Risk 
Many studies within the last decade have analyzed audit fees as a function of 
various proxies for client risk.  For instance, Bell et al. (2001) acquire confidential 
workpapers pertaining to the audits of 422 client firms conducted by an international 
accounting firm during 1989.  Using the natural logarithm of fees billed, the natural 
logarithm of hours worked, or the fee per hour as the dependent variable, they document 
a positive association between audit fees and the auditor-assessed level of client business 
risk obtained via OLS regression.  They note that the increase in audit fees arises solely 
out of additional hours worked, as there was no change in the hourly billing rate.  
Bedard and Johnstone (2004) find similar results using data provided by an 
undisclosed participating audit firm.  Specifically, the data used in their analyses 
“are derived from engagement partners’ assessments of their existing clients made 
during the participating firm’s 2000-2001 client continuance risk assessment 
process, during which the firm’s engagement partners consider risks posed by their 
clients and make planning and pricing decisions.” (Bedard and Johnstone 2004, 
284) 
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The authors, using OLS regression with either the natural logarithm of planned audit 
personnel hours or the planned hourly billing rate as the dependent variable, find a 
positive association between earnings manipulation risk and both audit hours and hourly 
billing rates.  They measure earnings manipulation risk as the number of  “yes” answers 
to nine “yes/no” questions pertaining to what are considered high-risk scenarios in the 
audit industry, with one of the questions specifically addressing whether “the company 
has a history of exactly meeting consensus earnings estimates” (Bedard and Johnstone 
2004, 285).  
Analyzing 429 non-financial companies that are audited by the Big 5 firms during 
the 2000 fiscal year Abbott et al. (2006) find a significant positive association between 
the level of audit fees and the direction of discretionary accruals.  In other words, 
income-increasing (income-decreasing) discretionary accruals are positively associated 
with higher (lower) audit fees, suggesting that auditors consider client risk when pricing 
engagements.  These results are corroborated by Charles et al. (2010), who use a 
proprietary measure of financial reporting risk as the variable of interest and document its 
positive association with the natural log of audit fees.  Their analyses are conducted using 
data from 4,320 Big 4 client firm-years and are restricted to the 2000-2003 period.  
Using a key word search in the EDGAR Online database during the period of 
January 1, 2004 through March 31, 2005 to obtain their data (along with financial 
information from the Compustat database), Feldmann et al. (2009) find that audit fees are 
higher in 2005 for their sample of 228 firms that restated their 2003 fiscal year end 
financial statements as compared to the control group of non-restating firms.  They 
determine this by OLS regression with the difference between the natural logarithm of 
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the sum of audit and audit related fees in 2005 and 2003 being the dependent variable.  
The authors suggest one explanation for the fee premium is the auditor’s perception of an 
increase in litigation risk associated with the audit.   
Venkataraman et al. (2008), using the SDC database to identify IPO firms and 
Compustat to retrieve the necessary control data, conduct an analysis of audit fees on 142 
firms that go public between January 1, 2000 and December 21, 2002.  Using OLS 
regression with the natural logarithm of audit fees as the dependent variable, they 
document that audit fees are higher for IPO engagements as compared to post-IPO 
engagements, suggesting that audit fees are higher when the auditor anticipates a higher 
risk of litigation associated with the engagement.  
Finally, Munsif et al. (2011) use OLS regression to examine the audit fees of 1,610 
SEC registrants, excluding financial and foreign firms, during 2004 through 2007 that 
have remediated previously disclosed internal control weaknesses.  The authors obtain 
audit fee data from the Audit Analytics database and relevant financial data from the 
Compustat annual database.  The authors document lower audit fees for firms that 
remediate such weaknesses opposed to firms that do not remediate.  However, the initial 
audit fee premium associated with the adverse disclosure does not diminish until 
approximately three years after the remediation, suggesting that auditors are cautious 
regarding the reduction in the client’s inherent risk in the first two years following the 
remediation.  These results further suggest that auditors indeed factor client risk into the 
pricing of the audit. 
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Collectively, this latter stream of research provides evidence that audit fees are 
associated with the auditor’s assessed level of client risk, suggesting that auditors indeed 
consider the client’s inherent risk when pricing the engagement. 
Development of Audit Fee Related Hypotheses 
The risk of auditor litigation increases as client-specific risk increases, and 
litigation risk is a fundamental consideration during the fee-setting process of an audit 
engagement (Clarkson and Simunic 1994; Simunic and Stein 1996).  The total cost of an 
audit can be categorized into two components: resource cost and possible litigation cost 
(Abbott et al. 2006; Simunic and Stein 1996).  The former increases as audit effort 
increases, and the latter, as represented by Simunic (1980), is the product of litigation 
likelihood and the present value of all future possible losses associated with the audit of 
the present period financial statements.  This suggests that audit litigation risk is, 
therefore, positively correlated with audit fees, and has been corroborated in several 
empirical studies investigating the relation between client risk factors, audit effort, and 
audit fees (e.g., Simunic and Stein 1996; Bell et al. 2001; Geiger and Rama 2003; Bedard 
and Johnstone 2004).  The collective evidence from such studies implies that auditors 
taking on risky engagements attempt to mitigate such risk by enhancing the quality of the 
audit through an increase in monitoring.  This increase in monitoring arises from an 
increase in audit effort (i.e. audit hours), thereby increasing the audit fees charged to the 
client.   
Prior research concerning the association of audit fees and client risk have generally 
used various measures of the client firm’s financial health as proxies for the auditors’ 
litigation risk, but evidence presented in recent audit-planning research implies that 
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auditors also consider the likelihood of earnings management when performing an 
assessment of client risk (Abbott et al. 2006).  For instance, using signed discretionary 
accruals as a proxy for earnings management, Abbott et al. (2006) hypothesize and find a 
significant positive association between audit fees and the likelihood of earnings 
management. Specifically, audit fees increase (decrease) in income-increasing 
discretionary accruals.  Further, Bedard and Johnstone (2004) find a positive association 
between audit fees and the risk of a client engaging in earnings management as measured 
by the number of “yes” answers to nine “yes/no” questions pertaining to what are 
considered relevant, high-risk scenarios, with one of the questions specifically addressing 
whether “the company has a history of exactly meeting consensus earnings estimates” 
(Bedard and Johnstone 2004, 285).  
Empirical evidence suggests that management has adopted earnings manipulation 
practices due to the significant economic advantages of meeting or just beating analysts’ 
forecasts (e.g., Bartov et al. 2002; Barua et al. 2006; Bauman and Shaw 2006; 
Burgstahler & Eames 2006).  However, the SEC uses a pattern of meeting or beating 
analysts’ estimates to identify possible cases of accounting irregularities (Bryan-Low 
2002).  Therefore, auditors may view clients that consistently meet or just beat analyst 
forecasts by one cent or less as riskier clients, and thus charge higher audit fees in order 
to compensate for the additional potential litigation risk.  
However, research pertaining to earnings forecasts present evidence suggesting 
positive outcomes associated with meeting or just beating forecasts, and the frequency 
with which forecasts are met or exceeded.  For instance, Bartov et al. (2002) find that 
quarterly abnormal returns are positively associated with the earnings surprise for the 
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quarter, suggesting that investors reward (penalize) firms having earnings that meet or 
beat (miss) earnings forecasts.  Kasznik and McNichols (2002) find that abnormal annual 
returns are positively associated with firms at least meeting analysts’ estimates, and that 
the market assigns an even higher value to firms that meet estimates consistently.  
Further, the documented premium appears to be persistent for a length of time, which 
may suggest “...investors’ perceptions that firms that consistently meet expectations are 
less risky than those that do not” (Kasznik and McNichols 2002, 730, emphasis added).  
Chevis et al. (2007) empirically address the question as to whether managers have 
incentive to consistently meet or beat analysts’ forecasts and thus view this behavior as a 
“strategy” in improving market perceptions.  Specifically, the authors examine whether 
the market valuation and the valuation of earnings of firms that consistently meet or 
exceed analyst forecasts differs as the frequency of meeting or beating increases.  Their 
analysis yields evidence suggesting that “meet” firms are more highly valued in the 
market than “non-meet” and that this valuation premium is positively associated with the 
firm’s “meet” horizon.  Given such documented positive (negative) outcomes assigned to 
firms that frequently meet or just beat (miss) analyst forecasts, auditors may view such 
clients as having less (more) inherent risk and thus may charge lower (higher) audit fees.  
The above discussion leads to my first two hypotheses (both stated in the null 
form): 
H1:  Audit fees are not associated with the frequency of meeting or just beating 
 analyst earnings forecasts. 
 
H2:  Audit fees are not associated with the frequency of just missing analyst 
 earnings forecasts. 
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Audit Fee Model  
I base the empirical model on prior research seeking to identify determinants of 
audit fees. The model is as follows:  
 LN_AUDFEES   =  β0 + β1*LN_TA + β2*RECINV + β3*SQRTSEG  
    + β4*FOROPS + β5*LIQ + β6*LOSS + β7*ROA  
    + β8*BM + β9*ICW + β10*GC + β11*BIG4  
    + β12*AUDINIT + β13*NUM_MB + β14*NUM_MISS  
    +β15-23 * (Industry Dummy Variables) + ε 
where: 
 
 LN_AUDFEES =  natural logarithm of the audit fees in the 2007 fiscal  
     year ($ actual); 
 
 LN_TA =  natural logarithm of TA, where TA is defined as total  
    assets (first expressed in $ thousands); 
 
 RECINV =  receivables plus inventory, scaled by total assets;  
 
 SQRTSEG =  square root of the number of business segments, as   
    reported in Compustat; 
 
 FOROPS =  1 if the firm has foreign operations, 0 otherwise; 
 
 LIQ  =  ratio of current assets divided by current liabilities; 
 
 LOSS  =  1 if the firm reports negative income for 2007, 0 otherwise; 
 
 ROA  =  return on assts, measured as net income, divided by TA; 
 
 BM  =  book to market ratio, measured as book value per share,  
    divided by share price at the end of the fiscal year 2007; 
 
 ICW  =  1 if the firm discloses an internal control weakness in 2007,  
    0 otherwise; 
 
 GC  =  1 if the firm receives a going concern opinion for the 2007  
    fiscal year, 0 otherwise; 
 
 BIG4  =  1 if the firms’ auditor is a Big 4 auditor, 0 otherwise; 
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 AUDINIT =  1 if 2007 is the auditor’s initial year on the engagement,  
    0 otherwise; 
 
 NUM_MB =  number of quarters, during 2005 through 2007, actual  
    earnings reported meets or exceeds the analyst’s forecast by 
    one cent per share or less  
    (i.e., $0.00 ≤ forecast error ≤ $0.01); 
 
 NUM_MISS =  number of quarters, during 2005 through 2007, actual  
    earnings reported is less than the analyst’s forecast by no  
    more than one cent per share 
    (i.e., -$0.01 ≤forecast error < $0.00). 
 
Control Variables  
The control variables are obtained from prior audit fee literature.  Nearly all of this 
extant audit fee literature, seeking to identify determinants of audit fees, follows the 
Simunic (1980) model, which uses various measures of client size, complexity, financial 
health, and risk.  Examples of research published within the last decade that follow the 
Simunic (1980) audit fee model include DeFond et al. (2002), Frankel et al. (2002), 
Abbott et al. (2003; 2006), Whisenant et al. (2003), Bedard and Johnstone (2004), 
Chaney et al. (2004), Sankaraguruswamy and Whisenant (2005), Raghunandan and Rama 
(2006), Venkataraman et al. (2008), Charles et al. (2010), Choi et al. (2010), and Munsif 
et al. (2011). 
Larger and more complex client firms should demand more resources from the 
auditor.  Since audit fees are, at least partially determined by the amount of resources an 
auditor must allocate to a client (Simunic 1980), I follow all of the aforementioned 
studies and control for firm size and complexity using the following proxies.  Firm size is 
measured as the natural log of assets (LN_TA).  Following Abbott et al. (2003; 2006), 
Charles et al. (2010), Choi et al. (2010), Munsif et al. (2011), Raghunandan and Rama 
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(2006), and Whisenant et al. (2003), I control for firm complexity by including three 
measures in the model: the amount of inventory and receivables a firm has, scaled by 
total assets (RECINV), the square root of a firm’s number of business segments 
(SQRTSEG), and a measure indicating whether or not the firm has any foreign operations 
(FOROPS).  In line with prior research, I expect the signs of these coefficients to all be 
positive. 
Firms that are considered financially viable and profitable pose less risk to an 
auditor, as the likelihood of audit-related litigation is less for financially healthy firms 
(Simunic 1980). Therefore, financially healthy firms should be charged lower audit fees.  
I use three proxies for financial health.  Following Choi et al. (2010), Raghunandan and 
Rama (2006), and Whisenant et al. (2003), I employ a measure of liquidity (LIQ) in my 
model, calculated as current assets divided by current liabilities, and it represents the 
firm’s ability to satisfy short-term obligations with liquid assets.  Similar to Charles et al. 
(2010), Choi et al. (2010), and Venkataraman et al. (2008), I employ both LOSS and 
ROA as control variables in the model.  LOSS indicates whether the firm reported 
negative earnings for the year of analysis and ROA captures the firm’s return on assets, 
measured as net income divided by total assets.  Prior studies also employ ROA (Abbott 
et al. 2006; Raghunandan and Rama 2006).  I expect the coefficients on LIQ and ROA to 
be negative, and the coefficient on LOSS to be positive.4 
Each of the following represents a potential increase in risk to the auditor: firm 
growth and a qualified audit opinion.  Choi and Wong (2007) assert that the demand for 
                                                 
4 I also included in the model the variable LEV to control for a firm’s degree of leverage, but it was not 
significant in any of the test models. Therefore, for the sake of parsimony, I exclude it from my analyses. In 
addition, Menon and Williams (2001) fail to find a relation between leverage and audit fees, as do Abbott 
et al. (2006), and posit that leverage may not be an adequate proxy for auditor’s litigation risk.  
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audit services is greater for rapidly growing firms than for non-rapidly growing firms.  In 
addition, high-growth firms may present special risks to the auditor (Charles et al. 2010).  
I control for firm growth by including the book-to-market ratio (BM) in the model (an 
inverse measure of firm growth), calculated as book value per share divided by price per 
share of common stock outstanding at the end of the fiscal year of analysis.  Since this 
proxy for growth is an inverse measure, I expect the coefficient to be negative.  In 
addition, I use two measures for qualified audit opinions. Similar to Munsif et al. (2011) 
and Raghunandan and Rama (2006), I control for both an internal control weakness 
qualified opinion (ICW) as well as a going concern modified opinion (GC), and expect 
the coefficients to be positive.  
In order to control for the possible existence of audit fee premiums associated with 
high-quality (i.e., Big 4) auditors, I include the indicator variable BIG4 in the model, and 
I expect the coefficient to be positive (based on the applicable empirically supported 
theoretical arguments pertaining to audit quality presented earlier).  
Finally, I control for audit pricing that is unique to the initial year of the audit 
engagement.  The first year of the audit often requires substantial additional effort from 
the auditor (Flanigan 2002).  Conversely, auditors new to the client may discount the fees 
associated with the first year in order to secure future economic rents from the client 
(DeAngelo 1981a).   I control for these idiosyncrasies in first-year audit pricing by 
including the indicator variable AUDITINIT in the model.  This variable captures 
whether 2007 is the first year of the audit engagement.  With regard to low-balling 
(pricing the first year of audit below cost), empirical evidence has been mixed.  Those 
that find evidence of low-balling include Francis and Simon (1987), Simon and Francis 
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(1988), Ettredge and Greenberg (1990), and Sankaraguruswamy and Whisenant (2005), 
while those that do not find such evidence include Simunic (1980), Francis (1984), and 
Palmrose (1986).5   I do not predict the sign of the coefficient on AUDITINIT.  Similar to 
prior studies, I also control for industry membership and following Munsif et al. (2011). I 
use the ten industry groups as defined by Dr. French.6  
Test Variables 
Analysts make their earnings forecasts throughout the year, making revisions as 
they receive new earnings-relevant information concerning their target firms.  
Consequently, forecasts issued closer to the earnings announcement date are based on a 
more rich set of information and thus tend to be more accurate than the preceding 
forecasts, ceteris paribus (Sinha et al. 1997).  This positive association between most 
recent forecasts and forecast accuracy has been well documented in prior research 
(Crichfield et al. 1978; O’Brien 1988; Brown 1991; Sinha et al. 1997).  Hence, for the 
purpose of conservative analysis, I use the most recent forecast issued prior to the 
earnings announcement date as the analyst forecast measure, and calculate the forecast 
error for the sample of firms as actual earnings per share less forecasted earnings per 
share.  NUM_MB (NUM_MISS) represents the number of quarters a firm’s actual 
earnings exactly meets-or-just beats (or just misses), by one cent or less, the analyst 
forecast for that quarter during the twelve quarters beginning January 2005 and ending 
December 2007.   
                                                 
5 Huang et al. (2009) also study fee discounts in the initial year of audit and document that discounts were 
around 24% in 2001 and only 16% during 2005-2006. 
 
6 The classifications are available at 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html . 
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Sample and Data for Audit Fee Analysis 
I begin by obtaining the universe of firms in the I/B/E/S database, having a fiscal 
year end of December 31, and having analyst forecast data for the quarters beginning 
January 1, 2005 and ending December 31, 2007.  I remove observations with irregular 
data (e.g., having more than 12 quarterly forecasts within a 12 quarter period).  
I obtain 2007 audit fee data from the Audit Analytics database and relevant 
financial data from the Compustat annual database.  Consistent with prior research 
related to audit fees, I discard foreign firms as well as firms that operate in the financial 
sector (SIC codes 60 through 67).  I also remove one firm deemed an outlier.7  This 
process yields 1,588 firms in the final sample.  
Table 1 presents the industry distribution of the sample firms.  The majority of the 
firms operate within the manufacturing industry (49.874%), followed by the services 
industry (19.081%), and the transportation industry (14.798%).  
Table 2 displays descriptive data about the sample.  The mean (median) total assets 
for the companies in the sample are $4,398 million ($655 million).  The mean (median) 
audit fees paid by the companies in my sample are $2,378,000 ($1,184,000).  On average, 
more than half of the sample firms have operations in countries outside of the United 
States (57%).  The mean (median) measure of liquidity, ratio of current assets to current 
liabilities, is 2.926 (1.927).  On average, 27% of the sample firms reported negative 
earnings for 2007 and experienced a return on assets of -1.6%.  The mean (median) book 
to market ratio for the sample firms is 44.8% (38.8%), indicating that, on average, the 
market value of the sample firms is 2.25 times greater than the book value.  With regard 
                                                 
7 This firm had a book-to-market ratio (BM) 17 times larger than the sample’s mean BM value.  
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to qualified audit opinions, the mean (median) percentage of sample firms disclosing an 
internal control weakness is 8% (0%), and the mean (median) of firms receiving a going 
concern qualified opinion is 2% (0%).  On average, Big 4 firms audit 82% of the sampled 
companies, and only 5% have a new auditor during the year of analysis.  
All of the aforementioned descriptive statistics, with the exception of the mean and 
median values of the natural logarithm of total assets, are in line with the descriptive 
statistics presented for their fourth year of analysis in Munsif et al. (2011).8  The mean 
(median) number of quarters that a sample firm exactly met or exceeded the analyst’s 
forecast during the twelve quarters between January 2005 and December 2007 is 2.15 (2), 
while the mean (median) number of quarters in which earnings fell short of the forecast is 
.64 (0). 
Analysis of Pearson correlations involving the explanatory variables is presented in 
Table 3.  Similar to Charles et al. (2010), firm size (LN_TA) is the most strongly 
correlated variable with audit fees.  In addition, in line with the correlations presented by 
Choi et al. (2010), LN_TA has the highest correlation coefficients and is significantly 
correlated with LIQ, LOSS, ROA, and BIG4, with ρ = -0.344, -0.385, 0.339, and 0.429, 
respectively.  Only six of the correlations exceed .3 (four of which are the 
aforementioned correlations pertaining to firm size), suggesting multicollinearity is not a 
problem.  This is later confirmed by a review of the variance inflation factor (VIF) scores 
of all of the regressions, none of which are high enough to create a cause for concern of 
multicollinearity (max VIF score is 2.761). 
                                                 
8 Munsif et al. (2011) study the relationship between audit fees and firms that have remediated internal 
control weaknesses. Their fourth year of data is 2007, the same year of analysis as studied in this essay. 
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Regression Results 
Table 4 presents the regression results.  The overall regression is significant (F = 
234.243, p < 0.001) with an adjusted R2 of 77.2%.  The high R2 of the regression 
suggests a well-specified model, and is in line with the reported R2 of regression models 
utilized in extant audit fee studies, as stated by Abbott et al. (2006).  With regard to the 
control variables for which I made directional predictions, they are all significant and all 
of the signs of the coefficients are in accordance with ex ante directional expectations, 
with the exception of the GC variable. However, similar to prior research (Abbott et al. 
2006), GC is not significant in the model.  An explanation for this insignificance may be 
the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), which 
enforces proportionate liability rules in securities litigation whereby “the damages paid 
by the defendant are limited to their ‘fair share’ of wrongdoing” (Watkins et al. 2004, 
166).  This explanation is also presented in Carcello and Palmrose (1994) and referenced 
in Abbott et al. (2006).  With regard to AUDINIT, no directional prediction was made 
and the variable is not significant in the model.  
Interesting results are obtained with regard to the test variables.  Both NUM_MB 
and NUM_MISS are significant (at p < 0.05 and p < 0.10, respectively).   Specifically, 
there is a significant negative association between audit fees and the number of quarters a 
firm meets or just beats analyst forecasts by one cent (supporting the H1 hypothesis), 
while there is a marginally significant positive association between audit fees and the 
number of quarters a firm just misses such forecasts by no more than one cent 
(marginally supporting the H2 hypothesis). Stated differently, audit fees decrease 
(increase) when the frequency of meeting or just beating forecasts increases (decreases).  
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These results support my hypotheses that audit fees are associated with the frequency of 
meeting or just beating or just missing analyst earnings forecasts.  Specifically, this 
evidence documents firms that often meet or just beat analyst forecasts enjoy lower audit 
fees while firms that often just miss are penalized with higher audit fees, suggesting that 
auditors view firms that often meet or just beat analyst forecasts as posing less risk of 
auditor litigation than firms that often just miss such forecasts. 
Sensitivity Analyses 
I conduct several sensitivity tests.  Abbott et al. (2006) report that prior research 
indicates that audit fees do not increase linearly. Therefore, as in Abbott et al. (2006), I 
perform the following size-related test.  I partition the sample into two groups based on 
total assets (below, and equal to or above, the median value of the natural logarithm of 
total assets, deemed “smaller” and “larger” firms, respectively) and perform separate 
regressions on the two samples.  Table 5 presents the regression results for the larger firm 
sub-sample.  Although the NUM_MISS variable is not significant, the association 
between audit fees and NUM_MB remains negative and is significant, albeit the 
significance is marginal (p < 0.10).  Conversely, Table 6 illustrates that, when analyzing 
the smaller firms, the NUM_MB variable loses its significance, but the coefficient for the 
NUM_MISS variable is positive and significant (p < 0.05).  Collectively, these results 
suggest that the main results are driven by firm size.  Larger (smaller) firms, that 
frequently meet or just beat (just miss) analyst expectations, are viewed by the auditor as 
posing less (more) risk of auditor litigation as evidenced by lower (higher) audit fees.  
As an additional sensitivity analysis, I delete the 278 sample firms that are audited 
by non-Big 4 auditors, and thus restrict the sample to clients of Big 4 firms.  Presented in 
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Table 7, the results, which are qualitatively similar to those presented in Table 5, show 
that Big 4 auditors charge less to firms that more frequently meet or just beat analyst 
earnings expectations. 
Conclusion 
In this essay, I employ regression analysis on 1,588 non-financial, domestic firms 
having a fiscal year end of December 31, 2007, and I find that the frequency of meeting 
or just beating (just missing) analyst forecasts is negatively (positively) associated with 
audit fees.  These results suggest auditors view firms that frequently meet or just beat 
(just miss) analyst forecasts as being inherently less (more) risky.   
In this study, I use only one measure of forecast error.  Combining conservatism 
and theories concerning forecast recency (Sinha et al. 1997), I use the single most recent 
estimate as the analyst forecast measure from which I calculate the forecast error.  
Therefore, one avenue for future research is to determine whether these results hold under 
different measures of the forecast error.  
Given the results obtained herein, a second suggestion for future research is to 
further investigate the association between audit fees and firm size.  For example, 
although the results found in this essay suggest that auditors view smaller firms as 
possessing more inherent risk, the association may be driven my omitted variables, such 
as auditor tenure, audit committee expertise, and board diligence.  The evidence obtained 
in this suggested study would possibly provide insights to management pertaining to the 
cost-benefit analysis between recruiting and hiring directors with certain expertise and 
active board members and reduced audit fees.  
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CHAPTER IV: AUDIT COMMITTEE COMPENSATION AND MEETING-
BEATING ANALYST FORECASTS 
Approximately two decades ago, firms began restructuring director compensation 
plans to include incentive-based pay, with some firms requiring their directors to take 
significant equity positions within the firm.  The National Association of Corporate 
Directors (NACD) encourages greater equity (of at least 50%) in a director’s 
compensation structure (NACD 2001) for two primary reasons.  The NACD argues that 
greater equity compensation will better align directors’ interests with those of 
shareholders by directing focus on long-term rather than short-term performance goals 
(Daily and Dalton 2002; Boumosleh 2009).  However, the ultimate intent of greater 
equity compensation is to motivate directors to perform their governance responsibilities 
more effectively so that agency conflicts between management and shareholders are 
mitigated.  
Yet equity compensation in director pay can be perceived as a double-edged sword.  
This is particularly an issue of concern for directors on the audit committee. 
Compensating the independent directors on the audit committee with greater equity may 
motivate them to behave like managers seeking high returns in the short-term.  Some 
compensation experts argue it could motivate these directors to focus on short-term 
performance to the detriment of the quality of the financial reporting process, while 
others believe it will better motivate independent directors to effectively monitor 
management across a range of activities including firm performance and the quality of 
financial reporting (Barrier 2002).  
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Although compensation experts agree there is skepticism regarding the potential 
implications of equity-based compensation on independent directors’ incentives to 
effectively perform their corporate governance responsibilities, the use of equity-based 
compensation for independent directors has progressively increased in popularity (Barrier 
2002; Fich and Shivdasani 2005; Archambeault et al. 2008; Boumosleh 2009).  Such 
popularity, however, has not clearly manifested in better or improved corporate 
governance in the context of the audit committee’s oversight of the quality of financial 
reporting.  As equity-based compensation to independent directors has increased in 
popularity over the last two decades, so too has the magnitude and frequency of financial 
misreporting (Archambeault et al. 2008).  A clear example is the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s (SEC) investigation of General Electric (GE), which revealed that GE’s 
executives approved improper accounting procedures in order to meet earnings 
expectations (SEC 2009).  GE agreed to pay a $50 million penalty to settle the charges.  
While such anecdotes suggest equity compensation may have unintended consequences, 
research evidence on the implications of equity compensation for independent directors 
on the audit committee is mixed, thus leading to an impasse on the consensus regarding 
the implications of equity-based compensation on the quality of financial reporting (e.g., 
Sharma and Iselin 2006; Archambeault et al. 2008; Cullinan et al. 2008; Boumosleh 
2009).   
To advance knowledge about why certain audit committees are more effective than 
others, several researchers call for examining the incentives facing the directors on the 
audit committee.  DeZoort et al. (2002), Sharma and Iselin (2006), Archambeault et al. 
(2008), Carcello et al. (2011) and Sharma and Sharma (2011) recommend future research 
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to examine the role of the compensation paid to independent audit committee members 
and how it is related to their oversight of the quality of financial reports.  Responding to 
this call is imperative because the contemporary literature offers relatively minimal 
insight on how incentives affect the audit committee’s effectiveness in monitoring the 
quality of financial reporting.  
Equity versus cash compensation paid to directors on the audit committee is only 
now receiving more academic attention although the business press has been debating its 
merits for some time.  For example, Barrier (2002) documents interviews with 
executives, audit committee members, compensation consultants, and academics, and 
finds there is no consensus regarding what is the best form of compensation for the audit 
committee.  The issue at hand is to design a compensation structure that motivates 
directors on the audit committee to provide independent and effective oversight of 
management-prepared financial reports while ensuring that the compensation is 
commensurate with their responsibilities and does not “bind” them to management 
(Sharma and Sharma 2011).  This is an important and delicate consideration because the 
source of the compensation is under the control of management yet the principal of the 
independent directors is the shareholders.  This principal-agent relationship has given 
way to the proposition that to act in the best interests of shareholders, the independent 
directors on the audit committee should receive incentives that promote shareholders’ 
interests.  One such proposition relevant to this study is that directors should receive 
greater equity-based compensation (NACD 2001).  Whether this is appropriate is 
ultimately an empirical issue that, based on research to date, remains unclear. 
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In this essay, I aim to contribute to the limited literature on audit committee 
compensation and financial reporting quality by examining the association between 
equity and cash compensation in audit committee director pay, and the likelihood of and 
magnitude with which actual earnings exceed analyst forecasts. By so doing, I also 
inform policy-makers such as the NACD and industry compensation experts.  
Prior Literature 
The relatively few archival studies that examine the association between 
compensation paid to audit committees and financial reporting quality provides mixed 
results.9  Sharma and Iselin (2006) identify 75 firms having the necessary data for 
analysis contained in proxy statements and Compustat and that announced a restatement 
between January 1, 2001 and December 31, 2002.  The announcements were reported by 
the General Accounting Office (GAO) and relate to fiscal years 1999 through 2001.   
After obtaining a control group matched on year, four-digit SIC code, and size (total 
assets), the authors implement a “1-1 matched-pairs logistic regression” as outlined by 
Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000)10 and find that providing stock options (measured 
dichotomously) to independent directors on the audit committee does not affect financial 
restatements but cash compensation (measured as the natural logarithm of the average 
cash compensation) does.  They reason that cash compensation is not contingent on firm 
performance and thus may be a better form of remuneration for the audit committee.   
                                                 
9  In an experimental setting, Magilke et al. (2009) observe that students acting as audit committee 
members prefer more aggressive reporting if they are compensated with short-term stock options but are 
most objective when they receive no stock-based compensation.  
 
10 This form of regression analysis is applicable to matched-pairs logistic regression as opposed to non-
matched pairs logistic regression, and is recommended by Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) in order to avoid 
biased estimates of the logit parameters that can occur when a non-matched pairs logistic regression is 
utilized in a 1-1 matched-sample design (Sharma and Iselin 2006).  
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Archambeault et al. (2008) use the 10-k wizard database to identify a final sample 
of 153 firms having restated financial statements from 1999-2002.  They obtain a control 
sample by matching on year, industry as determined by SIC code, size as determined by 
total assets, and stock exchange.  Using logistic regression with the indicator variable 
RSTMT as the dependent variable, they find that a greater value of both short-term and 
long-term stock options in a director’s compensation structure is associated with a greater 
incidence of financial restatements.  They conclude that stock options incentivize 
directors to focus on firm performance, which may be achieved, as their results show, 
through manipulation of the accounts.  This evidence suggests that although stock options 
may lead to positive performance outcomes that promote shareholder interests initially, 
the performance success is achieved through devious means that eventually impose costs 
on the firm that shareholders bear. 
Using 4,489 firm-year observations over the period 1994 through 1998, Boumosleh 
(2009) employs OLS regression to analyze the association between the dependent 
variable of total accruals and the variable of interest “Director PSO” where PSO stands 
for the proportion of stock options to total compensation.  The author finds that greater 
stock option compensation in a director’s compensation structure is related to lower 
financial reporting quality proxied by total accruals.  His results suggest that greater cash 
compensation is a more effective form of compensation.  However, Boumosleh (2009) 
examines the compensation of all directors on the board.11 
 
                                                 
11 The average director compensation is about $94,000 and the maximum is greater than $34 million for the 
period (1994-1998). See Yermack (2004) for details of director pay over time. 
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Cullinan et al. (2010) study 486 U.S. firms of which 243 have an adverse internal 
control report in 2004 to 2005.  Observations having internal control deficiencies were 
obtained from the Audit Analytics database and control observations were matched 
according to SIC code and total assets.  The existence of an audit committee stock option 
plan was determined by reading through proxy statements.  Using logistic regression, 
they report a positive association between the presence of a stock option compensation 
plan and the likelihood of an internal control deficiency suggesting that implementing a 
stock option plan for directors on the audit committee is detrimental to the audit 
committee’s effectiveness in overseeing the quality of financial reporting.   
In summary, it is clear that the evidence associated with specific implications of 
equity in the compensation structure of audit committees on financial reporting quality is 
mixed.  One possible explanation is the use of different measures of compensation; 
Sharma and Iselin (2006) and Cullinan et al. (2010) use dichotomous measures because 
disclosure on director compensation is limited at the time of analysis.  Archambeault et 
al. (2008) and Boumosleh (2009) estimate values of stock options making various 
assumptions.  However, since December 15, 2006 the SEC requires proxy statements to 
disclose more details of director compensation including the quantity and value of any 
stock options granted.12  Consequently, databases such as Corporate Library now disclose 
such data, which I exploit in this study. 
 
 
                                                 
12 SEC final rule issued September 8, 2006. Release nos. 33-8732A, 34-54302A, and IC-27444A. File No. 
S7-03-06, available at: http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2006/33-8732afr.pdf. 
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Development of Compensation Related Hypotheses 
The agency framework suggests that to ensure directors provide effective oversight 
of management and protect shareholders’ interests, directors need to be appropriately 
compensated (Elson 1995; Daily and Dalton 2002; Hillman and Dalziel 2003; Sharma 
and Iselin 2006; Archambeault et al. 2008).  If directors’ compensation is structured so as 
to incentivize them to act like shareholders, then it is expected that they, as agents of the 
shareholders, will protect the interests of shareholders by performing effective oversight 
of management.  Since the financial reports are prepared by management, and 
independent directors on the audit committee are responsible for overseeing that the 
reports are not subject to manipulation by management, it follows that appropriately 
compensated audit committee directors will discharge their financial reporting oversight 
responsibilities objectively.  
The compensation structure of directors comprises equity and cash, with a greater 
proportion of equity-based compensation (Monks and Minow 2001; Yermack 2004).  The 
equity incentive component is largely in the form of stock options, because the belief is 
that granting stock options will align the directors’ interests to those of shareholders, as it 
will motivate directors to ensure management engages in projects that create value for the 
firm (NACD 2001; 2003).  This belief is empirically supported in research providing 
evidence that stock option compensation paid to directors is positively related to firm 
value (Fich and Shivdasani 2005). 
However, apart from creating firm value, shareholders’ interests also lie in 
management preparing reports that are not subject to earnings manipulation.  In this 
context, stock options as a form of compensation to independent directors, especially 
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those on the audit committee, may not be appropriate.  This is because stock option 
compensation may induce directors to engage in more risk, at a level higher than 
shareholders’ preference, as the increase in share price from manipulated unexpected 
earnings, unknown to the market at that time, would yield benefits to the directors as they 
cash in their options (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia 1998; Sanders and Hambrick 2007).   
The SEC investigations of stock option backdating scandals at UnitedHealth, 
Cablevision Systems, Comverse Technology, Silicon Solutions, Broadcom and others 
suggests that independent directors failed in their duty to prevent the backdating scandals 
arguably because they too sought to gain from such practices.  This assertion has also 
been expressed on Wall Street.  For example, Kenneth A. Bertsch, director of corporate 
governance for TIAA-CREF, says: “Indeed, directors should not get stock options, which 
create an incentive to juice the stock price in the short run as they prepare to cash in 
options” (McNamee et al. 2002).  
These anecdotes suggest that stock option-based incentive pay to directors has 
significant implications for a director’s objectivity.  The CEO entrenchment and 
compensation literature supports this idea because highly paid independent directors, 
primarily in the form of stock options, are loyal to the CEO and such a culture in the 
boardroom does not permit constructive criticism of management policies (Brick et al. 
2006).  Extending this proposition to the audit committee will imply that audit committee 
members receiving greater proportion of their compensation in stock options may not 
disagree with management’s assertions regarding the financial statements.  Audit 
committee members that are compensated with stock options will stand to gain from 
cashing-in their options if the firm meets or just beats or exceedingly beats analysts’ 
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forecasted earnings.  Such directors may be inclined to compromise their objectivity by 
supporting financial reporting decisions made by management.  Directors remunerated 
more in cash, which usually is a fixed amount and is not contingent on firm performance, 
do not stand to gain from a share price increase if a firm meets or just beats or 
exceedingly beats analysts forecasts. 
The preceding discussion leads me to expect that greater equity compensation in the 
audit committee directors’ total compensation structure would be positively associated 
with the likelihood of meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts.  Alternatively, I expect that 
greater cash compensation in the audit committee directors’ total compensation structure 
will be negatively associated with the likelihood of meeting or beating analysts’ 
forecasts.  Thus, I present three pairs of hypotheses that examine the association between 
audit committee compensation structure and both meet or just beat and the extent to 
which actual earnings exceed analysts’ forecasts. 
H3a:  The proportion of audit committee total compensation that is equity-based 
 is positively associated with the likelihood of meeting or just beating 
 analysts’ forecasted earnings. 
 
H3b:  The proportion of audit committee total compensation that is equity-based 
 is positively associated with the likelihood of actual earnings exceeding 
 analysts’ forecasted earnings. 
 
H4a:  The proportion of audit committee total compensation that is cash-based is  
  negatively associated with the likelihood of meeting or just beating analysts’ 
  forecasted earnings. 
 
H4b:  The proportion of audit committee total compensation that is cash-based is 
 negatively associated with the likelihood of actual earnings exceeding 
 analysts’ forecasted earnings. 
 
H5a:  The ratio of cash-based to equity-based audit committee compensation is  
  negatively associated with the likelihood of meeting or just beating analysts’ 
  forecasted earnings. 
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H5b:  The ratio of cash-based to equity-based audit committee compensation is  
  negatively associated with the likelihood of actual earnings exceeding  
  analysts’ forecasted earnings. 
 
Compensation Model 
I base the empirical model on prior research that examines the effects of audit 
committee compensation on the likelihood of a financial restatement (Sharma & Iselin 
2006; Archambeault et al. 2008) and internal control weakness (Cullinan et al. 2010), as 
well as on literature addressing the likelihood of firms engaging in the meet or just beat 
strategy of earnings management (Frankel et al. 2002; Cheng and Warfield 2005; Chevis 
et al. 2007; Davis et al. 2009).  Accordingly, I employ logistic regression to model the 
probability of a firm meeting or just beating or exceedingly beating analysts’ earnings 
forecasts as a function of the structure of compensation paid to the members of the firm’s 
audit committee while controlling for firm-specific and other governance characteristics. 
The model is specified as follows: 
Meet-Beat  = β0 + β1* LN_TA + β2* LEV + β3* ROA + 
  β4* MKTBOOK + β5* LITRISK + β6* BIG4 +  
  β7* INSIDEOWN + β8* CEO_EQ +  
   β9* ACIND + β10* ACEXPERT 
   + β11* (audit committee compensation metric:   
    AC_EQUITY or AC_CASH or CASHTOEQ) 
   + β12-20 * (INDUSTRY) + ε 
 
where: 
 
LN_TA  = natural logarithm of total assets; 
LEV  = total liabilities divided by total assets; 
ROA  = net income divided by total assets; 
MKTBOOK = market to book ratio, calculated as stock price at fiscal  
    year end divided by book value per share; 
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LITRISK = 1 if firm’s SIC code is 2833 – 2836, 3570 – 3577,  
    3600 – 3674, 5200 – 5961, or 7370 – 7370, 0 otherwise; 
BIG4  = 1 if firm is audited by a Big4 accounting firm in sample  
    year, 0  otherwise; 
INSIDEOWN = percentage of firm equity owned by insiders during the  
    sample year;  
CEO_EQ = percentage of equity-based compensation in the CEO’s  
    total compensation structure; 
ACIND  = 1 if the firm’s audit committee is comprised entirely of  
    independent directors, 0 otherwise; 
ACEXPERT = 1 if the firm’s audit committee has appointed an expert,  
    0 otherwise; 
AC_EQUITY = audit committee’s average value of equity    
    compensation comprised of stock and stock options to  
    average total compensation as reported by Corporate  
    Library; 
AC_CASH = audit committee’s average cash compensation to   
    average total compensation as reported by Corporate  
    Library; 
CASHTOEQ = audit committee’s natural logarithm of average cash  
    compensation to the natural logarithm of the average equity 
    compensation as reported by Corporate Library; 
INDUSTRY = Fama-French 10 group industry indicator variables. 
 
Dependent Variables 
Analysts make their earnings forecasts throughout the year, making revisions as 
they receive new earnings-relevant information concerning their target firms.  
Consequently, forecasts issued closer to the earnings announcement date are based on a 
more rich information set and thus tend to be more accurate than the preceding forecasts, 
ceteris paribus (Sinha et al. 1997).  This positive association between forecast recency 
and forecast accuracy has been well documented in prior research (Crichfield et al. 1978; 
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O’Brien 1988; Brown 1991; Sinha et al. 1997).  Hence, I use the most recent forecast 
issued prior to the earnings announcement date as the analyst forecast measure, and 
calculate the forecast error for the sample of firms as actual earnings per share less 
forecasted earnings per share.  I employ four meet-beat metrics as the dependent variable: 
MB  = 1 if actual earnings reported meets or exceeds the analyst’s  
    forecast by one cent per share or less  
    (i.e., $0.00 ≤ forecast  error ≤ $0.01), 0 otherwise; 
BIGBEAT = 1 if actual earnings reported exceeds the analyst’s forecast  
    by more than one cent per share  
    (i.e., forecast error > $0.01), 0 otherwise; 
BIGBEAT_04 = 1 if actual earnings reported exceeds the analyst’s forecast  
    by 4 cents or more  
    (i.e., forecast error > $0.04), 0 otherwise; 
BIGBEAT_05 = 1 if actual earnings reported exceeds the analyst’s forecast  
    by 5 cents or more  
    (i.e., forecast error > $0.05), 0 otherwise. 
 
Prior research considers meeting or beating analysts’ forecasted earnings by one 
penny a form of earnings management (e.g., Frankel et al. 2002).  The first meet or just 
beat metric follows this reasoning (MB).  The remaining proxies are notated BIGBEAT, 
BIGBEAT_04, and BIGBEAT_05 because firms beating analysts’ forecasted earnings by 
more than one penny are considered to have increasingly surprised the market and 
potentially exceeded the forecasted earnings by engaging in greater levels of earnings 
management (Frankel et al. 2002; Cheng and Warfield 2005; Chevis et al. 2007; Davis et 
al. 2009).  Cheng and Warfield (2005) use earnings surprises of $0.04 or more and $0.05 
or more as measures for beating analysts’ forecasts by a “large” margin.  I adopt a similar 
practice and use both $0.04 (BIGBEAT_04) and $0.05 (BIGBEAT_05) as the 
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determining measures of exceeding forecasts by a “large” margin.13 
Control Variables 
The first control variable is firm size.  Prior research (e.g., Cheng and Warfield 
2005; Sharma and Iselin 2006; Chevis et al. 2007; Archambeault et al. 2008; Davis et al. 
2009) controls for size because larger firms experience greater analyst and market 
scrutiny and thus are less likely to manipulate earnings.  However, larger firms may face 
more pressure to meet earnings expectations so the incentive to manipulate earnings 
could be relatively greater than small firms.  Consistent with prior research, I proxy firm 
size using the natural logarithm of total assets (LN_TA) and do not predict the directional 
association between firm size and the likelihood of meeting or just beating or exceedingly 
beating earnings expectations. 
I include leverage (LEV) as a control variable in the model as prior research shows 
a relation between leverage and the likelihood of meeting or beating earnings 
expectations.  Chevis et al. (2007) and Davis et al. (2009) report a positive association 
between leverage and the likelihood to meet or beat analyst forecasts.  Prior research also 
documents an association between leverage and discretionary accruals as a proxy for 
earnings management (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; DeAngelo et al. 1994; Cheng and 
Warfield 2005; Boumosleh 2009).  Specifically, Boumosleh (2009) finds that leverage is 
significant and positively associated with total accruals, however Cheng and Warfield 
(2005) find leverage to be negatively associated with abnormal accruals.  These mixed 
                                                 
13 I further justify the use of $0.04 and $0.05 as measures of “big beat” as follows. I use 4 cents because the 
percentage of sample observations in Cheng and Warfield (2005) [this essay] that exceeded earnings 
forecasts by 4 cents is 4.1 [4.3] percent. I use 5 cents because 4.3 percent of the observations in my sample 
exceeded earnings forecasts by 5 cents, resulting in the same sample size as the 4 cents sample. Cheng and 
Warfield (2005) also use 3 cents and 6 cents, and I do the same in the sensitivity analyses section. 
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results suggest that highly leveraged firms are either under pressure to meet or exceed 
performance benchmarks in order to attract future investors, or they are subject to greater 
scrutiny from debt-holders thus curbing management’s temptations to engage in earnings 
management.  Given these alternative explanations, I do not predict a directional 
association between LEV and the dependent variables. 
I control for firm performance because firms with higher performance may face less 
incentives to manipulate earnings or, because they are high performers, they may feel 
market pressure to maintain or exceed performance expectations (e.g., Cheng and 
Warfield 2005; Chevis et al. 2007; Davis et al. 2009).  Accordingly, I do not predict a 
directional association for firm performance measured as return on assets (ROA). 
I include a variable to capture the growth of the firm as represented by the firm’s 
market-to-book ratio (MKTBOOK).  In line with prior studies (Frankel et al. 2002; 
Cheng and Warfield 2005; Boumosleh 2009), I predict the coefficient on this variable to 
be positive.  I also include an indicator variable to capture whether the firm operates 
within a litigious industry (LITRISK), as earlier research has documented that firms in 
litigious industries are more likely to meet or just beat analysts’ forecasts (Cheng and 
Warfield 2005) and that firms in high risk industries are more inclined to manage 
earnings (Beasley et al. 2000; Frankel et al. 2002).  Based on these documented 
associations, I predict the coefficient of LITRISK to be positive. 
Following prior studies, I include an indicator variable to control for auditor type 
(BIG4). Sharma and Iselin (2006) find a negative association between auditor type and 
the likelihood of restatement and Cullinan et al. (2010) find a significant negative 
association between auditor type and the probability of an internal control weakness.   
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However, Archambeault et al. (2008) document a positive association between auditor 
type and the likelihood of restatement and Davis et al. (2009) find a significantly positive 
association between auditor type and the likelihood of meeting or beating analyst 
forecasts.  Given the mixed results concerning the influence of a Big N accounting firm 
on a client’s proclivity to engage in various measures of earnings management as well as 
the likelihood of the firm having an internal control weakness, I do not predict the sign of 
the coefficient on the BIG4 control variable.  
Insider ownership (INSIDEOWN), that is ownership by management, has the 
potential to either instigate or prevent earnings manipulation.  Agency theory posits that 
providing equity ownership in the firm encourages management to behave like 
shareholders, while the theory also predicts that inside ownership can incentivize 
management to become entrenched and adopt strategies that promote their own interests 
(Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983).  Consequently, I do not predict the sign of the 
coefficient on INSIDEOWN.  
The significant economic consequences of meeting or just beating analysts’ 
forecasts, and the extent of beating, have led management to adopt earnings manipulation 
practices (Bartov et al. 2002; Barua et al. 2006; Burgstahler & Eames 2006), particularly 
when management is incentivized through equity compensation (Healy 1985; 
Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Du et al. 2007).  Extant literature documents a 
significant positive association between CEO compensation and financial reporting 
failure (Efendi et al. 2007; Johnson et al. 2007) and between CEO compensation and the 
proclivity to meet or just beat analysts’ quarterly earnings forecasts (Bauman and Shaw 
2006).  Accordingly, I include the variable CEO_EQ in the model to control for the 
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extent to which the CEO’s compensation package is equity based, and expect it to be 
positively associated with the likelihood of meeting or just beating, or exceedingly 
beating, analysts’ forecasts. 
The variable ACIND represents whether the firm’s audit committee is comprised 
entirely of independent directors.  The inclusion of this variable in the model is derived 
from prior literature documenting a negative association between ACIND and the 
likelihood of restatement (Abbott et al. 2004; Bedard et al. 2004) as well as the 
probability of an internal control weakness (Naiker and Sharma 2009; Cullinan et al. 
2010).   I therefore expect a negative coefficient on the ACIND variable.   
Based on prior research indicating that audit committees having members with 
financial expertise are associated with generally better quality financial reporting (Abbott 
et al. 2004; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008; Beasley et al. 2009; Naiker and Sharma 
2009; Dhaliwal et al. 2010), I include ACEXPERT in the model to capture whether the 
sample firm’s audit committee has identified an expert or not. I expect this variable to 
have a negative coefficient.  Following recent prior research (Naiker and Sharma 2009; 
Dhaliwal et al. 2010), I define an expert as an audit committee member who possesses 
accounting expertise by way of a CPA designation or experience as a financial controller 
or a chief financial officer.  
Finally, I control for the industry in which the firm operates by using the ten 
industry groups, as defined by Dr. French.  The classifications are available at  
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 
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Test Variables 
I use three measures for compensation paid to the audit committee members. First, 
similar to Archambeault et al. (2008) who also measure their equity compensation 
variables as percentages of total compensation, I compute the ratio of the average sum of 
stock and stock options to average total compensation paid to the audit committee as 
reported by Corporate Library (AC_EQUITY).  Audit committee members are given 
stock options as a means of aligning their interests with those of shareholders in order to 
more effectively monitor management.  However, equity incentives may instead align 
these directors’ interests with those of management in order to capitalize on equity 
payouts.  Unlike other studies that only capture the presence of an equity component in 
the compensation paid to audit committee directors (Sharma and Iselin 2006; Persellin 
2009; Cullinan et al. 2010), I measure this variable continuously in order to assess not 
only the ability of this variable to impact the likelihood of a firm managing earnings in 
order to meet or just beat earnings forecasts, but also the degree to which the value of 
equity compensation is related to the likelihood of actual earnings exceeding analysts’ 
forecasted earnings. 
Second, cash compensation is measured as the ratio of average total cash 
compensation to average total compensation paid to the directors on the audit committee 
(AC_CASH).  I include this variable of interest, and employ it as a continuous measure 
relative to total compensation, for the following reasons.  Prior literature has focused 
primarily on the effects of equity-based compensation on financial reporting quality 
without also analyzing the effects of cash compensation (e.g., Archambeault et al. 2008; 
Cullinan et al. 2010).  Since a director’s total compensation comprises equity, cash, and 
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other payments, it is not always the case that a high (low) equity component means a low 
(high) cash component.  That is, these two components are not completely inversely 
related.  Third, due to data limitations, prior studies (e.g., Sharma and Iselin 2006) have 
not been able to measure the cash component in an audit committee director’s 
compensation structure. 
The third measure of compensation is a derivative of the two aforementioned 
variables and is the ratio of the natural logarithm of average total cash compensation to 
the natural logarithm of average total equity compensation (CASHTOEQ).  I adopt this 
approach because it allows me to test the effects of the relative values of cash and equity 
compensation against each other.  Since I predict that cash compensation has an earnings 
manipulation reduction effect and equity compensation incentivizes earnings 
manipulation, this measure will allow for the evaluation of the relative power of cash and 
equity compensation against each other on earnings manipulation. 
Sample and Data for Compensation Analysis 
I begin with the universe of firms having a 2007 fiscal year end of December 31 
with earnings and forecast data in the I/B/E/S database.  I then delete firms with missing 
firm control variables as well as firms missing data required for deriving the variables of 
interest.  Therefore, the final sample is comprised of the intersection of firms having the 
necessary data in I/B/E/S, Compustat, and Corporate Library, which yields 1,011 firms. 
I limit the sample to 2007 for the following three reasons.  First, the focus is on 
compensation paid to directors on the audit committee.  The SEC disclosure rules on 
director compensation disclosure became effective on December 15, 2006.  The 
Corporate Library database provides more complete director compensation data for fiscal 
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2007 than for 2006.  Second, I focus on 2007 to ensure that any over-reaction, anxiety 
over compensation disclosure requirements, or lack of clarity pertaining to the new 
regulation will have settled by then.  Companies have traditionally been reluctant to 
provide executive compensation disclosures and their reaction has been similar for 
director compensation.14  Third, I limit the sample to 2007 to avoid the most recent 
tumultuous period (2008-2009) due to the financial meltdown.15 
Table 8 Panel A presents the industry distribution of the final sample. The majority 
of the sample observations are manufacturing firms (36.60%), followed by finance or 
insurance firms (22.65%), and service firms (14.83%).  This distribution is similar to 
prior research (e.g., Chevis et al. 2007) that examines meeting or beating analysts’ 
forecasts.  Panel B illustrates the frequency of forecast errors within the sample.  The 
actual earnings for approximately one third (32.34%) of the sample firms were less than 
the forecast earnings for the sample period. 195 of the sample firms (19.29%) met, or just 
beat by one cent, analyst forecasts for the sample period, and the remainder (489 firms, or 
48.37%) of the firms exceeded analyst forecasts by a margin greater than one cent.  
Results 
Table 9 presents the descriptive statistics for the full sample, as well as for two sub-
samples of firms partitioned by the full sample median forecast error  ($0.01).  The 
results of tests of differences in means between the two sub-samples are also presented.  
With regard to control variables, the univariate results illustrate firms that exceeded 
                                                 
14 The Division of Corporate Finance reviewed the compensation disclosures issued by 350 selected firms 
for the first year under the new disclosure policy, and generally found the disclosures to be lacking 
prominence as well as presentation of the determinants of the compensation structure (SEC 2007). 
 
15 Examining one financial period also helps to minimize and control for non-independence effects, 
heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation. 
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analysts’ expectations to a degree less than the full sample’s median positive forecast 
error of $0.01 are significantly different from the firms having a forecast error of equal to 
or greater than $0.01 in the following ways: they are more leveraged, less profitable, less 
likely to be audited by a Big 4 firm, and employ management having greater inside 
ownership.  
The univariate results indicate that firms having earnings forecast errors that are 
less than the sample median forecast error of $0.01 compensate the members on the audit 
committee significantly more in cash as opposed to equity.  Specifically, the 
compensation structure of audit committee members in firms having a forecast error less 
than (more than) the median error is comprised of, on average, 48.9% (52.5%) stock and 
stock options and 45.7% (41.9%) cash compensation16.  Further, the ratio of cash 
compensation to equity compensation is significantly greater for firms having forecast 
error of less than  $0.01 compared to firms having a forecast error of greater than $0.01.  
In summary, the univariate results provide initial evidence of an association between 
forecast error and how the audit committee is compensated.  
Table 10 presents the Pearson correlations between the variables in the model, 
including all four measures of the dependent variable.  The highest correlation, with ρ = -
0.941, is between AC_EQUITY and CASHTOEQ, which is not surprising.  However, 
since I do not include these two variables together in a model, this does not present a 
threat of multicollinearity.  Excluding the high correlations amongst the dependent 
                                                 
16 Note that the percentages of average stock and stock option compensation to average total compensation 
(AC_EQUITY) and average cash to average total compensation (AC_CASH) do not sum to 1. This is 
because firms in the sample also remunerate with “pension” and “other” types of compensation. Since these 
types of compensation are in the minority (representing only 4.9% and 6.2% of average total compensation 
offered in the sample firms), they are excluded from the analysis conducted in this essay. 
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variables and the variables of interest, only one correlation is above .30, which suggests 
that multicollinearity is not a problem during regression analysis in any of the models.  In 
addition, I observe that the cash-based compensation measures (AC_CASH and 
CASHTOEQ) are negatively correlated with all four meat-beat metrics (i.e. the 
dependent variables), and are significant (p < 0.05) for three of the four (BIGBEAT, 
BIGBEAT_04, and BIGBEAT_05).  On the contrary, equity-based compensation is 
positively correlated with all four dependent variables, but the correlations are significant 
for only two of them (BIGBEAT_04 and BIGBEAT_05).  
Tables 11 reports the results obtained from multivariate logistic regression when 
the meet-beat metric is meeting or just beating analysts’ forecasted earnings by $0.01 
(MB).  This model is used to test the H3a, H4a, and H5a hypotheses that pertain to meeting 
or just beating ($0.00 ≤ forecast error ≤  $0.01) analysts’ forecasted earnings.  The results 
show that none of the audit committee compensation variables of interest are significant, 
although the signs of the coefficients are in line with the hypotheses. 
Tables 12, 13, and 14 present the results obtained from logistic regression when the 
dependent variable is set to BIGBEAT, BIGBEAT_04, and BIGBEAT_05, respectively.  
These models are used to test H3b, H4b, and H5b hypotheses pertaining to the association 
between audit committee compensation structure and the extent to which the firm 
exceeds analysts’ earnings forecasts.  When the dependent variable is set to BIGBEAT 
(Table 12), the audit committee compensation variables AC_CASH and CASHTOEQ 
have negative coefficients that are significant at p < 0.01 and p < 0.05, respectively.  
AC_EQUITY has a positive coefficient and is significant at p < 0.10.  When the 
dependent variable is set to BIGBEAT_04 (Table 13) and BIGBEAT_05 (Table 14), all 
  60
three compensation variables are significant as predicted at p < 0.01.  More specifically, 
AC_EQUITY is positive and significant while AC_CASH and CASHTOEQ are negative 
and significant.  Overall, this evidence suggests that an association exists between the 
type and amount of compensation paid to audit committee members and the extent to 
which the firm exceeds earnings expectations.  
Regarding the results associated with the control variables in Tables 12 through 14, 
ACEXPERT is the only control variable that remains consistently significant in all nine 
regressions.  It is negatively associated with all three beat metrics at the p < 0.01 level. 
These results lend further support to existing literature documenting evidence showing 
that audit committees that have members with financial expertise are associated with 
generally better quality financial reporting (Beasley et al. 2009).  
LN_TA, LITRISK, and ACIND are consistently not significant in all nine 
regressions.  One explanation for the non-significance of ACIND is that, since my year of 
analysis is 2007, most audit committees during this period are comprised entirely of 
independent directors as required by SOX. LEV and MKTBOOK are significant (p < 
0.01) and negatively associated with the beat metric in six of the nine regressions.  While 
the results pertaining to LEV suggest that highly leveraged firms may be subject to 
greater scrutiny from debt-holders thus curbing management’s temptations to engage in 
earnings management, the results pertaining to MKTBOOK are counterintuitive.   
INSIDEOWN is only significantly associated with the beat metric in five of the nine 
regressions, with p-values ranging from p < 0.10 to p < 0.05.  Interestingly, this control 
variable is negatively associated with the BIGBEAT and the BIGBEAT_04 dependent 
variables.  These results are contrary to the theory that inside ownership can incentivize 
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management to become entrenched and adopt strategies that promote their own interests 
(Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983).  However, CEO_EQ is positive and significant, 
with p-values ranging from p < 0.10 to p < 0.01, in five of the regressions lending some 
credence to the theory that management may be incentivized to participate in earnings 
manipulation when compensated through equity compensation (Healy 1985; Bergstresser 
and Philippon 2006; Du et al. 2007) and the level of manipulation is associated with the 
level of equity pay.  
Finally, ROA and BIG4 are significant (p < 0.01) and positively associated with the 
dependent variable in only the three regressions, where the dependent variable is set to 
BIGBEAT.  This suggests that more profitable companies, likely audited by Big 4 firms, 
are more likely to beat earnings expectations by a larger margin.  
The aforementioned results collectively present that the type of compensation, 
whether predominantly equity-based or predominantly cash-based, paid to audit 
committee directors is significantly related to the extent by which a firm is likely to 
manage earnings in order to beat analysts forecasts.  These findings complement prior 
research providing evidence implying that cash-based director compensation is more 
effective in preserving the effectiveness of the audit committee’s financial reporting 
oversight role.  The results also extend prior research by documenting that equity-based 
compensation incentivizes audit committee directors to focus on exceeding earnings 
expectations by larger margins.  This suggests that equity-based compensation motivates 
independent directors on the audit committee to focus on short-term performance thereby 
aligning their interests with management. The implication is that equity-based 
compensation could potentially entrench independent directors who are supposed to 
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oversee management and encourage cronyism in the boardroom.  
Sensitivity Analyses 
I conduct a number of sensitivity analyses to confirm the robustness of the results.  
I begin by performing regressions on two additional measures of the big beat metric.  
Following Cheng and Warfield (2005), I run additional regressions where BIGBEAT_03 
(forecast error ≥ $0.03) or BIGBEAT_06 (forecast error ≥ $0.06) is set as the dependent 
variable.  Table 15 (Table 16) present the results of the model when the dependent 
variable is set to BIGBEAT_03 (BIGBEAT_06).  In both cases, the coefficients on the 
audit committee compensation variables retain their expected sign and the variables are 
significant; AC_EQUITY is positive and significant at p < 0.01, and AC_CASH and 
CASHTOEQ are negative and significant at p < 0.01.  In addition, the variables retain 
their directional association with the dependent variables and become increasingly 
significant as the margin of forecast error increases (i.e. significance increases when the 
dependent variable changes from BIGBEAT_03 to BIGBEAT_06).  With regard to the 
control variables, the results obtained when BIGBEAT_03 is the dependent variable are 
similar to those obtained when the dependent variable is set to BIGBEAT_04, with the 
following differences.  The coefficients on ROA and BIG4 are positive and become 
significant at p < 0.01 and p < 0.05, respectively. These results indicate a significant, 
positive association between firm profitability and auditor type only when actual earnings 
exceed forecasted earnings by $0.03 or more.  INSIDEOWN becomes significant at p < 
0.01, lending further contradictory evidence concerning the potential for earnings 
management when inside ownership is present (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983).  The 
results obtained when BIGBEAT_06 is set as the dependent variable are qualitatively 
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similar to the results obtained when BIGBEAT_05 is the dependent variable, with no 
change in significance in any of the control variables.  
I also run the regression with BIGBEAT_07 (beat is equal to or greater than $0.07) 
set as the dependent variable.  The results obtained, which are not tabulated, are 
qualitatively similar to those obtained when the dependent variable is set to either 
BIGBEAT_05 or BIGBEAT_06.  
Next, given that “[i]nternal governance structures are established to maintain the 
credibility of firms’ financial statements and safeguard against such behavior as earnings 
manipulation” (Dechow et al. 1996, 4), I control for three additional measures of 
corporate governance in the models where the dependent variable is set to BIGBEAT_04 
or BIGBEAT_05 to see if the directions of the coefficients and the significance of any of 
the variables of interest change.  Since the board of directors plays an important role in 
establishing the internal controls of financial reporting (Beasley 1996; Farber 2005; 
Krishnan 2005), I control for board independence (LN_BDOUTSIZE), board diligence 
(LN_BDMTGS), and long-term board tenure (PCT_BDTEN15).  LN_BDOUTSIZE is 
defined as the natural logarithm of the number of outside directors on the board during 
the year of analysis, LN_BDMTGS is the natural logarithm of the number of the total 
number of meetings held by the board of directors during the year of analysis, and 
PCT_BDTEN15 is the percentage of directors having tenure on the board of greater than 
15 years as of the year of analysis.  LN_BDOUTSIZE and LN_BDMTGS are 
significantly positive (p < 0.01) in all six regressions with no change to the main results. 
These results suggest that firms with more independent, diligent boards of directors 
exceed earnings forecasts to a larger extent, which conflicts with most evidence obtained 
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in studies concerning board independence and earnings management (Dechow 1996; 
Klein 2002).  With regard to PCT_BDTEN15, I include it in the model to capture the 
potential degradation in the quality of financial reporting oversight that may be attributed 
to long-tenured directors.  The coefficient on this variable is not significant in any of the 
regressions, and the main test results do not change.  
Finally, I perform the following size-related tests.  I partition the sample into two 
groups based on total assets (below, and equal to or above, the median value of the 
natural logarithm of total assets) and perform separate regressions, 24 regressions in total 
(three for each of the four different meet-beat or large beat metrics, for each of the 
partitioned sub-samples).  For ease of discussion, I refer to the sub-sample having a 
measure of LN_TA less than (equal to or greater than) the median value as “smaller” 
(“larger”) firms.  For the larger firms, the coefficients on the variables of interest are 
significant (p < 0.01) at directional expectations when the dependent variable is MB, but 
are not significant (however directions remain in line with expectations) when the 
dependent variable is BIGBEAT, BIGBEAT_04, or BIGBEAT_05 (with the exception of 
AC_CASH, which is negative and significant at p < 0.10 when the dependent variable is 
BIGBEAT_05).  The results for smaller firms are in the reverse; the model is not 
significant when the dependent variable is set to MB, however the variables of interest 
are significant (p < 0.01), and as predicted, when the dependent variable is BIGBEAT_04 
or BIGBEAT_05.  When the dependent variable is BIGBEAT, the only variable of 
interest that is significant, as predicted, is AC_CASH (p < 0.10).  
The aforementioned size-related results offer some interesting insights.  They 
collectively present that the type of compensation, whether predominantly equity-based 
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or predominantly cash-based, paid to audit committee directors is significantly related to 
the likelihood of meeting or just beating earnings forecasts in larger firms, and is 
significantly related to the extent by which a firm is likely to manage earnings in order to 
beat analysts forecasts in smaller firms.  These results may be indicative of different 
types of pressures that differentially sized firms might face.  For instance, consistent with 
prior research, management in larger firms may manipulate earnings just enough to either 
meet or just beat earnings forecasts so as to not experience the negative economic 
consequences associated with missing such a benchmark (Bartov et al. 2002; Barua et al. 
2006; Bauman and Shaw 2006; Burgstahler & Eames 2006), whereas management in 
smaller firms may be attempting to artificially “grow” firm valuation through 
manipulating earnings in order to exceed earnings forecasts to a larger extent.  In either 
case, the type of compensation paid to the firm’s audit committee directors plays an 
important role in curbing such behavior.  
Conclusion 
In this essay, I find evidence suggesting a significant association between audit 
committee compensation and meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts.  Specifically, I find 
that neither cash nor option/equity-based compensation is significantly associated with 
the likelihood of meeting or just beating analysts’ earnings forecasts.  However, I observe 
that greater equity in the compensation structure is positively associated with the 
likelihood of actual earnings beating forecasted earnings by a greater margin ($0.04 and 
$0.05).  Conversely, greater cash compensation in the pay structure of independent 
directors on the audit committee is inversely related to the likelihood of actual earnings 
exceeding forecasts by a large margin.  These findings suggest that compensation plans 
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comprised predominantly of cash, as opposed to stock and stock options, are “best” at 
preserving objectivity in financial reporting oversight tasks performed by the audit 
committee.  I posit that since equity-based (cash-based) compensation is (is not) tied to 
the financial performance of the firm, it is, therefore, more (less) likely to incentivize 
directors to align their interests with those of managers.    
My results suggest interesting avenues for future research.  One avenue is to assess 
whether auditors share the same concerns with regard to the effects of director equity 
compensation and investigate if auditors price audit services higher for firms that 
compensate their directors primarily through incentive-based pay.   
Another option is to further explore the results associated with larger versus smaller 
firms. The evidence documented in the first essay suggests that auditors view smaller 
firms as bearing more risk of auditor litigation. One explanation for this finding, to be 
empirically supported via future research, is that auditors are aware of the unique 
pressures that smaller as opposed to larger firms face, and may thus price their audits 
accordingly.  
An additional avenue for future research is to confirm the results documented 
herein in performing regression analysis by replacing the current dependent variables 
with a different empirically derived measure of earnings management (i.e. discretionary 
accruals) and determine if results associated with the test variables remain unchanged.  
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CHAPTER V: AUDIT COMMITTEE CHARACTERISTICS AND REPEATEDLY 
MEETING OR BEATING ANALYST FORECASTS 
In an effort to identify what constitutes a “good” audit committee, DeFond and 
Francis (2005) and Carcello et al. (2011) call for additional research addressing specific 
characteristics of the audit committee beyond independence and expertise. Audit 
committee member tenure and the number of other directorships are two issues that have 
received increasing attention from effective governance advocates and others in recent 
years.   
DeZoort et al. (2002, 66) call for an enhancement of the richness of audit 
committee composition measures, specifically suggesting, “research could address 
whether …current audit committee tenure affects overall ACE [audit committee 
effectiveness].”  A survey by Heidrick and Struggles (2007) finds that 21 percent of 
companies had a term-limit policy for directors, and that this proportion had doubled 
since 2000.  Shareholder activists have recently put forth proposals at many companies 
concerning placing a limit on the number of years a director can serve.17  Reflecting this 
trend, publications issued by the Big 4 now discuss audit committee director tenure issues 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2000; Deloitte 2010).  For example, Deloitte (2010) notes in its 
Audit Committee Brief that “[t]o be most effective, audit committees should periodically 
reassess the optimal mix of committee members, taking into account…the skills, 
experiences, diversity, time commitments, tenure, and rotation of its members.”  Such 
views are similar to those expressed by other academics (Lapides et al. 2007). 
                                                 
17 AT&T, American Express, Home Depot, Pfizer and United Technologies are some examples of 
companies that have had shareholder proposals related to director term-limits in recent years. 
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During the Senate hearings related to the Enron failure, senators and others raised 
the possibility of limiting the number of boards a director could serve on at any time 
(U.S. Senate 2002b).  Increasingly, companies are having formal policies that restrict the 
number of other directorships that can be held by their outside directors.  For example, 
General Motors noted in its 2007 proxy statement that under its Corporate Governance 
Guideline No. 13, “non-management directors are encouraged to limit the number of 
other boards of U.S. public companies on which they serve, to no more than four.... 
Moreover, the Directors and Corporate Governance Committee and the Board annually 
review whether members of GM’s Audit Committee serve on audit committees of other 
companies, and whether that service compromises their ability to fulfill their duties on 
GM’s Audit Committee.” 
Thus, there is now an increased focus on audit committee member characteristics 
beyond independence and financial expertise.  Along these lines, Carcello et al. (2011) 
note that “for good audit committees, most of the focus is on audit committee financial 
expertise and independence” and suggest that there is a “need to develop better measures 
of board and audit committee characteristics.”  Yet, there is limited prior research on 
audit committee member tenure and “busyness.” Yang and Krishnan (2005) find that 
earnings management is lower when audit committee members have longer tenure and 
have multiple other board memberships.  In contrast, Dhaliwal et al. (2010) show that 
accruals quality is positively related to lower tenure and fewer board memberships of the 
audit committee financial expert.  In addition, Barua et al. (2010) find that the extent of 
investment in internal auditing is higher when audit committee members have shorter 
tenure.  Sharma and Iselin (2006) find that restatements are less likely when audit 
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committee members have multiple board memberships, but Sharma et al. (2009) find that 
multiple directorships are negatively associated with audit committee meeting frequency.   
Thus, the results from prior studies, which are discussed in detail in the following 
section, are not consistent. In addition, data from four of the above five studies are from 
the pre-SOX period when there was also greater variation in audit committee member 
characteristics, such as independence and the presence of financial experts.  Given the 
recent increased focus on audit committee director tenure and busyness, in this essay I 
examine the association between these two audit committee characteristics and the 
likelihood that a company will repeatedly meet or just beat earnings forecasts versus 
repeatedly just missing earnings forecasts.  
Prior Literature and Development of Hypotheses 
The SEC (1999a) noted that “audit committees play a critical role in the financial 
reporting system by overseeing and monitoring management's and the independent 
auditors' participation in the financial reporting process.”  Thus, the audit committee 
serves as an important monitoring mechanism in ensuring high quality financial reporting 
and can influence whether a firm will have the ability to engage in the meet-beat strategy 
of earnings management.  
In their detailed summaries of research related to audit committees, DeZoort et al. 
(2002), DeFond and Francis (2005), and Carcello et al. (2011) note that almost all 
research related to audit committee composition has focused on independence and 
financial expertise.  While earlier research on audit committees focused on independence, 
listing-related regulatory changes mandated by the NYSE and NASDAQ in 1999 (SEC 
1999b, 1999c) and the requirement in SOX that all audit committee members be 
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independent has led to a focus on audit committee financial expertise in more recent 
research.  Generally, prior research finds audit committees that have financial experts and 
that are diligent are associated with higher quality financial reporting and auditing using a 
variety of measures, such as fraudulent financial reporting, accruals, internal controls and 
going-concern reporting.  
For example, Abbott et al. (2000) obtain a sample of 78 firms that were sanctioned 
by the SEC for fraud or aggressive accounting, through the SEC Accounting and 
Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs), during the period of 1980 through 1996.  The 
authors then obtain a control group by matching based on industry (determined primarily 
by four digit SIC code), size (determined primarily on the market value of equity), year, 
and national exchange, yielding a final analysis sample size of 156 firms.  Logistic 
regression is employed, with the dependent variable indicating whether the firm is a 
sanctioned firm and two test variables pertaining to audit committee independence and 
number of annual meetings.  The authors document a positive and significant association 
between audit committee independence and frequency of annual meetings and the 
likelihood of being sanctioned.  
Carcello et al. (2008) find a significant negative association between the presence 
of a financial expert on the audit committee and the level of earnings management, and 
this association is more pronounced when the financial expert has accounting-related 
work experience.  They obtain these results through the employment of regression 
whereby the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the absolute value of 
discretionary accrual measure.  The authors utilize the Compact D/SEC database to 
obtain a final sample of 283 firms with a fiscal year end between July 15, 2003 and 
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December 31, 2003, that are traded on the NYSE, Nasdaq’s National Market (NNM), and 
Nasdaq’s Small Cap Market (SCM), and that possess all necessary data in proxy 
statements and the Compustat database.  
Krishnan (2005) examines the relation between the likelihood of internal control 
deficiencies and three specific characteristics pertaining to audit committee quality: size, 
independence, and expertise.  The author uses logistic regression to test his hypotheses.  
The measure for the dependent variable, which indicates the presence or absence of 
internal control problems, is derived from 8-K reports.  Thus, the test sample of 128 firms 
is comprised of companies that switched auditors and reported internal control 
deficiencies in the Form 8-K, with a control sample of firms that filed a Form 8-K (i.e. 
changed auditors) but did not report an internal control problem.  Internal control and 
financial data is obtained from the Disclosure, Inc. database and audit committee data is 
obtained from firm proxy statements and 10-K reports.  The authors find a significant 
negative association between audit committee independence and expertise and the 
likelihood of an internal control deficiency. 
Naiker and Sharma (2009) analyze the effect of a particular kind of audit committee 
expert by studying the association between former audit partners, both affiliated with and 
unaffiliated with the external auditor, serving on the audit committee and the likelihood 
of internal control deficiency.  Their sample is comprised of 1,225 firms that are deemed 
“accelerated filers” wither regard to making SOX Section 404 internal control disclosures 
for the fiscal year 2004.  Internal control deficiency data, financial data, and governance 
data are obtained from the Audit Analytics database, the Compustat database, The Board 
Analyst database, respectively.  The authors employ logistic regression where the 
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presence of an internal control deficiency is a function of affiliated and non-affiliated 
auditor partners on the audit committee and additional financial control variables, and 
find a statistically significant negative association between the likelihood of disclosing an 
internal control problem and the presence of either an affiliated or non-affiliated audit 
partner as the expert on the audit committee.  
In their logistic regression analysis pertaining to audit committee independence and 
the likelihood of receiving a going-concern modified opinion, Carcello and Neal (2000) 
find a statistically negative relation between the percentage of directors affiliated with the 
company and the probability of a going-concern report, suggesting that affiliation 
compromises financial reporting objectivity.  The authors use the Compact D/SEC 
database to identify firms that are in financial distress, excluding financial firms, but 
haven’t filed bankruptcy prior to the analysis year of 1994.  The final sample is 
comprised of 223 firms having the necessary proxy and financial data available in the Q-
Data SEC files.  
Collectively, this stream of research suggests that firms with independent audit 
committees and audit committees with financial experts provide better financial reporting 
quality.  
Audit committees can also influence management’s ability to engage in earnings 
management through the extent of their support for the positions of the external auditor.   
Carcello and Neal (2003) study the association between audit committee independence 
and auditor dismissal following a new going concern report.  They employ logistic 
regression, where the incidence of auditor dismissal is the dependent variable and the 
percentage of affiliated audit committee members as the test variable.  The final sample is 
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comprised of four sub-samples initially derived from the Compact D/SEC database.  The 
primary test sample contains companies that received a new going concern report from a 
Big 6 auditor during the period of 1988 to 1999 and that dismissed their auditor prior to 
the issuance of the client’s financial statements for the following year.  This final sample 
size is 62.  A control group is obtained of firms also receiving a new going concern report 
during the same window of analysis but did not dismiss the auditor.  In addition, two sets 
of “benchmark” samples were obtained of firms receiving clean opinions; those that did, 
and those that did not dismiss their auditors.  The final sample size of all four sub-sample 
groups, all of which exclude financial firms, is 374 firms.  The authors find that audit 
committees that are more independent (i.e. have less affiliated directors) are more likely 
to prevent auditor dismissal following a new going concern report.  
 DeZoort et al. (2003) conduct an experiment, based on 55 usable responses to 
questionnaire materials sent to 362 directors, in which audit committee members make 
evaluations pertaining to materiality justification and accounting precision.  Using a 2x2 
between subjects design, the authors find that audit committees with financial experts are 
more likely to support the external auditor.   
In summary the aforementioned analyses conducted by Carcello and Neal (2003) 
and DeZoort et al. (2003) provide evidence suggesting that audit committees comprised 
of directors that are experts and are non-affiliated are more effective in performing 
financial reporting oversight tasks.  
In this study, I focus on two issues related to audit committee composition that have 
started receiving attention from corporate governance advocates and others yet have 
received sparse attention in prior research: tenure on the audit committee and the number 
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of other corporate boards simultaneously served on by audit committee directors.  
Audit Committee Member Tenure 
During the Enron hearings, Charles Elson, Director of the Center for Corporate 
Governance noted that: 
 “[T]here is concern about the length of directors’ terms. Directors who are on a 
 board for too long, are viewed as becoming effectively tired, not as sharp as they 
 once  were in reviewing the company and much more willing to accept 
 management representations than not. That is why a number of folks have called for 
 term limits for directors.” (U.S. Senate 2002b) 
 
Directors with longer tenure are likely to be more closely affiliated with management and 
less likely to challenge management decisions (Boeker and Goodstein 1993).  Vafeas 
(2003) studies 483 non-financial and non-utility firms listed on the 1994 Forbes list and 
asserts that term limits for board members should be considered by regulators.  This 
argument is in light of the author’s evidence, obtained through OLS regression of board 
characteristics on various measures of CEO pay, that long-tenured board members, as 
opposed to short-tenured members, are more closely affiliated with management as 
exhibited by long-tenured members’ proclivity to approve higher compensation to the 
CEO.   
While the above arguments relate to directors in general, it is likely that they are 
particularly applicable in the case of audit committee directors.  The 21st Century 
Governance and Financial Reporting Principles (Lapides et al. 2007), endorsed by the 
Institute of Internal Auditors, recommends that “the board should consider limiting the 
number of years an individual can serve on the audit committee to ensure adequate 
rotation of its members.” DeZoort et al. (2002) note the paucity of research related to 
director tenure and suggest that future research address whether audit committee member 
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tenure affects overall audit committee effectiveness.  Yang and Krishnan (2005) find that 
earnings management is less likely when audit committee members had longer tenure.  
The authors obtain these results through the execution of OLS regression in which a 
measure of quarterly discretionary accruals is the dependent variable and various 
characteristics of the audit committee serve as the test variables.  Their final sample 
comprises 731 firm-year observations during the period of 1996 through 2000.  
Necessary data is obtained from firm proxy statements, the I/B/E/S database, and the 
Compustat database.  
Conversely, Dhaliwal et al. (2010), using a final sample of 770 firms with data 
available for the period 2004 through 2006, obtained from The Board Analyst and the 
Compustat databases (excluding banks, financial institutions, utilities, and firms in 
regulated industries), regress variables representing multiple audit committee 
characteristics on accrual quality.  The authors document evidence suggesting a 
“profound” negative association between audit committee director tenure and accrual 
quality.  
The above discussion suggests the following hypothesis (stated in the null form): 
H6:  The likelihood of a company repeatedly engaging in the Meet-or-Just-Beat 
 strategy of earnings management is not related to audit committee director 
 tenure. 
 
Number of Other Directorships Held by Audit Committee Members 
Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that the number of other board 
memberships can be viewed as a signal of the market’s assessment about a particular 
director.  Under this reputation argument, directors establish reputations for being 
effective monitors and are rewarded with additional directorships.  Thus, the higher the 
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number of other board memberships, the greater the expertise of a director and the better 
the quality of monitoring provided by a director.  
The counterpoint is that too many board memberships spread a director thin, and 
thus reduces the quantity and/or quality of the oversight provided by the director.  For 
example, during the Enron hearings held by the Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations of the U.S. Senate’s Committee on Governmental Affairs, the Senators 
posed the following written question to some witnesses:  
“Some directors of the Enron Board have been criticized for their membership on 
numerous boards, calling into question their ability to dedicate time and focus to 
issues at Enron. Would you be in favor of limiting the number of corporate boards 
an individual may serve simultaneously?” (U.S. Senate 2002b) 
 
This view is espoused, among others, by the National Association of Corporate Directors 
(NACD 1996), Council of Institutional Investors (CII 1998), and the New York Stock 
Exchange (SEC 2003).  
In the context of audit committees, Yang and Krishnan (2005) find that earnings 
management is lower at firms where the audit committee directors serve on multiple 
boards, but Dhaliwal et al. (2010) show that accruals quality is positively related to 
accounting experts who hold low levels of multiple directorships. (Please see the 
previous section pertaining to the discussion of the H6 hypothesis for a detailed 
presentation of the research design of these two aforementioned studies).  
Sharma and Iselin (2006) identify 75 firms having the necessary data for analysis 
contained in proxy statements and Compustat and that announced a restatement between 
January 1, 2001 and December 31, 2002.  The announcements were reported by the 
General Accounting Office (GAO) and relate to fiscal years 1999 through 2001.  After 
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obtaining a control group matched on year, four-digit SIC code, and size (total assets), 
the authors implement logistic regression and find that the likelihood of restatement is 
negatively associated with the presence of audit committee members who sit on more 
than three other boards.  This evidence suggests that restatements are less likely at firms 
where audit committee members have multiple board memberships. 
Conversely, Fich and Shivdasani (2007) show that “busy boards” significantly 
increase a firm’s probability of facing financial litigation.  These results are obtained by 
identifying firms from the PricewaterhouseCoopers class action database and the 
Stanford University and Cornerstone Research litigation database that are involved in 
shareholder class-action law suits alleging financial fraud.  The sample period is from 
1998 to 2002 and the sample selection process yields a final sample size of 216 unique 
firm observations.  The CRSP, Compustat, and ExecuComp databases are used to obtain 
necessary dependent variable, test variable, and control variable measurements.  
Given such inconsistent evidence regarding simultaneous multiple board service, I 
do not make a directional prediction for my next hypothesis.  Thus, the last hypothesis, in 
the null form, is:  
H7:  The likelihood of a company repeatedly engaging in the Meet-or-Just-Beat 
 strategy of earnings management is not related to the number of additional 
 board memberships held by audit committee directors.18 
 
 
                                                 
18 I note that for my first hypothesis in this essay (H6) I focus on the number of years of service on the audit 
committee but for the second hypothesis (H7) I focus on the number of additional board memberships. I do 
this for two reasons. The first reason is to be consistent with the approach taken in prior research (e.g, Yang 
and Krishnan 2005; Barua et al. 2010; Dhaliwal et al. 2010). The second reason is the fact that, among 
others, the suggestions of Lapides et al. (2007) and Deloitte (2010) focus on audit committee tenure 
presumably because a new member on the committee may be more likely to view things from a different 
perspective and/or may be more skeptical. However, for hypothesis two I focus on the total number of 
additional board memberships because in the case of busy-boarding related discussions, the focus is on the 
time it takes to serve on boards; further, very few directors serve on more than three audit committees. 
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Model 
I base the empirical model on prior research seeking to explain the likelihood of 
firms engaging in the meet/just beat strategy of earnings management.  The model is as 
follows:  
 MB     =  β0 + β1*HORIZON + β2*FORSTD + β3*NUMANALY +  
    β4*LEV + β5*LITRISK + β6*MTOB + β7*LOGMKTVAL +  
    β8*LOSS + β9*BIG4 + β10*ACSIZE + β11*ACXPRT +  
    β12*ACMEET + β13*ACTENURE + β14*ACBUSY + ε 
 
where: 
 
 MB  =  1 if actual earnings reported repeatedly exceeds the   
     analyst’s forecast by one cent per share or less (i.e., $0.00 ≤ 
     forecast error ≤ $0.01), 0 otherwise (see below, following  
     description of the sample, for a more detailed explanation  
     of “repeated”); 
 
 HORIZON =  forecast horizon, measured as number of days between  
    earnings announcement and the day the most recent  
    earnings forecast was made; 
 
 FORSTD =  forecast dispersion, calculated as the standard deviation of  
    earnings forecasts during the 4th quarter of 2007; 
 
 NUMANALY =  number of analysts making an earnings forecast during  
    the 4th quarter of 2007; 
 
 LEV  =  leverage, equal to total liabilities divided by total assets; 
 
 LITRISK =  1 if firm’s primary SIC code is 2833 – 2836, 3570 – 3577,  
    3600 – 3674, 5200 – 5961, or 7370 – 7370, 0 otherwise; 
 
 MTOB  =  market to book ratio, calculated as stock price at fiscal  
    year-end divided by book value per share; 
 
 LOGMKTVAL =  natural logarithm of market value of equity; 
 
 LOSS  =  1 if the firm had a net loss for fiscal year 2007, 0 otherwise; 
 
 BIG4  =  1 if auditor is a Big 4 auditor, 0 otherwise; 
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 ACSIZE =  square root of the number of audit committee members  
    during 2007; 
 
 ACXPRT =  square root of the number of audit committee financial  
    experts during 2007; 
 
 ACMEET =  square root of the number of audit committee meetings  
    during 2007; 
 
 ACTENURE =  ratio of the number of members serving on the audit  
    committee for more than 7 consecutive years as of 2007; 
 
 ACBUSY =  ratio of the number of members on the audit committee  
    who hold more than three outside directorships during  
    2007. 
 
Before I discuss the rationale for including the control variables in the model, I note 
that as part of the sensitivity tests I use a variety of different measures for the audit 
committee related variables.   
Prior research has shown that the closer the earnings forecast is made to the 
earnings announcement, the smaller the forecast error (Crichfield et al. 1978; O’Brien 
1988; Brown 1991; Sinha et al. 1997).  Since earnings forecasts and forecast revisions 
occur at different times for different firms, I include the variable HORIZON to capture 
the number of days between the earnings announcement day and the most recent earnings 
forecast available.  Given that more recent forecasts, or forecasts with a smaller horizon, 
tend to be more accurate, I expect the coefficient on HORIZON to be negative in the 
above regression.  
I attempt to control for cross-sectional differences in the information environment 
that may affect forecast accuracy by including the following variables: forecast 
dispersion (FORSTD) as measured by the standard deviation of all forecasts issued for 
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the firm during the fourth quarter, the number of analysts following the firm 
(NUMANALY), as well as the logged market value of the firm (LOGMKTVAL) as a 
measure of firm size.  Forecast dispersion captures the degree of uncertainty that analysts 
have about the performance of the target firm, so I anticipate the coefficient of FORSTD 
to be negative.  Conversely, since the number of analysts following a firm represents the 
degree to which a firm is followed, I anticipate the coefficient of NUMANALY to be 
positive.  It can be argued that larger firms have more resources to engage in the meet-
beat strategy of earnings management.  Therefore, I expect the coefficient on 
LOGMKTVAL to be positive.  These directional predictions are based on results from 
prior research, which show that forecast horizon and dispersion are negatively related to 
forecast accuracy but positively related to firm size and the number of analysts following 
the firm (Atiase 1985; Lys and Soo 1995; Brown 1997; Cheng and Warfield 2005; 
Chevis et al. 2007; Davis et al. 2009).  
Chevis et al. (2007) find that the likelihood of meeting or just beating forecasts is 
positively associated with highly leveraged firms.  I therefore include leverage (LEV) as 
a control variable and expect the coefficient to be positive.  Following Cheng and 
Warfield (2005) and Frankel et al. (2002), I include variables to capture the growth of the 
firm as represented by the firm’s market-to-book ratio (MTB), whether the firm operates 
within a litigious industry (LITRISK), and whether the firm experienced a loss for the 
fiscal year (LOSS).  In their analysis of equity incentives and the probability of meeting 
or just beating analysts’ forecasts by $0.01, Cheng and Warfield (2005) find that growth 
is significantly and negatively associated with the likelihood to meet or just beat earnings 
forecasts, while firms in litigious industries are more likely to meet or just beat forecasts.  
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Frankel et al. (2002) find that firms reporting small earnings surprises are less likely to 
meet or just beat earnings forecasts.  I predict the coefficients of MTOB and LOSS to be 
negative, and the coefficient of LITRISK to be positive.  
I include three other audit committee related variables in our model.  I include 
ACSIZE because as the number of audit committee members increases it is likely that the 
extent of audit committee oversight will increase (Raghunandan and Rama 2007).  Based 
on prior research indicating that audit committees that have members with financial 
expertise are associated with generally better quality financial reporting (Beasley et al. 
2009), I include ACXPRT in the model and expect this variable to have a negative 
coefficient.  Audit committees that hold more frequent meetings are said to be more 
diligent and more effective in their monitoring (DeZoort et al. 2002; Carcello et al. 2011).  
Based on the above, I expect that more frequent audit committee meetings lead to better 
monitoring and less earnings management; hence, I expect the coefficient of ACMEET to 
be negative. 
Sample and Data 
Table 17 describes the sample selection process.  I begin by obtaining the universe 
of December 31 year-end firms having earnings and forecast data in the I/B/E/S database 
during the twelve quarters beginning in January 2005 and ending in December 2007.19  
Analysts make their earnings forecasts throughout the year, making revisions as 
they receive new earnings-relevant information concerning their target firms.  
                                                 
19  I stop with 2007 because I also wanted to examine if the propensity to repeatedly meet or just beat or 
repeatedly miss analyst forecasts is associated with subsequent negative restatements. Since, on average, it 
takes more than two years before most subsequent restatements are disclosed, I stopped with fiscal year 
2007. However, my subsequent analysis indicates that only 8 of the 156 sample firms (selected as described 
below) had a negative restatement until June 30, 2010, reinforcing the earlier suggestion that restatements 
are relatively infrequent. 
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Consequently, forecasts issued closer to the earnings announcement date are based on a 
richer information set and thus tend to be more accurate than the preceding forecasts 
(Sinha et al. 1997).  Prior studies have documented this positive association between 
forecast recency and forecast accuracy (Crichfield et al. 1978; O’Brien 1988; Brown 
1991; Sinha et al. 1997).  Hence, I use the most recent forecast issued prior to the 
earnings announcement date as the analyst forecast measure.  
I then calculate the forecast error, as actual earnings per share less forecasted 
earnings per share.  Meeting or just beating (just missing) analyst earnings expectations 
are firm-quarter observations for which actual earnings reported either meets or exceeds 
(misses) the analyst’s forecast by a cent per share or less, i.e., $0.00 ≤ forecast error ≤  
$0.01.  After removing irregular observations or observations with missing data and 
foreign firms, I obtain an initial sample of 3,205 firms.  
I delete 45 firms with either missing proxy data or missing control variable data in 
Compustat.  In addition, I delete two firms that switched to a non-December 31 fiscal 
year end during the analysis period, and one outlying firm.20  This process yields a final 
overall sample of 3,157 firms. 
Table 18 provides empirical evidence about the number of quarters in which firms 
either meet or just beat analyst forecasts, or just missed analyst forecasts.  The table 
shows that 727 of the 3,157 firms (23.03%) did not meet, just beat, or just miss even once 
during the 12 quarters examined in this study.  
 
                                                 
20 This firm was deemed an outlier at the sub-group regression analysis stage. It had a market-to-book ratio 
value that was approximately 40 times the size of the average ratio for the Just Miss group. 
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The data in Table 18 show a very interesting pattern. While 2,204 of the 3,157 
firms (69.81%) either meet or just beat analyst forecasts at least once during the 12 
quarters, only 1,277 firms (40.45%) just missed analyst forecasts at least once during the 
same time period.  Similarly, 563 of the 3,157 firms (17.83%) meet or just beat analyst 
forecasts at least four times during the study period; in contrast, only 34 of the 3,157 
firms (1.08%) just missed analyst forecasts at least four times during the 12 quarters.  
Overall, fewer firms are likely to just miss than to meet or just beat analyst forecasts.  
I then partition the overall sample of firms into repeated “Meet/Just Beat” and 
repeated “Just Miss” groups.  A firm is classified as a repeated Meet/Just Beat firm if it 
had a net meet or just beat count of at least 7 out of the 12 quarters.  Thus, a firm that met 
or just beat the earnings forecasts by $0.01 for 9 of the 12 quarters but also just missed 
forecasts by $0.01 for 2 of the 12 quarters is still considered a repeated Meet/Just Beat 
firm.  A firm is classified as a repeated Just Miss firm as long as the firm misses the 
earnings forecast by $0.01 or less, at minimum, a net of 2 out of the 12 quarters.  Thus, a 
firm that just missed the earnings expectation for 5 out of 12 quarters, but also met or just 
beat expectations for 3 of the 12 quarters is considered a repeated Just Miss firm.  The 
above process yields 77 repeated Meet/Just Beat firms and 79 repeated Just Miss firms.21  
All audit committee data are hand-collected from the firms’ proxy statements 
obtained from the SEC’s website.  After deleting observations with missing data for 
variables in the regression model, the final sample for the regression analysis includes 75 
                                                 
21 I recognize that the above process is somewhat arbitrary. However, because I have to hand-collect audit 
committee related data, I wanted the sample to be of manageable size. Further, the very definition of 
“repeated” implies more than two, so I used the “net of 2” for the repeated Just Miss firms; using a net of 3 
or more for the Just Miss firms drastically reduces the sample size of this group. With respect to the 
repeated Meet/Just Beat firms, I used alternative cutoffs (net of 8 or 9 quarters); the results with such 
alternative cutoffs are similar to those reported in this essay. 
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firms that repeatedly meet or just-beat analyst forecasts and 64 firms that repeatedly just 
missed analyst forecasts. 
Results 
Table 19 presents univariate results of differences between the two groups.  The 
repeated Meet/Just Beat firms have a shorter forecast horizon (p < .10), less forecast 
dispersion (p < .01), lower leverage (p < .05), and higher market value (p < 0.01); the 
repeated Meet/Just Beat firms also are more likely to be in risky industries (p < .05), and 
less likely to have losses (p < 0.05).  
Turning to audit committee related variables, there are no significant differences 
between the two groups in terms of the number of audit committee directors, the number 
of experts, or the number of meetings.  Further, the proportion of audit committee 
directors with more than three other board memberships is not significantly different 
between the two groups.  However, the repeated Meet/Just Beat group of firms has a 
higher proportion of long-tenured audit committee members (p < .01).    
Table 20 reports the results obtained from regression analysis.  The explanatory 
power of the model, as measured by the Pseudo R2, is 0.50; this is in line with those 
reported in prior research relating to meeting-beating analysts’ forecasts (Cheng and 
Warfield 2005; Chevis et al. 2007; Davis et al. 2009).  
Consistent with expectations, the likelihood of a firm repeatedly meeting or just 
beating analysts’ forecasts is negatively associated with number of days between the 
earnings forecast and the earnings announcement (HORIZON), forecast dispersion 
(FORSTD), market-to-book ratio (MTOB), loss (LOSS) and a Big 4 auditor (BIG4).  
Also consistent with expectations and prior research, the likelihood of engaging in 
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repeated meet/just beat behavior is positively associated with firm size (LOGMKTVAL) 
and industry type (LITRISK).    
With respect to the audit committee variables, consistent with expectations, the 
coefficients of ACSIZE, ACXPRT and ACMEET are negative and significant indicating 
that meeting or just beating analysts’ forecasts is less likely in firms that have audit 
committees that have more (a) members, (b) experts, and (c) meetings.  The coefficient of 
ACTENURE is negative and significant indicating that when the audit committee has a 
higher proportion of long-tenured members there is a higher likelihood of a firm 
repeatedly meeting or just beating analysts’ forecasts.  This result is consistent with the 
management-friendliness hypothesis; that is, long tenured outside directors become 
friendly with organizational management thereby creating a less stringent oversight 
environment.  The coefficient of ACBUSY is also negative and significant, indicating 
that as the proportion of directors who serve on more than three boards increases, the 
likelihood of the firm repeatedly meeting or just beating analyst forecasts increases.  This 
evidence supports the argument espoused by good governance advocates that companies 
should consider limiting the number of boards on which audit committee members serve 
concurrently.     
Sensitivity Analyses 
I perform the following additional analyses as part of my sensitivity tests.  First, I 
recognize that the use of seven years (for audit committee director tenure) and more than 
three boards (for concurrent directorships) is necessarily arbitrary.  Hence, I use a number 
of other cutoff measures. For the tenure variable, I use the following alternative cutoffs:  
five years and ten years. With each of these alternative measures, the ACTENURE 
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variable remains negative and significant (as in Table 20).  However, for the ACBUSY 
variable, when I use more than two as the cutoff (instead of more than three), ACBUSY 
is not significant at conventional levels.  Thus, it appears that the difference arises once a 
director sits on more than three boards.  In such alternative regressions, the sign and 
significance of the other variables in the model are generally similar to those presented in 
Table 20.  
Next, instead of using the proportion of audit committee members with tenure or 
board memberships above a specific threshold, I use the average tenure and board 
membership measures for the audit committee.  With this alternative specification, the 
ACTENURE variable is once again negative and significant but the ACBUSY variable is 
not significant. 
Some prior studies use dummy variables for audit committee related variables (e.g., 
if the committee met more than a specified number of times a year).  Further, some other 
studies have sought to distinguish between accounting experts and other types of experts 
(e.g., Dhaliwal et al. 2010).  Hence, I use dummy variables for meetings and experts, in 
lieu of ACMEET and ACXPRT, as follows: ACMEETD = 1 if the committee met more 
than the median number of meetings (8) of the sample, 0 otherwise; ACACCXPRT = 1 if 
an accounting expert is present on the audit committee, 0 otherwise.22  With such 
alternative specification of the regression model, I find that ACMEETD is negative and 
significant but ACACCXPRT is not significant.   More importantly, the significance of 
the variables of interest, namely ACTENURE and ACBUSY remains substantively 
                                                 
22  I define an accounting expert as someone who has experience as an auditor or as a senior corporate 
executive in accounting or finance (e.g., CFO, CAO, VP-Finance, etc.) 
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similar to those presented in Table 20. 
I include an additional control variable measuring internal control quality in the 
regression model.  I define this dummy variable as follows: ICW = 1 if there is a material 
weakness in internal controls for fiscal year 2007, 0 otherwise.  ICW is not significant in 
the model, and the sign and significance of the other variables remains substantively 
similar to those presented in Table 20. 
Conclusion 
In this essay, I examine the propensity of 3,157 firms to meet or just beat, or just 
miss, analyst forecasts by $0.01 or less during 2005 through 2007.  I find that firms are 
much more likely to repeatedly meet or just beat analyst forecasts than to repeatedly just 
miss analyst forecasts.  In the analyses, I find that audit committee director tenure is 
positively associated with the likelihood of a firm repeatedly meeting or just beating 
analyst forecasts.  This finding holds whether I use the average number of years of audit 
committee member tenure, or the proportion of directors with more than five, seven, or 
ten years of audit committee tenure.  These results provide strong support for the 
argument that too long a service may lead to audit committee members becoming less 
vigilant or more permissive of earnings management, and support calls (e.g., Lapides et 
al. 2007) to restrict the tenure of directors on the audit committee. 
My results for the number of other directorships held by audit committee members 
is mixed: when I use the proportion of directors holding more than three other board 
memberships, the ACBusy variable is positive and significant in the regression, indicating 
that audit committees that have a higher proportion of members with four or more other 
board memberships are less likely to prevent earnings management.  However, when I 
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use the average number of board memberships, or the proportion of audit committee 
directors holding more than two other directorships, the ACBusy variable is not 
significant in the regression.  Since the NYSE and others have typically sought to limit 
the number of board memberships to four, the results may be viewed as providing partial 
support for efforts seeking to limit busy-boarding by audit committee directors. 
My results suggest avenues for future research. One avenue is to examine the 
association between audit committee member tenure and busy-boarding with other 
measures of audit quality and financial reporting quality, particularly in the post-SOX 
period. Another interesting area is to examine the reaction of external and internal 
auditors when audit committee members have long tenure and/or multiple board 
memberships. Finally, it is also interesting to examine how audit committee member 
interactions and processes vary with the tenure and busy-boarding of audit committee 
members. 
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CHAPTER VI: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 as well as the Statement on Auditing Standards 
No. 99: Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, have specific 
requirements related to the composition of audit committees, the interaction between 
audit committees and external auditors, and auditors’ attitudes and procedures concerning 
risk assessment.  Prior studies have focused more on the financial expertise and 
independence of audit committees but there is not as much research related to audit 
committee compensation, tenure and busyness. In addition, I contribute to extant audit 
fee literature and study auditors’ behavior concerning risk assessment. Hence, I test the 
associations between various measures of meeting or beating analyst forecasts (my proxy 
for client risk and earnings management) and audit fees, audit committee compensation, 
and audit committee tenure and busyness. 
Audit Fees and Repeatedly Meeting-Beating or Missing Analyst Forecasts 
In Chapter III, I extend extant audit fee literature by providing evidence on 
auditors’ risk assessment of clients that frequently meet or just beat, or frequently just 
miss, analyst forecasts.  In conducting regression analysis on 1,588 non-financial, 
domestic firms having a fiscal year end of December 31, 2007, I find that the frequency 
of meeting or just beating (just missing) analyst forecasts is negatively (positively) 
associated with audit fees.  These results suggest auditors view firms that frequently meet 
or just beat (just miss) analyst forecasts as being inherently less (more) risky.  
The first limitation of this study is the lack of theory, or empirically derived 
evidence, supporting the use of frequently meeting or just beating, or just missing, 
forecasts as a proxy for client risk.  Extant research studying the association between 
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audit fees and business risk have used various proxies for client risk, such as confidential 
or proprietary measures (Bell et al. 2001; Bedard and Johnstone 2004; Charles et al. 
2010), discretionary accruals (Abbott et al. 2006), restatements (Feldmann et al. 2009), 
initial public offerings (Venkataraman et al. 2008), and internal control weaknesses 
(Munsif et al. 2011).  To date, I am unaware of any literature employing the frequency of 
meeting-just beating or just missing analyst forecasts as a proxy for client risk.  A second 
potential limitation is the use of only one measure of forecast error in the study.  
Combining conservatism and theories concerning forecast recency (Sinha et al. 1997), I 
use the single most recent estimate as the analyst forecast measure from which I calculate 
the forecast error.  However, the degree to which analyst forecasts have been measured in 
extant literature (e.g. use of the mean, median or mode of all forecasts made during a 
specific window as opposed to the single most recent forecast), is the degree to which 
forecast errors can be measured. 
Audit Committee Compensation and Meeting-Beating Analyst Forecasts 
 In Chapter IV, I contribute to the limited literature on audit committee 
compensation and financial reporting quality by examining the association between 
equity and cash compensation in audit committee director pay, and the magnitude with 
which actual earnings exceed analyst forecasts.  By so doing, I also inform policy-makers 
such as the NACD and industry compensation experts.  Specifically, I evaluate the 
association between compensation structure (proportion of stocks and options (equity), 
proportion of cash, and the proportion of cash to equity) of the audit committee and (1) 
whether firms are more likely to meet or just beat analysts’ earnings forecasts, and (2) the 
magnitude with which actual earnings exceed analysts’ earnings forecasts.  
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Using logistic regression on a sample of 1,011 firms, I find evidence suggesting a 
significant association between audit committee compensation and the likelihood of 
meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts.  Specifically, I find that neither cash nor option/ 
equity-based compensation is significantly associated with the likelihood of meeting or 
just beating analysts’ earnings forecasts.  However, I observe that greater equity in the 
compensation structure is positively associated with the likelihood of actual earnings 
beating forecasted earnings by a greater margin ($0.04 and $0.05).  Conversely, greater 
cash compensation in the pay structure of independent directors on the audit committee is 
inversely related to the likelihood of actual earnings exceeding forecasts by a large 
margin.  These findings suggest that compensation plans comprised predominantly of 
cash, as opposed to stock and stock options, are “best” at preserving objectivity in 
financial reporting oversight tasks performed by the audit committee.  I posit that since 
cash-based compensation is not tied to the financial performance of the firm it is, 
therefore, less likely to incentivize directors to align their interests with those of 
managers.  In contrast, the effect of stock and stock option-based compensation suggest 
independent directors on the audit committee may be motivated to focus on firm 
performance to the detriment of reporting quality because such compensation is either 
directly or indirectly linked to firm performance. 
A limitation of this study, as with most studies pertaining to corporate governance, 
is the threat of endogeneity.  Although I make a case for using meeting-just beating as a 
proxy for earnings management, the present study does not include additional analyses 
seeking to confirm that meeting-beating is a function of equity-based compensation, as 
opposed to equity compensation being a function of a firm’s ability to exceed earnings to 
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a greater extent.  One way to mitigate the threat of endogeneity is to perform additional 
regression analysis replacing the current dependent variable with a different empirically 
derived measure of earnings management (i.e. discretionary accruals) and determine if 
results associated with the test variables remain unchanged.  
Audit Committee Characteristics and Repeatedly Meeting or Beating  
Analyst Forecasts 
In Chapter V, I examine the propensity of 3,157 firms to meet-or-just-beat or just 
miss analyst forecasts by $0.01 or less during 2005 to 2007.  I find that firms are much 
more likely to repeatedly meet-or-just-beat analyst forecasts than to repeatedly just miss 
analyst forecasts.  In addition, using logistic regression on a sample size of 139 firms, I 
find that audit committee director tenure and busyness are positively associated with the 
likelihood of a firm repeatedly meeting-or-just-beating analyst forecasts.  These results 
are consistent with suggestions from governance advocates about the benefits related to 
restricting audit committee member tenure (e.g., Lapides et al. 2007; Deloitte 2010) and 
service on multiple boards (NACD 1996; CII 1998; U.S. Senate 2002b). 
A limitation of this essay is the potentially low statistical power associated with the 
small sample size used for the regression analysis.  Data concerning audit committee 
tenure and number of simultaneous participating on other outside boards was hand-
collected from proxy statements, thus restricting the sample size.  In addition, and as 
mentioned as a limitation of essay one, additional support is needed for the use of 
repeatedly meeting-or-just beating analysts’ forecasts as a proxy for poor financial 
reporting quality in light. 
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TABLE 1:  Industry Membership 
Industry Number Percent 
Mining and Construction 139 8.753% 
Manufacturing 792 49.874% 
Transportation 235 14.798% 
Wholesale and Retail 118 7.431% 
Services 303 19.081% 
Other 1 0.063% 
Total 1,588 100% 
  94
TABLE 2:  Descriptive Statistics 
 
n = 1,588 
 
Variable Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3 
Audit Fees 
(in $000s) 2,378 3,744 611 1,184 2,469 
Total Assets 
(in $millions) 4,398 15,169 181 655 2,677 
LN_AUDFEES 14.034 1.107 13.323 13.984 14.719 
LN_TA 6.598 1.887 5.198 6.484 7.893 
RECINV 0.211 0.167 0.072 0.183 0.310 
SQRTSEG 1.278 0.631 1.000 1.000 1.732 
FOROPS 0.570 0.495 0.000 1.000 1.000 
LIQ 2.926 3.470 1.272 1.927 3.336 
LOSS 0.270 0.443 0.000 0.000 1.000 
ROA -0.016 0.328 -0.008 0.041 0.083 
BM 0.448 0.376 0.231 0.388 0.605 
ICW 0.080 0.267 0.000 0.000 0.000 
GC 0.020 0.125 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BIG4 0.820 0.380 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AUDINIT 0.050 0.214 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NUM_MB 2.150 2.092 1.000 2.000 3.000 
NUM_MISS 0.640 0.878 0.000 0.000 1.000 
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TABLE 3:  Pearson Correlations 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1)  LN_AUDFEES 1               
(2)  LN_TA 0.827 1              
(3)  RECINV 0.069 -0.081 1             
(4)  SQRTSEG 0.171 0.165 0.117 1            
(5)  FOROPS 0.366 0.222 0.281 0.041 1           
(6)  LIQ -0.314 -0.344 -0.105 -0.104 -0.074 1          
(7)  LOSS -0.269 -0.385 -0.180 -0.130 -0.135 0.200 1         
(8)  ROA 0.223 0.339 0.183 0.080 0.153 -0.075 -0.479 1        
(9)  BM 0.010 0.068 0.142 0.076 0.000 -0.011 0.001 0.063 1       
(10) ICW 0.000 -0.106 0.050 -0.043 0.054 0.001 0.145 -0.028 0.026 1      
(11) GC -0.109 -0.176 -0.012 -0.008 -0.035 -0.040 0.198 -0.413 -0.061 0.115 1     
(12) BIG4 0.451 0.429 -0.080 0.056 0.097 -0.123 -0.130 0.106 -0.027 -0.059 -0.115 1    
(13) AUDINIT -0.083 -0.105 0.020 -0.047 -0.028 0.052 0.078 -0.079 0.046 0.067 0.043 -0.122 1   
(14) NUM_MB 0.051 0.059 0.031 -0.007 0.093 -0.051 -0.170 0.109 -0.043 -0.060 -0.079 0.083 0.021 1  
(15) NUM_MISS -0.004 -0.037 0.011 0.031 0.000 0.025 -0.040 0.015 -0.059 -0.043 -0.046 0.008 -0.049 0.202 1 
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TABLE 4:  Regression Results 
 
Model:  LN_AUDFEES   =  β0 + β1*LN_TA + β2*RECINV + β3*SQRTSEG + 
    β4*FOROPS + β5*LIQ + β6*LOSS + β7*ROA + 
    β8*BM + β9*ICW + β10*GC + β11*BIG4 + 
    β12*AUDINIT + β13*NUM_MB + β14*NUM_MISS + 
    β15-23 * (Industry Dummy Variables) + ε 
 
 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient p-value* 
Intercept  10.123 0.000 
LN_TA + 0.496 0.000 
RECINV + 0.853 0.000 
SQRTSEG + 0.035 0.059 
FOROPS + 0.253 0.000 
LIQ - -0.014 0.001 
LOSS + 0.110 0.002 
ROA - -0.264 0.000 
BM - -0.143 0.000 
ICW + 0.300 0.000 
GC + -0.054 0.326 
BIG4 + 0.308 0.000 
AUDINIT +/- 0.054 0.398 
NUM_MB +/- -0.014 0.044 
NUM_MISS +/- 0.028 0.076 
    
Industry Variables  Yes  
    
n = 1,588 Adj. R2 = 0.772 F-stat = 234.243 0.000 
 
* P-values are one-tailed, with the exception of the intercept, AUDITINIT, NUM_MB, 
and NUM_MISS. 
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TABLE 5:  Sensitivity Analysis Regression Results 
 
“Larger” Firms Only  
(“Larger” defined as firms having total assets equal to  
or greater than the median value of LN_TA) 
 
 
Model:  LN_AUDFEES   =  β0 + β1*LN_TA + β2*RECINV + β3*SQRTSEG + 
    β4*FOROPS + β5*LIQ + β6*LOSS + β7*ROA + 
    β8*BM + β9*ICW + β10*GC + β11*BIG4 + 
    β12*AUDINIT + β13*NUM_MB + β14*NUM_MISS + 
    β15-23 * (Industry Dummy Variables) + ε 
 
 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient p-value* 
Intercept  9.677 0.000 
LN_TA + 0.564 0.000 
RECINV + 1.241 0.000 
SQRTSEG + 0.011 0.330 
FOROPS + 0.309 0.000 
LIQ - -0.039 0.002 
LOSS + 0.088 0.102 
ROA - -0.030 0.461 
BM - -0.146 0.003 
ICW + 0.438 0.000 
GC + 0.304 0.153 
BIG4 + 0.078 0.229 
AUDINIT +/- 0.140 0.100 
NUM_MB +/- -0.016 0.086 
NUM_MISS +/- 0.002 0.94 
    
Industry Variables  Yes  
    
n = 794 Adj. R2 = 0.700 F = 81.273 0.000 
 
* P-values are one-tailed, with the exception of the intercept, AUDITINIT, NUM_MB, 
and NUM_MISS. 
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TABLE 6:  Sensitivity Analysis Regression Results 
 
“Smaller” Firms Only  
(“Smaller” is defined as firms having total assets less than the median value of LN_TA) 
 
 
Model:  LN_AUDFEES   =  β0 + β1*LN_TA + β2*RECINV + β3*SQRTSEG + 
    β4*FOROPS + β5*LIQ + β6*LOSS + β7*ROA + 
    β8*BM + β9*ICW + β10*GC + β11*BIG4 + 
    β12*AUDINIT + β13*NUM_MB + β14*NUM_MISS + 
    β15-23 * (Industry Dummy Variables) + ε 
 
 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient p-value 
Intercept  10.459 0.000 
LN_TA + 0.445 0.000 
RECINV + 0.585 0.000 
SQRTSEG + 0.083 0.025 
FOROPS + 0.207 0.000 
LIQ - -0.017 0.000 
LOSS + 0.096 0.027 
ROA - -0.210 0.000 
BM - -0.097 0.037 
ICW + 0.257 0.000 
GC + -0.113 0.197 
BIG4 + 0.384 0.000 
AUDINIT +/- -0.009 0.910 
NUM_MB +/- -0.012 0.230 
NUM_MISS +/- 0.047 0.030 
    
Industry Variables  Yes  
    
n = 794 Adj. R2 = 0.520 F = 38.330 0.000 
 
* P-values are one-tailed, with the exception of the intercept, AUDITINIT, NUM_MB, 
and NUM_MISS. 
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TABLE 7:  Sensitivity Analysis Regression Results 
 
Big4 Firms Only 
 
Model:  LN_AUDFEES   =  β0 + β1*LN_TA + β2*RECINV + β3*SQRTSEG + 
    β4*FOROPS + β5*LIQ + β6*LOSS + β7*ROA + 
    β8*BM + β9*ICW + β10*GC +  
    β11*AUDINIT + β12*NUM_MB + β13*NUM_MISS + 
    β14-22 * (Industry Dummy Variables) + ε 
 
 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient p-value 
Intercept  10.463 0.000 
LN_TA + 0.493 0.000 
RECINV + 0.916 0.000 
SQRTSEG + 0.014 0.265 
FOROPS + 0.242 0.000 
LIQ - -0.016 0.001 
LOSS + 0.069 0.054 
ROA - -0.297 0.000 
BM - -0.144 0.000 
ICW + 0.353 0.000 
GC + 0.058 0.359 
AUDINIT +/- 0.101 0.176 
NUM_MB +/- -0.013 0.058 
NUM_MISS +/- 0.011 0.488 
    
Industry Variables  Yes  
    
n = 1,310 Adj. R2 = 0.758 F = 187.625 0.000 
 
* P-values are one-tailed, with the exception of the intercept, AUDITINIT, NUM_MB, 
and NUM_MISS. 
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TABLE 8:  Industry Membership 
 
 
           
Panel A - Industry Membership of Sample 
Industry Number Percent 
Mining and Construction 77 7.62% 
Manufacturing 370 36.60% 
Transportation 121 11.97% 
Wholesale and Retail 64 6.33% 
Finance and Insurance 229 22.65% 
Services 150 14.83% 
Total 1,011 100% 
 
 
Panel B - Frequency of Forecast Errors 
 n % 
Forecast Error < $0.00 327 32.34% 
Forecast Error = $0.00 104 10.29% 
Forecast Error = $0.01 91 9.00% 
Forecast Error = $0.02 94 9.30% 
Forecast Error = $0.03 62 6.13% 
Forecast Error = $0.04 43 4.25% 
Forecast Error = $0.05 43 4.25% 
Forecast Error = $0.06 25 2.47% 
Forecast Error = $0.07 34 3.36% 
Forecast Error = $0.08 20 1.98% 
Forecast Error = $0.09 14 1.38% 
Forecast Error = $0.10 20 1.98% 
Forecast Error = $0.11 15 1.48% 
Forecast Error = $0.12 9 0.89% 
Forecast Error = $0.13 10 0.99% 
Forecast Error = $0.14 8 0.79% 
Forecast Error = $0.15 5 0.49% 
  
 TABLE 9: Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 All Firms (n = 1,011) 
Firms with FE less than  
the sample’s median FE of $0.01 
(n = 431) 
Firms with FE equal to or larger than  
the sample’s median FE of $0.01 
(n = 580) 
 Mean SD Q1 Med Q3 Mean SD Q1 Med Q3 Mean SD Q1 Med Q3 
p-value 
from tests 
of 
differences 
LN_TA 8.117 1.694 6.930 8.023 9.196 8.084 1.831 6.734 7.982 9.219 8.142 1.585 7.038 8.036 9.170 0.596 
LEV 0.579 0.221 0.435 0.582 0.730 0.603 0.230 0.462 0.604 0.778 0.561 0.214 0.424 0.571 0.704 0.003 
ROA 0.053 0.075 0.021 0.050 0.087 0.043 0.084 0.012 0.040 0.086 0.060 0.066 0.030 0.054 0.088 0.001 
MKTBOOK 3.258 3.911 1.490 2.242 3.518 3.157 3.766 1.390 2.246 3.627 3.333 4.016 1.561 2.231 3.496 0.474 
LITRISK 0.180 0.381 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.170 0.373 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.180 0.387 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.517 
BIG4 0.940 0.231 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.920 0.266 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.960 0.199 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.016 
INSIDEOWN 0.092 0.144 0.017 0.040 0.095 0.107 0.159 0.023 0.050 0.116 0.080 0.131 0.015 0.035 0.080 0.004 
CEO_EQ 0.202 0.185 0.015 0.175 0.329 0.192 0.180 0.000 0.169 0.316 0.209 0.189 0.028 0.178 0.341 0.149 
ACIND 0.870 0.335 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.860 0.347 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.880 0.326 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.384 
ACEXPERT 0.970 0.178 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.980 0.151 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.960 0.195 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.145 
AC_EQUITY 0.510 0.219 0.381 0.529 0.655 0.489 0.226 0.362 0.515 0.644 0.525 0.213 0.395 0.541 0.666 0.010 
AC_CASH 0.435 0.209 0.291 0.418 0.553 0.457 0.223 0.310 0.434 0.568 0.419 0.197 0.281 0.409 0.533 0.005 
CASHTOEQ 0.994 0.218 0.870 0.959 1.069 1.017 0.238 0.877 0.968 1.089 0.976 0.200 0.866 0.951 1.053 0.004 
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TABLE 10: Pearson Correlations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Numbers in bold indicate significance levels of 5% or less. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
(1)  MB 1                 
(2)  BIGBEAT -0.473 1                
(3)  BIGBEAT_04 -0.343 0.724 1               
(4)  BIGBEAT_05 -0.310 0.655 0.905 1              
(5)  LN_TA -0.029 0.039 0.042 0.051 1             
(6)  LEV -0.017 -0.070 -0.054 -0.024 0.492 1            
(7)  ROA 0.042 0.085 0.035 0.036 -0.068 -0.276 1           
(8)  MKTBOOK 0.043 -0.019 -0.070 -0.061 -0.067 0.114 0.298 1          
(9)  LITRISK 0.083 -0.016 -0.042 -0.058 -0.212 -0.252 0.003 0.072 1         
(10) BIG4 -0.054 0.082 0.053 0.032 0.247 0.074 0.056 0.017 -0.056 1        
(11) 
INSIDEOWN -0.013 -0.074 -0.075 -0.061 -0.210 -0.144 0.050 0.066 0.032 -0.089 1       
(12) CEO_EQ -0.060 0.084 0.075 0.063 0.272 0.142 -0.003 0.005 -0.151 0.117 -0.151 1      
(13) ACIND 0.031 0.029 0.024 0.021 -0.073 -0.009 -0.001 0.010 0.046 -0.043 -0.030 0.027 1     
(14) ACEXPERT -0.009 -0.045 -0.061 -0.056 0.048 0.022 -0.004 0.030 0.026 -0.021 -0.022 -0.009 -0.004 1    
(15) AC_EQUITY 0.034 0.062 0.070 0.060 -0.051 -0.183 0.084 0.147 0.200 0.087 -0.078 0.103 0.063 0.046 1   
(16) AC_CASH -0.021 -0.078 -0.083 -0.082 -0.024 0.155 -0.101 -0.140 -0.148 -0.095 0.075 -0.128 -0.042 -0.062 -0.852 1  
(17) CASHTOEQ -0.029 -0.073 -0.082 -0.071 0.022 0.169 -0.078 -0.133 -0.165 -0.099 0.082 -0.137 -0.048 -0.062 -0.941 0.917 1 
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 TABLE 11:  Logistic Regression Results 
 
 Model:  MB =  β0 + β1* LN_TA + β2* LEV + β3* ROA +β4* MKTBOOK + β5* LITRISK + β6* BIG4 +  
   β7* INSIDEOWN + β8* CEO_EQ + β9* ACIND + β10* ACEXPERT + 
   β11* (audit committee compensation metric: AC_EQUITY or AC_CASH or CASHTOEQ) + 
    β12-20 * (INDUSTRY) + ε 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Predicted Sign Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept  -1.320 0.002 -1.055 0.064 -0.807 0.385 
LN_TA +/- 0.014 0.958 0.012 0.969 0.013 0.963 
LEV +/- 0.231 0.820 0.216 0.844 0.237 0.810 
ROA +/- 1.822 0.029 1.812 0.032 1.828 0.028 
MKTBOOK + 0.006 0.474 0.006 0.465 0.006 0.473 
LITRISK + 0.474 0.003 0.484 0.002 0.480 0.003 
BIG4 +/- -0.551 0.005 -0.539 0.007 -0.553 0.005 
INSIDEOWN +/- -0.835 0.087 -0.857 0.071 -0.834 0.087 
CEO_EQ + -0.758 0.008 -0.748 0.011 -0.772 0.007 
ACIND - 0.191 0.293 0.196 0.282 0.193 0.290 
ACEXPERT - -0.135 0.463 -0.132 0.465 -0.143 0.459 
AC_EQUITY + 0.323 0.258     
AC_CASH -   -0.231 0.380   
CASHTOEQ -     -0.337 0.242 
INDUSTRY  Yes  Yes  Yes  
        
Observations 
     MB = 0 
     MB = 1 
 
1,011 
        816 
       195 
 
1,011 
       816 
       195 
 
1,011 
       816 
       195 
 
Pseudo R2 / p-val  5% 0.193 4% 0.207 4% 0.191 
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TABLE 12:  Logistic Regression Results 
 
 Model:  BIGBEAT = β0 + β1* LN_TA + β2* LEV + β3* ROA +β4* MKTBOOK + β5* LITRISK + β6* BIG4 +  
    β7* INSIDEOWN + β8* CEO_EQ + β9* ACIND + β10* ACEXPERT + 
    β11* (audit committee compensation metric: AC_EQUITY or AC_CASH or CASHTOEQ) + 
     β12-20 * (INDUSTRY) + ε 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Predicted Sign Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept  -0.548 0.437 -0.080 0.988 0.122 0.977 
LN_TA +/- 0.062 0.101 0.056 0.185 0.060 0.121 
LEV +/- -0.838 0.000 -0.806 0.001 -0.818 0.000 
ROA +/- 1.867 0.001 1.854 0.001 1.878 0.001 
MKTBOOK + -0.013 0.334 -0.014 0.303 -0.013 0.319 
LITRISK + -0.141 0.362 -0.136 0.370 -0.137 0.369 
BIG4 +/- 0.544 0.002 0.541 0.002 0.536 0.003 
INSIDEOWN +/- -0.636 0.097 -0.640 0.092 -0.630 0.103 
CEO_EQ + 0.659 0.001 0.632 0.003 0.631 0.003 
ACIND - 0.176 0.206 0.178 0.200 0.178 0.201 
ACEXPERT - -0.590 0.007 -0.602 0.005 -0.603 0.005 
AC_EQUITY + 0.370 0.089     
AC_CASH -   -0.522 0.007   
CASHTOEQ -     -0.457 0.021 
INDUSTRY  Yes  Yes  Yes  
        
Observations 
     BIGBEAT = 0 
     BIGBEAT = 1 
 
1,011 
        522 
        489 
 
1,011 
        522 
        489 
 
1,011 
        522 
        489 
 
Pseudo R2 / p-val  5% 0.003 6% 0.002 6% 0.003 
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TABLE 13:  Logistic Regression Results 
 
 Model:  BIGBEAT_04 = β0 + β1* LN_TA + β2* LEV + β3* ROA +β4* MKTBOOK + β5* LITRISK + β6* BIG4 +  
    β7* INSIDEOWN + β8* CEO_EQ + β9* ACIND + β10* ACEXPERT + 
    β11* (audit committee compensation metric: AC_EQUITY or AC_CASH or CASHTOEQ) + 
     β12-20 * (INDUSTRY) + ε 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Predicted Sign Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept  -0.655 0.308 0.148 0.962 0.595 0.541 
LN_TA +/- 0.055 0.258 0.046 0.436 0.052 0.306 
LEV +/- -0.736 0.003 -0.708 0.006 -0.707 0.006 
ROA +/- 0.907 0.507 0.869 0.542 0.918 0.497 
MKTBOOK + -0.051 0.001 -0.052 0.000 -0.052 0.000 
LITRISK + -0.146 0.375 -0.133 0.396 -0.137 0.389 
BIG4 +/- 0.308 0.410 0.312 0.400 0.297 0.447 
INSIDEOWN +/- -0.815 0.037 -0.844 0.025 -0.816 0.036 
CEO_EQ + 0.485 0.066 0.457 0.091 0.440 0.109 
ACIND - 0.147 0.313 0.154 0.294 0.152 0.301 
ACEXPERT - -0.761 0.000 -0.775 0.000 -0.783 0.000 
AC_EQUITY + 0.715 0.000     
AC_CASH -   -0.855 0.000   
CASHTOEQ -     -0.850 0.000 
INDUSTRY  Yes  Yes  Yes  
        
Observations 
     BIGBEAT_04 = 0 
     BIGBEAT_04 = 1 
 
1,011 
        678 
        333 
 
1,011 
        678 
        333 
 
1,011 
        678 
        333 
 
Pseudo R2 / p-value  6% 0.003 6% 0.002 6% 0.002 
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TABLE 14:  Logistic Regression Results 
 
 Model:  BIGBEAT_05 = β0 + β1* LN_TA + β2* LEV + β3* ROA +β4* MKTBOOK + β5* LITRISK + β6* BIG4 +  
    β7* INSIDEOWN + β8* CEO_EQ + β9* ACIND + β10* ACEXPERT + 
    β11* (audit committee compensation metric: AC_EQUITY or AC_CASH or CASHTOEQ) + 
     β12-20 * (INDUSTRY) + ε 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Predicted Sign Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept  -0.763 0.183 0.097 0.984 0.492 0.689 
LN_TA +/- 0.051 0.358 0.041 0.563 0.048 0.410 
LEV +/- -0.418 0.366 -0.371 0.482 -0.386 0.444 
ROA +/- 1.331 0.192 1.299 0.213 1.346 0.182 
MKTBOOK + -0.051 0.000 -0.053 0.000 -0.052 0.000 
LITRISK + -0.110 0.436 -0.099 0.448 -0.100 0.446 
BIG4 +/- 0.079 0.957 0.077 0.959 0.066 0.971 
INSIDEOWN +/- -0.561 0.351 -0.584 0.314 -0.563 0.347 
CEO_EQ + 0.330 0.255 0.287 0.311 0.283 0.317 
ACIND - 0.142 0.336 0.147 0.326 0.146 0.327 
ACEXPERT - -0.730 0.000 -0.751 0.000 -0.752 0.000 
AC_EQUITY + 0.712 0.000     
AC_CASH -   -0.946 0.000   
CASHTOEQ -     -0.855 0.000 
INDUSTRY  Yes  Yes  Yes  
        
Observations 
     BIGBEAT_05 = 0 
     BIGBEAT_05 = 1 
 
1,011 
        721 
        290 
 
1,011 
        721 
        290 
 
1,011 
        721 
        290 
 
Pseudo R2 / p-value  5% 0.019 5% 0.010 5% 0.012 
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TABLE 15:  Sensitivity Analysis - Logistic Regression Results 
 
 Model:  BIGBEAT_03 = β0 + β1* LN_TA + β2* LEV + β3* ROA +β4* MKTBOOK + β5* LITRISK + β6* BIG4 +  
    β7* INSIDEOWN + β8* CEO_EQ + β9* ACIND + β10* ACEXPERT + 
    β11* (audit committee compensation metric: AC_EQUITY or AC_CASH or CASHTOEQ) + 
     β12-20 * (INDUSTRY) + ε 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Predicted Sign Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept  -0.505 0.529 0.115 0.976 0.447 0.715 
LN_TA +/- 0.026 0.793 0.019 0.885 0.024 0.820 
LEV +/- -0.636 0.017 -0.626 0.021 -0.626 0.021 
ROA +/- 1.991 0.001 1.960 0.001 1.996 0.001 
MKTBOOK + -0.043 0.000 -0.043 0.000 -0.043 0.000 
LITRISK + -0.111 0.420 -0.098 0.438 -0.101 0.435 
BIG4 +/- 0.508 0.019 0.515 0.015 0.504 0.020 
INSIDEOWN +/- -0.931 0.003 -0.959 0.001 -0.938 0.002 
CEO_EQ + 0.457 0.077 0.448 0.087 0.434 0.102 
ACIND - 0.177 0.220 0.185 0.199 0.183 0.205 
ACEXPERT - -0.687 0.000 -0.693 0.000 -0.699 0.000 
AC_EQUITY + 0.606 0.000     
AC_CASH -   -0.629 0.001   
CASHTOEQUITY -     -0.627 0.000 
INDUSTRY  Yes  Yes  Yes  
        
Observations 
     BIGBEAT_03 = 0 
     BIGBEAT_03 = 1 
 
1,011 
        616 
        395 
 
1,011 
        616 
        395 
 
1,011 
        616 
        279 
 
Pseudo R2 / p-value  6% 0.001 6% 0.001 6% 0.001 
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TABLE 16:  Sensitivity Analysis - Logistic Regression Results 
 
  Model:   BIGBEAT_06 = β0 + β1* LN_TA + β2* LEV + β3* ROA +β4* MKTBOOK + β5* LITRISK + β6* BIG4 +  
      β7* INSIDEOWN + β8* CEO_EQ + β9* ACIND + β10* ACEXPERT + 
      β11* (audit committee compensation metric: AC_EQUITY or AC_CASH or CASHTOEQ) + 
       β12-20 * (INDUSTRY) + ε 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Predicted Sign Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept  -1.132 0.008 -0.111 0.982 0.280 0.907 
LN_TA +/- 0.059 0.257 0.047 0.490 0.056 0.308 
LEV +/- -0.200 0.853 -0.127 0.941 -0.161 0.904 
ROA +/- 1.011 0.495 0.981 0.520 1.027 0.482 
MKTBOOK + -0.061 0.000 -0.064 0.000 -0.062 0.000 
LITRISK + -0.107 0.446 -0.096 0.456 -0.097 0.455 
BIG4 +/- 0.199 0.776 0.190 0.795 0.183 0.811 
INSIDEOWN +/- -0.297 0.809 -0.322 0.777 -0.301 0.803 
CEO_EQ + 0.293 0.319 0.228 0.389 0.238 0.379 
ACIND - 0.031 0.492 0.035 0.491 0.036 0.490 
ACEXPERT - -0.835 0.000 -0.866 0.000 -0.861 0.000 
AC_EQUITY + 0.792 0.000     
AC_CASH -   -1.158 0.000   
CASHTOEQUITY -     -0.965 0.000 
INDUSTRY  Yes  Yes  Yes  
        
Observations 
     BIGBEAT_06 = 0 
     BIGBEAT_06 = 1 
 
1,011 
        764 
        247 
 
1,011 
        764 
        247 
 
1,011 
        764 
        247 
 
Pseudo R2 / p-value  5% 0.035 5% 0.012 5% 0.022 
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TABLE 17: Sample Selection 
 
 
           Number of firm quarters 
  
Total number of firm-quarter observations in I/B/E/S    3,521  
  
Less: Foreign observations          (316)  
  
Less: Missing financial, proxy, or analyst data        (45)  
  
Less: Observations that switched to a non-12/31 fiscal year end      (2)  
  
Less: Outlier               (1)  
  
Sample Size         3,157  
 
 
  
   
 
   TABLE 18: Number of Quarters of Meet/Just Beat or Just Miss Analyst Forecasts 
 
 
    This table presents the frequency of meeting or just beating analyst forecasts, or just missing analyst 
      forecasts, during the 12 quarters ending December 31, 2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  MEET OR JUST BEAT 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Total 
J  
U  
S 
T 
        
MI  
S  
S 
0 727 492 282 162 95 54 23 15 20 4 4 2 1,880 
1 176 208 159 122 73 52 18 16 9 9 5 3 850 
2 34 64 54 36 37 25 22 11 2 6 - - 291 
3 12 18 10 17 14 16 5 8 1 1 - - 102 
4 3 1 3 7 4 1 3 - 1 - - - 23 
5 1 2 1 2 2 1 - - - - - - 9 
6 - - 1 - 1 - - - - - - - 2 
Total 953 785 510 346 226 149 71 50 33 20 9 5 3,157 
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TABLE 19:  Univariate Tests of Differences 
 
 
Repeated Meet/Just Beat 
Firms 
(n = 75) 
Repeated Just Miss  
Firms 
(n = 64) 
 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. 
p-value from 
tests of 
differences 
HORIZON 31.730 20.000 30.458 45.730 26.000 41.066 0.051 
FORSTD 0.020 0.011 0.028 0.083 0.030 0.250 0.000 
NUMANALY 7.910 6.000 4.902 6.940 5.000 5.188 0.146 
LEV 0.520 0.480 0.277 0.608 0.627 0.282 0.044 
LITRISK 0.390 0.000 0.490 0.190 0.000 0.393 0.015 
MKTBOOK 3.249 2.797 2.645 4.340 2.041 6.716 0.174 
LOGMKTVAL 3.181 2.968 0.745 2.889 2.723 0.767 0.015 
LOSS 0.070 0.000 0.251 0.220 0.000 0.417 0.013 
BIG4 0.850 1.000 0.356 0.830 1.000 0.380 0.816 
ACSIZE 1.901 1.732 0.200 1.923 1.732 0.234 0.756 
ACXPRT 1.268 1.000 0.375 1.284 1.000 0.408 0.784 
ACMEET 2.775 2.828 0.492 2.801 2.828 0.601 0.774 
ACTENURE 0.298 0.250 0.287 0.174 0.000 0.240 0.006 
ACBUSY 0.078 0.000 0.145 0.056 0.000 0.137 0.243 
 
This table presents univariate tests of difference between 75 firms that repeatedly meet or just 
beat analyst forecasts and 64 firms that repeatedly just missed meeting analyst forecasts. The 
sample sizes differ from those depicted in the top-right and bottom-left corners of Table 2 due to 
missing data for variables in the regression model. The variables are defined as follows:  
HORIZON = Forecast horizon, equal to the number of days between earnings announcement and 
the day the most recent earnings forecast was made; FORSTD = Forecast dispersion, calculated 
as the standard deviation of earnings forecasts during the 4th quarter of 2007; NUMANALY = 
Number of analysts making an earnings forecast; LEV = Leverage, equal to total liabilities 
divided by total assets; LITRISK = Indicator variable if firm’s SIC code is 2833–2836, 3570–
3577, 3600–3674, 5200–5961, or 7370–7370, 0 otherwise;  MTOB = Market to book ratio, 
calculated as stock price at fiscal year-end divided by book value per share; LOGMKTVAL = 
Logged market value of equity; LOSS = Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm had a net loss for 
fiscal year 2007, 0 otherwise; BIG4 = 1 if auditor is a Big 4 firm, 0 otherwise; ACSIZE = Square 
root of the number of audit committee members during 2007; ACXPRT = Square root of the 
number of audit committee financial experts during 2007; ACMEET = Square root of the number 
of audit committee meetings during 2007; ACTENURE = Ratio of audit committee members 
having consecutive tenure on the committee greater than 7 years; ACBUSY = Ratio of members 
on the committee who hold more than three other outside directorships. 
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TABLE 20: Regression Results 
 
Model:  MB    =  β0 + β1*HORIZON + β2*FORSTD + β3*NUMANALY +  
    β4*LEV + β5*LITRISK + β6*MTOB + β7*LOGMKTVAL +  
    β8*LOSS + β9*BIG4 + β10*ACSIZE + β11*ACXPRT +  
    β12*ACMEET + β13*ACTENURE + β14*ACBUSY + ε 
 
 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient p-value 
Intercept  5.618 0.030 
HORIZON - -0.016 0.027 
FORSTD - -25.108 0.002 
NUMANALY + 0.000 0.498 
LEV + 0.522 0.288 
LITRISK + 2.539 0.001 
MKTBOOK - -0.212 0.002 
LOGMKTVAL + 1.451 0.005 
LOSS - -1.198 0.070 
BIG4 - -0.947 0.085 
ACSIZE - -2.083 0.047 
ACXPRT - -0.973 0.093 
ACMEET - -1.210 0.009 
ACTENURE ? 2.476 0.009 
ACBUSY ? 4.108 0.018 
 
Model Chi-square = 65.511, p < .001; Nagelkerke R2 = .502. 
 
Note: This table presents the results from a logistic regression with MBMISS as the dependent 
variable. MB = 1 if firm repeatedly met or just beat analysts’ forecast by one cent per share or 
less (i.e., $0.00 ≤ forecast error ≤  $0.01), and 0 otherwise. The sample includes 75 firms that 
repeatedly meet-or-just-beat analyst forecasts and 64 firms that repeatedly just missed meeting 
analyst forecasts. Other variables are defined as in Table 3.4.  
 
 113 
REFERENCES 
Abbott, L. J., Y. Park, and S. Parker. 2000. The effects of audit committee activity and 
 independence on corporate fraud. Managerial Finance 26 (11): 55 - 67. 
 
______, S. Parker, G. F. Peters, and K. Raghunandan. 2003. The association 
 between audit committee characteristics and audit fees. Auditing: A Journal of 
 Theory & Practice 22 (2): 17-32. 
 
______, ______, and G. F. Peters. 2004. Audit committee characteristics and 
 restatements. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 23 (1): 69-87. 
 
______, ______, and ______. 2006. Earnings management, litigation risk, and 
asymmetric audit fee responses. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 25 (1): 
85-98. 
 
Agrawal, A., and S. Chadha. 2005. Corporate governance and accounting scandals. 
Journal of Law and Economics 48 (2): 371–406. 
 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). 2007. Audit Risk and 
Materiality in Conducting an Audit. AU Section 312. New York, NY: AICPA.  
 
Archambeault, D. S., F. T. DeZoort, D. R. Hermanson. 2008. Audit committee incentive 
compensation and accounting restatements. Contemporary Accounting Research 25 
(4): 965-92.  
 
Atiase, R. 1985. Predisclosure information, firm capitalization and security price 
behavior around earnings announcements. Journal of Accounting Research 23 (1): 
21-36. 
 
Ball, R. 2009. Market and political/regulatory perspectives on the recent accounting 
scandals. Journal of Accounting Research 47 (2): 277-323. 
 
Barber, B., Odean, T., 2008. All that glitters: the effect of attention and news on the 
buying behavior of individual and institutional investors. Review of Financial 
Studies 21: 785–818.  
 
Barrier, M. 2002. The compensation balance. Internal Auditor 59 (3): 42–7.  
 
Barth, M., J. Elliott, and M. Finn. 1999. Market rewards associated with patterns of 
increasing earnings. Journal of Accounting Research 37 (2): 387-414. 
 
Bartov, E., D. Givoly, and C. Hayn. 2002. The rewards to meeting or beating earnings 
expectations. Journal of Accounting & Economics 33 (2): 173-204. 
  
 114 
______, and D. Cohen. 2008. Mechanisms to meet/beat analyst earnings expectations in 
the pre- and post-Sarbanes-Oxley eras. Working Paper, New York University. 
 
Barua, A., J. Legoria, and J. Moffitt. 2006. Accruals management to achieve earnings 
benchmarks: A comparison of pre-managed profit and loss firms. Journal of 
Business Finance & Accounting 33 (5) & (6): 653-70. 
 
______, D. Rama, and V. Sharma. 2010. Audit committee characteristics and investment 
in internal auditing. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 29: 501-13. 
 
Bauman, M., and K. Shaw. 2006. Stock option compensation and the likelihood of 
meeting analysts’ quarterly earnings targets. Review of Quantitative Finance and 
Accounting 26: 301-19. 
 
Beasley, M. S., 1996. An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director 
composition and financial statement fraud. The Accounting Review 71: 443–65.  
 
______, J. V. Carcello, D. R. Hermanson, and P. D. Lapides. 2000. Fraudulent financial 
reporting: Consideration of industry traits and corporate governance mechanisms. 
Accounting Horizons 14 (4): 441-54. 
 
______, J. V. Carcello, D. R. Hermanson, and T. L. Neal. 2009. The audit committee 
oversight process. Contemporary Accounting Research 26 (1): 65-122. 
 
Bedard, J. C., S. M. Chtourou, and L. Courteau. 2004. The effect of audit committee 
expertise, independence, and activity on aggressive earnings management. 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 23 (2): 13-35.  
 
______, and K. M. Johnstone. 2004. Earnings manipulation risk, corporate governance 
risk, and auditors’ planning and pricing decisions. The Accounting Review 79 (2): 
277-304. 
 
Bell, T. B., W. R. Landsman, and D. A. Shackelford. 2001. Auditors’ perceived business 
risk and audit fees: Analysis and evidence. Journal of Accounting Research 15 (1): 
4-24.  
 
Bergstresser, D., and T. Philippon. 2006. CEO incentives and earnings management. 
Journal of Financial Economics 80: 511-29. 
  
Boeker, W., and J. Goodstein. 1993. Performance and successor choice: The moderating 
effects of governance and ownership. Academy of Management Journal 36 (1): 
172-86. 
 
Bonazzi, L., and S. M. N. Islam. 2007. Agency theory and corporate governance. Journal 
of Modelling in Management 2 (1): 7-23. 
 115 
Boumosleh, A. 2009. Director compensation and the reliability of accounting 
information. The Financial Review 44: 525-39. 
 
Brick, I. E., O. Palmon, and J. K. Wald. 2006. CEO compensation, director 
compensation, and firm performance: Evidence of cronyism. Journal of Corporate 
Finance 12: 403-23.  
 
Brown, L. 1991. Forecast selection when all forecasts are not equally recent. 
International Journal of Forecasting 7 (3): 349-56. 
 
________. 1997. Analyst forecasting errors. Additional evidence. Financial Analysts’ 
Journal 53 (6): 81-8. 
 
Brown, S., S. A. Hillegeist, and K. Lo. 2009. The effect of earnings surprises on 
information asymmetry. Journal of Accounting & Economics 47 (3): 208-25. 
 
Bryan-Low, C. 2002. Meeting expectations used to draw favor, now it invites scrutiny. 
The Wall Street Journal Aug 5, C1. 
 
Burgstahler, D., and I. Dichev. 1997. Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases 
and losses. Journal of Accounting & Economics 24: 99-126. 
 
______, and M. Eames. 2006. Management of earnings and analysts’ forecasts to achieve 
zero and small earnings surprises. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 33 (5) 
& (6): 633-52. 
 
Carcello, J. V., and Z. Palmrose. 1994. Auditor litigation and modified reporting on 
bankrupt clients. Journal of Accounting Research 32: 1-30. 
 
______, and T. L. Neal. 2000. Audit committee composition and auditor reporting. The 
Accounting Review 75 (4): 453-67. 
 
______, and ______.  2003. Audit committee characteristics and auditor dismissals 
following “new” going-concern reports. The Accounting Review 78 (1): 95-117. 
 
______, C. Hollingsworth, A. Klein and T. Neal. 2008. Audit committee financial 
expertise, competing corporate governance mechanisms, and earnings management. 
Working Paper, University of Tennessee. 
 
______, D. Hermanson, and Z. Ye. 2011. Corporate governance research in accounting 
and auditing: Insights to date and directions for future research. Working Paper: 
University of Tennessee: Knoxville, TN. 
 
Chaney, P., D. C. Jeter, and L. Shivakumar. 2004. Self-selection of auditors and audit 
pricing in private firms. The Accounting Review 79 (1): 51–72.  
 116 
Charles, S. L., S. M. Glover, and N. Y. Sharp. 2010. The association between financial 
reporting risk and audit fees before and after the historic events surrounding SOX. 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 29 (1): 15-39. 
 
Cheng, Q., and T. Warfield. 2005. Equity incentives and earnings management. The 
Accounting Review 80 (2): 441-76. 
 
Chevis, G., S. Das, and K. Sivaramakrishnan. 2007. Does it pay to consistently meet 
analysts’ earnings expectations? Working paper, Baylor University.   
 
Choi, J., and T. J. Wong. 2007. Auditors’ governance functions and legal environments: 
An international investigation. Contemporary Accounting Research 24 (1): 13–46.  
 
______, J. Kim, and Y. Zang. 2010. Do abnormally high audit fees impair audit quality? 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 29 (2): 115-40.  
 
Clarkson, P. M., and D. A. Simunic. 1994. The association between audit quality, 
retained ownership, and firm-specific risk in U.S vs. Canadian IPO markets. 
Journal of Accounting & Economics 17: 207-28.  
 
Council of Institutional Investors (CII). 1998. Core policies, positions and explanatory 
notes. Washington, DC. 
 
Craswell, A. T., J. R. Francis, and S. L. Taylor. 1995. Auditor brand name reputations 
and industry specializations. Journal of Accounting and Economics 20 (3): 297-
322. 
 
Crichfield, T., T. Dyckman, and J. Lakonishok. 1978. An evaluation of security analysts’ 
forecasts. The Accounting Review 53 (3): 651-68. 
 
Cullinan, C. P., H. Du, and G. B. Wright. 2008. Is there an association between director  
 option compensation and the likelihood of misstatement? Advances in Accounting  
 24 (1): 16–23. 
 
______, ______, and W. Jiang. 2010. Is compensating audit committee members with 
stock options associated with the likelihood of internal control weakness? 
International Journal of Auditing 14: 256-73. 
 
Daily, C. M., and D. R. Dalton. 2002. The problem with equity compensation. Journal of 
Business Strategy Jul/Aug: 28-30. 
 
Davidson, R. A., and D. Neu. 1993. A note on the association between audit firm size and 
audit quality. Contemporary Accounting Research 9 (Spring): 479-88. 
 
 
 117 
Davis, L. R., B. S. Soo., and G. M. Trompeter. 2009. Auditor tenure and the ability to 
meet or beat earnings forecasts. Contemporary Accounting Research 26 (2): 517-
48. 
 
DeAngelo, L. 1981a. Auditor independence, “low balling”, and disclosure regulation. 
Journal of Accounting & Economics (August) 113-27. 
 
______. 1981b. Auditor size and auditor quality. Journal of Accounting & Economics 
(December): 183-99.  
 
DeAngelo, H., L. DeAngelo, and D. Skinner. 1994. Accounting choice in troubled 
companies. Journal of Accounting & Economics 17: 113–43.  
 
Dechow, P., R. Sloan, and A. Sweeney. 1996. Causes and consequences of earnings 
manipulation: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC. 
Contemporary Accounting Research 13: 1–36.  
 
______, W. Ge, and C. Schrand. 2010. Understanding earnings quality: A review of the 
proxies, their determinants and their consequences. Journal of Accounting & 
Economics 50: 344-401. 
 
DeFond, M.L. and J. Jiambalvo, 1994. Debt covenants violation and manipulation of 
accruals, Journal of Accounting and Economics 17, 145–176.  
 
______, J. R. Francis, and T. J. Wong. 2000. Auditor industry specialization and market 
segmentation: Evidence from Hong Kong. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and 
Theory 19 (1): 49-66. 
 
______, K. Raghunandan, and K. Subramanyam. 2002. Do nonaudit services fees impair 
auditor independence? Evidence from going concern audit opinions. Journal of 
Accounting Research 40 (4): 1247-74.  
 
______, and J. R. Francis. 2005. Audit research after Sarbanes-Oxley. Auditing: A 
Journal of Practice & Theory (Supplement): 5-30. 
 
Degeorge, F., J. Patel, and R. Zeckhauser. 1999. Earnings management to exceed 
thresholds. Journal of Business 72 (1): 1-33.  
 
Deloitte. 2010. Audit Committee Brief (June). Deloitte Development LLC.  
 
DeZoort, F. T., D. R. Hermanson, D. S. Archambeault, and S. A. Reed. 2002. Audit 
committee effectiveness: A synthesis of the empirical audit committee literature. 
Journal of Accounting Literature 21: 38-75. 
 
 118 
_______, D. R. Hermanson, and R. W. Houston. 2003. Audit committee support for 
auditors: The effects of materiality justification and accounting precision. Journal 
of Accounting and Public Policy 22 (3): 175-99. 
 
Dhaliwal, D., V. Naiker, and F. Navissi. 2010. The association between accruals quality 
and the characteristics of accounting experts and mix of expertise on audit 
committees. Contemporary Accounting Research 27 (3): 787-827. 
 
Diamond, D. W., and R. E. Verrecchia. 1991. Disclosure, liquidity, and the cost of 
capital. Journal of Finance 46 (4): 1325-59.  
 
Dopuch, N., and D. Simunic. 1982. Competition in auditing: An assessment. Fourth 
Symposium on Auditing Research, University of Illinois.  
 
Du, H., C. P. Cullinan, and G. B. Wright. 2007. Is there a relationship between 
management and revenue misstatements? Journal of Forensic Accounting 8 (1) & 
(2): 119-40. 
 
Efendi, J., A. Srivastava, and E. Swanson. 2007. Why do corporate managers misstate 
financial statements? The role of option compensation and other incentives. Journal 
of Financial Economics 85 (3): 667-708.  
 
Elson, C. M. 1995. The duty of care, compensation, and stock ownership. University of 
Cincinnati Law Review 63 (2): 649-711.  
 
Ettredge, M., and R. Greenberg. 1990. Determinants of fee cutting on initial audit 
engagements. Journal of Accounting Research 28 (1): 198-210.  
 
Fama, E. F. 1980. Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political 
Economy 88: 288 - 303. 
 
________ , and M. C. Jensen. 1983. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law 
and Economics 26 (2): 301-25. 
 
Farber, D. 2005. Restoring trust after fraud: Does corporate governance matter? The 
Accounting Review 80 (2): 539-61. 
 
Feldmann, D. A., W. J. Read, and M. J. Abdolmohammadi. 2009. Financial restatements, 
audit fees, and the moderating effect of CFO turnover. Auditing: A Journal of 
Practice & Theory 28 (1): 205-23. 
 
Fich, E. M., and A. Shivdasani. 2005. The impact of stock-option compensation for 
outside directors on firm value. The Journal of Business 78 (6): 2229-54. 
 
 
 119 
______, and ______. 2007. Financial fraud, director reputation, and shareholder wealth. 
Journal of Financial Economics 86: 306-36. 
 
Flanigan, J. 2002. Andersen’s pain will strengthen system. Los Angeles Times (Los 
Angeles, CA) Mar 24, 1.  
 
Francis, J. R. 1984. The effect of audit firm size on audit prices: A study of the Australian 
market. Journal of Accounting & Economics 6 (February): 133-51. 
 
––––––, and D. Simon. 1987. A test of audit pricing in the small-client segment of the US 
audit market. The Accounting Review 62 (1): 145-57. 
 
Frankel, R., M. McNichols, and G. P. Wilson. 1995. Discretionary disclosure and 
external financing. The Accounting Review 70 (1): 135-50.  
 
______, M. Johnson, and K. Nelson. 2002. The relation between auditors’ fees for 
nonaudit services and earnings management. The Accounting Review 77: 71-105. 
 
Frieder, L., and A. Subrahmanyam. 2005. Brand perceptions and the market for common 
stock. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 40: 57–85.  
 
Geiger, M. A., and D. V. Rama. 2003. Audit fees, nonaudit fees, and auditor reporting on 
stressed companies. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 22 (2): 53-69. 
 
Goldfarb, Z. A. 2010. Diebold settles fraud charges for $25 million. The Washington Post 
Jun 3 suburban edition, A13. 
 
Graham, J., C. Harvey, and S. Rajgopal. 2005. The economic implications of corporate 
financial reporting. Journal of Accounting and Economics 40 (1): 3-73. 
 
Grullon, G., G. Kanatas, and J. Weston. 2004. Advertising, breadth of ownership, and 
liquidity. Review of Financial Studies 17: 439–61.  
 
Healy, P. M. 1985. The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions. Journal of 
Accounting & Economics 7: 85-107. 
 
Heidrick and Struggles. 2007. 10th annual corporate board effectiveness study 2006-
2007. Chicago, IL. 
 
Hillman, A. J., and T. Dalziel. 2003. Boards of directors and firm performance: 
Integrating agency and resource dependence perspectives. Academy of Management 
Journal 28 (3): 383-96.  
 
Hosmer, D. W., and S. Lemeshow. 2000. Applied logistic regression, 2nd ed. New York: 
John Wiley & Sons.  
 120 
 
Huang, H., K. Raghunandan, and D. Rama. 2009. Audit fees for initial audit engagements 
before and after SOX. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 28 (1): 171-90. 
 
Johnson, S. A., H. E. Ryan, and Y. S. Tian. 2007. Managerial incentives and corporate 
fraud: The sources of incentives matter. Working paper, Texas A&M University.  
 
Johnstone, K. M., and J. C. Bedard. 2003. Risk management in client acceptance 
decisions. The Accounting Review 78 (4): 1003-25. 
 
Kasznik, R., and M. F. McNichols. 2002. Does meeting earnings expectations matter? 
Evidence from analyst forecast revisions and share prices. Journal of Accounting 
Research 40 (3): 727-59. 
 
Klein, A. 2002. Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings 
management. Journal of Accounting & Economics 33: 375-400. 
 
Klein, B., and K. B. Leffler. 1981. The role of market forces in assuring contractual 
performance. Journal of Political Economy 89 (August): 615-41. 
 
Koh, K., D. Matsumoto, and S. Rajgopal. 2008. Meeting or beating analyst expectations 
in the post-scandals world: Changes in stock market rewards and managerial 
actions. Contemporary Accounting Research 25 (4): 1067-98. 
 
Krishnan, G., and G. Visvanathan. 2008. Does the SOX definition of an accounting 
expert matter? The association between audit committee directors’ accounting 
expertise and accounting conservatism. Contemporary Accounting Research 25 (3): 
827-58. 
 
Krishnan, J. 2005. Audit committee quality and internal control: An empirical analysis. 
The Accounting Review 80 (April): 649-75. 
 
________,  K. Raghunandan, and J. Yang. 2007. Were former Andersen clients treated 
more leniently than other clients? Evidence from going-concern modified audit 
opinions. Accounting Horizons (December): 423-35. 
 
Lang, M., and R. Lundholm. 1993. Cross-sectional determinants of analyst ratings of 
corporate disclosures. Journal of Accounting Research 31 (2): 246-71. 
 
______, and ______. 2000. Voluntary disclosure and equity offerings: Reducing 
information asymmetry or hyping the stock? Contemporary Accounting Research 
17 (4): 623-62. 
 
 
 
 121 
Lapides, P. D., M. S. Beasley, J. V. Carcello, F. T. DeZoort, D. R. Hermanson, T.L. Neal, 
and J.G. Tompkins. 2007. 21st century governance and audit committee principles. 
Corporate Governance Center, Kennesaw State University. 
 
Larcker, D. F., and S. A. Richardson. 2004. Fees paid to audit firms, accrual choices, and 
corporate governance. Journal of Accounting Research, 42 (3): 625-58. 
Leone, M. 2010. Ex-Diebold CFOs charged with fraud. CFO.com Jun 2. Downloaded Jun 
10 2011, available at http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/14502539?f=search. 
 
Lev, B. 1992. Information disclosure strategy. California Management Review 34 
(Summer): 9-33.  
 
Lys, T., and L. Soo. 1995. Analysts’ forecast precision as a response to competition. 
Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance 10 (4): 751-65.  
 
Magilke, M. J., B. W. Mayhew, and J. E. Pike. 2009. Are independent audit committee 
members objective? Experimental evidence. The Accounting Review 84 (6): 1959-
81.  
 
Marquardt, C. A., and C. I. Wiedman. 1998. Voluntary disclosure, information 
asymmetry, and insider selling through secondary equity offerings. Contemporary 
Accounting Research 15 (4): 505-37. 
 
McNamee, M., N. Byrnes, and L. Lavelle. 2002. Turn up the heat on board cronyism, Mr. 
Grasso. BusinessWeek Apr 22, Iss. 3779: 36. 
 
Menon, K., and D. D. Williams. 2001. Long-term trends in audit fees. Auditing: A 
Journal of Practice & Theory 20 (1): 115-36. 
 
Messier, W., Jr., S. Glover, and D. Prawitt. 2008. Auditing and Assurance Services: A 
Systematic Approach. 6th edition. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Irwin.  
 
Miller, M. H., and F. Modigliani. 1966. Some estimates of the cost of capital to the 
electric utility industry, 1954-57. American Economic Review (April 1974): 259-70.  
 
Monks, R., and N. Minow. 2001. Corporate governance, 2nd ed. Oxford, UK: Blackwell  
 Publishing.  
 
Munsif, V., K. Raghunandan, D. V. Rama, and M. Singhvi. 2011. Audit fees after 
remediation of internal control weaknesses. Accounting Horizons 25 (1): 87-105. 
 
Myers, S., and N. Majluf. 1984. Corporate financing and investment decisions when 
firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics 
13 (2): 187-221. 
 122 
Naiker, V., and D. S. Sharma. 2009. Former audit partners on the audit committee and 
internal control deficiencies. The Accounting Review 84 (2): 559-87. 
 
National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD). 1996. Report of the NACD Blue 
Ribbon Commission on director professionalism. NACD: Washington DC. 
 
______. 2001. Director compensation: Purpose, principles, and best practices. 
Washington, D.C.: The National Association of Corporate Directors.  
 
______. 2003. Director compensation survey 2002-2003. Washington, D.C.: The 
National Association of Corporate Directors.  
 
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (NCFFR) (the Treadway 
Commission). 1987. Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.  
 
New York Stock Exchange / National Association of Securities, Blue Ribbon Committee 
(BRC) on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees. 1999. 
Report and recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on improving the 
effectiveness of corporate audit committees. New York, NY: New York Stock 
Exchange / National Association of Securities Dealers.  
 
O’Brien, P. 1988. Analysts’ forecasts as earnings expectations. Journal of Accounting & 
Economics 10 (1): 53-83. 
 
Palmrose, Z. 1986. Audit fees and auditor size. Journal of Accounting Research 24 (1): 
97-110. 
 
______. 1988. Analysis of auditor litigation and audit service quality. The Accounting 
Review 63 (January): 55-73. 
 
Persellin, J. 2009. The impact of form of compensation and likelihood of PCAOB 
inspection on audit committee member resolution of management/auditor disputes. 
Working paper, Texas State University. Paper presented at 2009 Auditing Section 
Midyear Conference. 
 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. 2000. Audit committee effectiveness: What works best. 2nd 
edition. Altamonte Springs, FL: The Institute of Internal Auditors Research 
Foundation. 
 
Raghunandan, K., and D. Rama. 2006. SOX Section 404 material weakness disclosures 
and audit fees. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 25 (1): 99–114.  
 
______, and ______. 2007. Determinants of audit committee diligence. Accounting 
Horizons 21 (3): 265-79. 
 123 
 
Ross, S. 1977. The determination of financial structure: The incentive-signaling 
approach. Bell Journal of Economics 8 (1): 23-40. 
 
Ruland, W., S. Tung, and N. E. George. 1990. Factors associated with the disclosure of 
managers’ forecasts. The Accounting Review 65 (3): 710:21. 
 
Sanders, W. G., and D. C. Hambrick. 2007. Swinging for the fences: The effects of CEO 
stock options on company risk taking and performances. Academy of Management 
Journal 50: 1055-78. 
 
Sankaraguruswamy, S., and S. Whisenant. 2005. Pricing initial audit engagements: 
Empirical evidence following public disclosure of audit fees. Working paper, 
University of Houston.  
 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). 2002. Public Law No: 107-204. Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office. 
 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 1999a. Letter from Lynn E. Turner, Chief 
Accountant: Call for academic research on key accounting issues. Available at: 
http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/aaacall.htm.  
 
____. 1999b. NYSE rulemaking. Release No. 34-42233; File No. SR-NYSE-99-39. 
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. 
 
_____. 1999c. NASD rulemaking. Release No. 34-42231; File No. SR-NASD-99-48. 
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. 
 
_____. 1999d. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99: Materiality. Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office. 
 
_____. 2003. NASD and NYSE rulemaking: Relating to corporate governance. Release 
No. 34-48745. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. 
 
_____. 2007. Division of Corporate Finance: Staff observations in the review of 
executive compensation disclosure. Available at: 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/execcompdisclosure.htm.  
 
_____. 2009. SEC charges General Electric with accounting fraud. 2009-178. Available 
at: http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-178.htm. 
 
Sharma D. S., and V. D. Sharma. 2011. Audit committee independence: Regulatory 
developments, the empirical literature and directions for future Research. Handbook 
on Emerging Issues in Corporate Governance, World Scientific Publishing Co. Inc.  
 
 124 
Sharma, V. D., and E. Iselin. 2006. Reputation, tenure and compensation of independent 
audit committee members and financial restatements. Paper presented at 2006 
American Accounting Association Annual Meeting, August 6–9, Washington, DC. 
 
_______,  V. Naiker, and B. Lee. 2009. Determinants of audit committee meeting 
frequency: Evidence from a voluntary governance system. Accounting Horizons 23 
(3): 245-63.  
 
Simon, D., and J. Francis. 1988. The effects of auditor change on audit fees: Tests of 
price cutting and price recovery. The Accounting Review 63 (April): 255-69. 
 
Simunic, D. A. 1980. The pricing of audit services: Theory and evidence. Journal of 
Accounting Research 18 (1): 161-90. 
______, and M. Stein. 1996. Impact of litigation risk on audit pricing: A review of the 
economics and the evidence. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 15: 119-
34.  
Sinha, P., L. Brown, and S. Das. 1997. A re-examination of financial analysts’ 
differential earnings forecast accuracy. Contemporary Accounting Research 14 (1): 
1- 42. 
 
Sloan, R. G. 2001. Financial accounting and corporate governance: a discussion. Journal 
of Accounting and Economics 32: 335-47. 
 
Taub, S. 2008. Xerox, KPMG settle investor suit. CFO.com Mar 27. Downloaded on Jun 
10 2011, available at http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/10942620?f=search. 
 
U.S. Senate. 2002a. Oversight hearing on Accounting and investor protection issues 
raised by Enron and other public companies. Committee on Banking, Housing and 
Urban Affairs. Washington, DC: GPO. 
 
____ 2002b. The role of the board of directors in Enron's collapse. Hearing before the 
Permanent Subcommittee of Investigations of the Committee on Governmental 
Affairs.  S. Hrg. 107–511. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. 
 
Vafeas, N. 2003. Length of board tenure and outside director independence. Journal of 
Business Finance and Accounting 30 (7/8): 1043-64.  
 
Venkataraman, R., J. P. Weber, and M. Willenborg. 2008. Litigation risk, audit quality, 
and audit fees: Evidence from initial public offerings. The Accounting Review 83 
(5): 1315-45. 
 
Walsh, M. W., and J. Healy. 2009. Ex-chief of A.I.G. settles fraud case for $15 million. 
The New York Times Aug 7 late edition, B1.  
 125 
 
Watkins, A. L., W. Hillison, and S. E. Morecroft. 2004. Audit quality: A synthesis of 
theory and empirical evidence. Journal of Accounting Literature 23: 153-93. 
 
Whisenant, S., S. Sankaraguruswamy, and K. Raghunandan. 2003. Evidence on the joint 
determination of audit and non-audit fees. Journal of Accounting Research 41 (4): 
721-44. 
 
Wiseman, R. M., and L. R. Gomez-Mejia. 1998. A behavioral agency model of 
managerial risk taking. Academy of Management Review 23: 133-53. 
 
Yang, J., and J. Krishnan. 2005. Audit committees and quarterly earnings management. 
International Journal of Auditing 9 (3): 201-19. 
 
Yermack, D., 2004. Remuneration, retention, and reputation incentives for outside 
directors. The Journal of Finance 59: 2281–2308.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 126 
VITA 
MARIA FILOFTEIA RICKLING 
 
    Born, Cincinnati, Ohio 
    B.B.A., Accounting and Management Information Systems 
    University of Cincinnati 
    Cincinnati, Ohio 
 
 2007   M.Acc, Accounting 
    Florida International University 
    Miami, Florida 
 
 2011   Doctoral Candidate in Accounting 
    Florida International University 
    Miami, Florida 
 
